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MO Japan Affirmative - National Deate Coaches Association

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MO Japan Affirmative - National Deate Coaches AssociationMo,Deate

MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

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    PLAN TEXT ..................................................................................................................................................... 4 1AC (1/17) ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 ** Uniqueness ** ............................................................................................................................................ 24 Presence Unpopular ......................................................................................................................................... 25 Presence Unpopular ......................................................................................................................................... 27 AT: Pullout Now ............................................................................................................................................. 28 AT: Pullout Now ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Okinawans Blame Japan .................................................................................................................................. 30 Okinawa kills relations .................................................................................................................................... 31 Relations Strained Now ................................................................................................................................... 32 Japan wants US out.......................................................................................................................................... 33 Relations Brink ................................................................................................................................................ 34 ** Alliance Advantage ** ................................................................................................................................ 35 Japan Wants US out ......................................................................................................................................... 36 Japan Hates bases ............................................................................................................................................ 37 Bases Kill US-Japan treaty .............................................................................................................................. 38 Base Kills Alliance .......................................................................................................................................... 39 Bases Kill Alliance .......................................................................................................................................... 40 Alliance Good Japan Rearm .......................................................................................................................... 41 Removal furthers alliance ................................................................................................................................ 42 Re-Arm Scenario East Asia War ................................................................................................................... 43 Re-Arm Scenario North Korean Prolif .......................................................................................................... 44 Re-Arm Scenario North Korean Prolif .......................................................................................................... 45 Ext. Japan Can Arm Now ............................................................................................................................. 46 Alliance Good - Heg (Troops) ......................................................................................................................... 47 Alliance Good - Heg (Relations) ..................................................................................................................... 48 Alliance Good Asian War ............................................................................................................................. 49 Alliance Good Asian War ............................................................................................................................. 50 Alliance Good Asian War ............................................................................................................................. 51 Alliance Good Middle East ........................................................................................................................... 52 Alliance Good Prolif ..................................................................................................................................... 53 Alliance Good Prolif ..................................................................................................................................... 54 Alliance Good Spartlys ................................................................................................................................. 55 Alliance Good Arabs .................................................................................................................................... 56 Alliance Good Taiwan .................................................................................................................................. 57 Alliance Good Taiwan .................................................................................................................................. 58 Alliance Good North Korea .......................................................................................................................... 59 Alliance Good Sino-Russia ........................................................................................................................... 60 Alliance Good Sino-Russia ........................................................................................................................... 61 Alliance Good China .................................................................................................................................... 63 Relations on the Brink Now ............................................................................................................................. 64 Relations on the Brink Now ............................................................................................................................. 65 Relations on the Brink Now ............................................................................................................................. 66 Alliance Brinks ................................................................................................................................................ 67 Alliance Brink ................................................................................................................................................. 69 Last printed 2/25/2014 11:47:00 PM 1

MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

    1 Japan Alliance Pwns ........................................................................................................................................ 73 Asia Loves the Alliance ................................................................................................................................... 74 Japan loves Alliance ........................................................................................................................................ 75 AT: China Threat key to Alliance .................................................................................................................... 76 ** Environmental Advantage ** ...................................................................................................................... 77 Greatest Stuff Ever - DUGONG ADVANTAGE!!!.......................................................................................... 78 Greatest Stuff Ever - DUGONG ADVANTAGE!!!.......................................................................................... 79 Greatest Stuff Ever - DUGONG ADVANTAGE!!!.......................................................................................... 80 Bases Bad Environment ................................................................................................................................ 81 Bases Bad - Coral Reef .................................................................................................................................... 82 Coral Reefs Good- Biodiversity ....................................................................................................................... 83 Coral Reef Extinction = Disease ...................................................................................................................... 84 2AC Add-on Environment (1/2)....................................................................................................................... 85 ** Marines Advantage ** ................................................................................................................................ 87 Marines Uniqueness ........................................................................................................................................ 88 Marines on Okinawa ........................................................................................................................................ 89 Marines Are Awesomesauce ............................................................................................................................ 90 Marines beatdown Terrorists............................................................................................................................ 91 Marines Kill Terrorists..................................................................................................................................... 92 AT: Marines bad .............................................................................................................................................. 93 AT: Army Solves ............................................................................................................................................. 94 ** Politics Advantage ** ................................................................................................................................. 95 Okinawa Link .................................................................................................................................................. 96 Politics Scenario Econ 1/2 ............................................................................................................................ 97 Politics Scenario Econ 2/2 ............................................................................................................................ 99 2AC Warming Add-on................................................................................................................................... 100 1AR Climate Change Japan can lead ........................................................................................................... 101 1AR Climate Change Helps Econ ............................................................................................................... 102 Uniqueness - Kan Pushing Reform ................................................................................................................ 103 Impact Timeframe 3 Years/Japan on the Brink............................................................................................ 104 ** Solvency ** .............................................................................................................................................. 105 Withdrawal Solves 1/3 ................................................................................................................................... 106 Withdrawal Solves 2/3 ................................................................................................................................... 107 Withdrawal Solves 3/3 ................................................................................................................................... 108 Removal Key- Alliance ................................................................................................................................. 110 Removal Key- Stops Backlash ....................................................................................................................... 111 Relations Solvency ........................................................................................................................................ 112 Relations Solvency ........................................................................................................................................ 113 Relations Solvency ........................................................................................................................................ 115 Random East Asian Stability Card ................................................................................................................. 116 Presence Bad ................................................................................................................................................. 117 Troop presence bad ........................................................................................................................................ 118 AT: Rearm DA .............................................................................................................................................. 119 AT: Rearm DA .............................................................................................................................................. 120 Withdrawal Popular ....................................................................................................................................... 121 ** Varun Cuts lots of Random Cards ** ........................................................................................................ 122 Last printed 2/25/2014 11:47:00 PM 2

MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

    1 Presence key to Japanese Economy................................................................................................................ 123 Okinawa = Military Presence ......................................................................................................................... 124 T Link In = Throughout .............................................................................................................................. 125 American Action Key .................................................................................................................................... 126 Women = Raped/SOFAs Bad ........................................................................................................................ 127 AT: T Substantial........................................................................................................................................ 128 American Influence in Japanese = Real World ............................................................................................... 129 Consultation Now/Key to Solve the Aff/SoKo Prolif Good (Check China) .................................................... 130 Japan key to East Asian Security ................................................................................................................... 131 Solvency Checks China & East Asia Stuff .................................................................................................. 132 Taiwan, China, NoKo Stability ...................................................................................................................... 133 AT: Consult Japan CP ................................................................................................................................... 134

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MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

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    PLAN TEXT

     The United States Federal Government should remove all military presence from Okinawa, Japan.

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    MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

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    1AC (1/17)

    Contention 1 is the Japanese Alliance

    Okinawa has pushed the US-Japan alliance to the brink

    Eric Talmadge - The Associated Press, 7/22/2010, ―Okinawa basing stresses U.S.-Japan relations,‖

    http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/ap_us_japan_062210/ // vkoneru

    TOKYO Uncertainty over a Marine base and plans to move thousands of U.S. troops to Guam are straining a post-World War II security alliance Japan and the United States set 50 years ago, but Tokyo's new leader said Tuesday he stands behind the pact. Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington. "Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region," Kan said in a

    televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. "Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States." The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defense of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan. Under the pact, promulgated 50 years ago Wednesday, nearly 50,000 American troops are deployed throughout Japan. The U.S. forces include a key naval base south of Tokyo where the only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier has its home port; Kadena Air Base, which is one of the largest in Asia; and more than 10,000 U.S. Marines on the southern island of Okinawa. The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1 percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere

    a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world's second-largest economy. "Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong," said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance." But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well. Kan has vowed to build a replacement facility on Okinawa, as the U.S. demanded, but details are undecided. Implementing the agreement would need the support of the local governor, who has expressed opposition to it. Kan was scheduled to visit Okinawa on Wednesday for ceremonies marking the end of the 1945 battle there that hastened Japan's surrender. Recent tension on the Korean peninsula and China's growing military assertiveness have undoubtedly driven home the importance of the U.S. security pact with Japanese leaders. Before he stepped down, Hatoyama suggested that the March sinking of a South Korean warship, allegedly by a North Korean torpedo, contributed to his decision keep Futenma on Okinawa reversing a campaign pledge to move it off the island. Tokyo was alarmed in April when a Chinese helicopter came within 300 feet (90 meters) of a Japanese military monitoring vessel in the vicinity of a Chinese naval exercise. That same month, Chinese ships were also spotted in international waters off Okinawa. Still, the Okinawa problem underscores an increasingly skeptical stance among some Japanese leaders toward the role of the security alliance.

    Though the pact was strongly supported by the staunchly pro-U.S. conservative party that ruled Japan for most of the past 60 years, the newly empowered Democratic Party of Japan, which swept to office last year, have taken a more nuanced

    approach, saying that while close security ties with Washington remain crucial Japan needs to improve its relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly China. On Monday, Kan said he will reassure Obama when they meet at a summit this

    weekend that Japan-U.S. ties continue to be "the cornerstone" of Japan's diplomacy. But he added that "I want to view this relationship from a broader point of view," and stressed Japan must not forget the importance of developing its Asian relationships.

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MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

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    1AC (2/17)

Removing troops is key to restoring the alliance

    Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, Huffington Post, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution at the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, served as a Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, nationally syndicated columnist with Copley News Service, and editor of the monthly political magazine Inquiry, 3/25/2010, ―Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,‖ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-

    bandow/okinawa-and-the-problems_b_512610.html

    The Japanese government needs to assess future dangers and decide on appropriate responses -- without assuming that the

    U.S. Marines will show up to the rescue. It is Japan's decision, but it should not be based on the presumption of American

    intervention. Having made its decision, then Tokyo should reconfigure its forces. Fairness suggests a major drawdown from

    Okinawa irrespective of whose military is protecting Japan. If the U.S. disengaged militarily, these decisions could be made

    without pressure from Washington. The two countries would still have much to cooperate about, including security.

    Leaving responsibility for Japan's defense with Tokyo would simply eliminate the unrealistic expectations engendered by

    the alliance on both sides. The governments could focus on issues of mutual interest, sharing intelligence, preparing

    emergency base access, and otherwise cooperating to meet international challenges. The best way for Americans to help

    residents of Okinawa is to press Washington to reshape U.S. foreign policy, making it more appropriate for a republic than

    a pseudo-empire. With the rise of numerous prosperous allied and friendly states -- most notably Japan, but also South

    Korea, Australia, India, and others -- the U.S. should step back, prepared to deal with an aggressive hegemon should one

    arise but determined to avoid being dragged into routine geopolitical squabbles. Then Tokyo could chart its own destiny,

    including deciding what forces to raise and where to base them. The Japanese government could no longer use American

    pressure as an excuse for inaction in Okinawa. Then Okinawans finally might gain justice -- after 65 long years

Japan rearm causes Asian arms race China and North Korea freak out and cause conflicts

    David Robinson, Lecturer at Edith Cowan University (Australia), 3/29/2010 Why the West should Discourage

    Japanese Military Expansion‖ Journal of Asia Pacific Studies http://www.japss.org/upload/10.robinson.pdf

    Japan‘s Self-Defense Force is already considered a powerful regional force, and Japan‘s previous decisions not to acquire

    nuclear weapons have been, ―on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism‖ [Bukh, 2010, pp7-8]. As

    Japan has a stockpile of plutonium and extremely sophisticated rocket technology, the possibility remains that Japan could

    become a major nuclear power within a decade if sufficiently provoked by regional competitors like North Korea

    [Matthews, 2003, p78], and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz has argued that Asia‘s security environment will eventually compel

    Japan to nuclearise [Mirashita, 2001, p5]. China and Japan are each dominant in the others‘ strategic thinking regarding

    economic, political and military issues, and the enhancement of Japanese military power must influence China‘s own

    strategic vision [Pyle, 2007, p312-315]. China and Korea also remain ―convinced that Japanese militarism, supported by an

    invigorated nationalist right wing, lurks just beneath the surface‖ [Samuels, 2007, p2]. At the very least Japan‘s new foreign

    policy could escalate into a regional arms race, with the potential for both Japan and South Korea to nuclearise. Issues like

    control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, and Chinese claims on Taiwan provide continuing fault-lines around

    which conflict might develop [Matthews, 2003, p81].

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MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

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    1AC (3/17)

    Even perception Japan is reconsidering weaponization is enough to set off an arms race in North Asia. Christopher W Hughes, PhD University of Sheffield, Professor at University of Warwick, January 2007,

    Asia Policy Number 3 75-104, ―North Korea‘s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of

    Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan‖

    http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:blE5TXfgjFIJ:www .nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP3/AP3H

    ughes.pdf+japanese+nuclearization+and+taiwan&hl=en&gl=us

    In turn, it is clear that also close to the forefront of regional policymakers‘ minds is the long-held apprehension that if North

    Korea is allowed the unbridled maintenance of its nuclear program then this will have a broader impact on nuclear

    proliferation in the Northeast Asia. It is often speculated that the current non-nuclear weapons states in Northeast Asia,

    whether ―reversal‖ or ―threshold‖ states, may be provoked by North Korea to embark on their own nuclear weapons

    programs. This ―nuclear cascade‖ might begin with Japan reconsidering its nuclear option, closely followed by South Korea

    reacting to the change of stance by both North Korea and Japan. The possible further upgrading by China (People‘s

    Republic of China or PRC) of its nuclear capabilities and doctrine, in reaction to a nuclearized Japan and Korean Peninsula,

    might then trigger renewed interest by Taiwan in a nuclear weapons capacity. Since October of 2006, North Korea‘s

    nuclear test has refueled this type of speculation. In mid-October, almost as if on cue, Nakagawa Shoichi, Chairman of the

    Policy Research Council of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and Foreign Minister Aso Taro attempted to

    initiate a debate in Japan on the utility of nuclear weapons. Abe Shinzo, the new prime minister, moved to reaffirm Japan‘s

    non-nuclear principles, but not before Japan‘s purported nuclear intentions had attracted the interest of China and South

    Korea. The leadership of both states expressed their appreciation of the need for Japan to preserve its non-nuclear stance.

    President George W. Bush on October 16 noted his concern that Japan‘s possible reconsideration of its nuclear stance

    would cause anxieties for China and North Korea‘s nuclear weapons might produce an arms race in Northeast Asia.

    Secretary of State Condoleexa Rice on October 10 voiced similar concerns, although expressing confidence that Japan

    would not go nuclear. Meanwhile in the United States there is a willingness to exploit again the so-called Japan card of

    encouraging talk of Japan‘s breaching of its non nuclear stances a means to punish China for its failure to pressure North

    Korea on its nuclear program.

East Asian arms race will cause extinction.

    Toshimaru Ogura and Ingyu Oh are professors of economics, April, ―Nuclear clouds over the Korean peninsula and Japan,‖ 1997 Accessed July 10, 2008 via Lexis-Nexis (Monthly Review)

    North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not

    produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals.

    Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic

    affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these

    countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

Japan has the technology to develop the bomb quickly now US defense reports conclude

    Jung Sung-ki, Korea Times staff writer, 3/18/2010, ―S. Korea, Japan Can Build Nuclear Weapons Quickly,‖

    http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/07/205_62636.html // vkoneru

    South Korea, like Japan, has the technology to build a nuclear arsenal quickly if it decides to do so, a U.S. defense report

    said Thursday. "Several friends or allies of the United States, such as Japan and South Korea, are highly advanced

    technological states and could quickly build nuclear devices if they chose to do so," said the Joint Operating Environment

    (JOE) 2010, released on Feb. 18, by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. The biennial report forecasts possible threats and

    opportunities for the U.S. military. The 2008 report categorized South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as three "threshold nuclear

    states" that have the capability to develop nuclear weapons rapidly, should their political leaders decide to do so.

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    1AC (4/17)

    Strengthening the US-Japan alliance is critical to loosen Sino-Russian ties and checking aggression

    Peter Brooks, Senior Fellow at the heritage foundation, 8/15/2005 ―An Alarming Alliance: Sino Russian ties

    tightening‖ The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081505a.cfm

The first- ever joint Chinese-Russian military exercises kick off Thursday in Northeast Asia. The exercises are small in

    scale but huge in implication. They indicate a further warming of the "strategic partnership" that Moscow and Beijing struck back in 1996. More importantly, they signal the first real post-Cold War steps, beyond inflammatory rhetoric, by

    Russia and China to balance and, ultimately, diminish U.S. power across Asia. If America doesn't take strategic steps

    to counter these efforts, it will lose influence to Russia and China in an increasingly important part of the world.

    Unimaginable just a few years ago, the weeklong military exercises dubbed "Peace Mission 2005" will involve

    10,000 troops on China and Russia's eastern coasts and in adjacent seas. This unmistakable example of Sino-Russian military muscle-flexing will also include Russia's advanced SU-27 fighters, strategic TU-95 and TU-22 bombers, submarines, amphibious and anti-submarine ships. The exercise's putative purpose is to "strengthen the capability of the two armed forces in jointly striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism," says China's Defense Ministry. But the Chinese defense minister was more frank in comments earlier this year. Gen. Cao Gangchuan said: "The exercise will exert both immediate and far-reaching impacts." This raised lots of eyebrows especially in the United States, Taiwan and

    Japan. For instance, although Russia nixed the idea, the Chinese demanded the exercises be held 500 miles to the south a

    move plainly aimed at intimidating Taiwan. Beijing clearly wanted to send a warning to Washington (and, perhaps, Tokyo)

    about its support for Taipei, and hint at the possibility that if there were a Taiwan Strait dust-up, Russia might stand with China. The exercise also gives Russia an opportunity to strut its military wares before its best customers Chinese

    generals. Moscow is Beijing's largest arms supplier, to the tune of more than $2 billion a year for purchases that include subs, ships, missiles and fighters. Rumors abound that Moscow may finally be ready to sell strategic, cruise-missile-capable bombers such as the long-range TU-95 and supersonic TU-22 to Beijing strengthening China's military hand against

    America and U.S. friends and allies in Asia. Russia and China are working together to oppose American influence all around their periphery. Both are upset by U.S. support for freedom in the region notably in the recent Orange (Ukraine),

    Rose (Georgia) and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) revolutions all of which fell in what Moscow or Beijing deems its sphere of

    influence. In fact, at a recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (i.e., Russia, China and the four 'Stans'), Moscow and Beijing conspired to get Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close U.S. airbases. As a result, Uzbekistan gave America 180 days to get out, despite the base's continued use in Afghanistan operations. (Quick diplomacy by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saved the Kyrgyz base, but it remains on the ropes.) Moreover, it shouldn't be overlooked that the "Shanghai Six" have invited Iran, India and Pakistan to join the group as observers, expanding China and Russia's influence into South Asia and parts of the Middle East. What to do? First, the Pentagon must make sure the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review balances U.S. forces to address both the unconventional terrorist threat and the big-power challenge represented by a Russia-China strategic partnership. Second, the United States must continue to strengthen its relationship with its ally Japan to ensure a balance of power in Northeast Asia and also encourage Tokyo to improve

    relations with Moscow in an effort to loosen Sino-Russian ties. Third, Washington must persevere in advancing its new

    relationship with (New) Delhi in order to balance Beijing's growing power in Asia and take advantage of India's longstanding, positive relationship with Russia. And be ready to deal. Russia has historically been wary of China. America must not ignore the possibilities of developing a long-term, favorable relationship with Russia despite the challenges

    posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's heavy-handed rule. These unprecedented military exercises don't make a

    formal Beijing-Moscow alliance inevitable. But they represent a new, more intimate phase in the Sino-Russian relationship. And China's growing political/economic clout mated with Russia's military would make for a potentially potent anti-American bloc. For the moment, Beijing and Moscow are committed to building a political order in Asia that doesn't include America atop the power pyramid. With issues from Islamic terrorism to North Korean nukes to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the stakes in Asia are huge. Washington and its friends must not waste any time in addressing the burgeoning Sino-Russian entente.

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MO Japan Aff DDI 2010

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    1AC (5/17)

Russia-China alliance causes Chinese military modernization and world war.

    Arthur Waldron, professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard, 1997, ―HOW NOT TO DEAL WITH CHINA,‖ March

    1997

    MAKING THESE flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of China's

    weapons acquisitions. An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national

    rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has

    intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and

    parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward

    repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia.

    The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22

    cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft

    carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and

    deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and

    submarines--and considering nuclear options. The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise

    from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did so in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of

    intimidation, fired ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation,

    particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979,

    and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction

    of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China.

    Chains of alliance or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself, could easily draw in

    neighboring states--Russia, or India, or Japan--or the United States.

China will develop nanoweapons

    News Max, interview with Lev Navrozov a journalist, author, and columnistextensively studied

    superweapons and won the Albert Einstein Price for outstanding intellectual achievements, 9/26/03, ―an

    interview on nanoweapons,‖ http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/9/25/210250.shtml

    What countries are developing the post-nuclear superweapons involving nanotechnology? LN: It is worthwhile to speak

    only of China, Russia if dictatorship comes back to that country, and the United States if it awakens from its sleep, which

    may well be its last. To make the nanoweapons useful, a country must have the ability and the will to either world

    domination or to the defense against another country‘s world domination.

Unchecked Chinese nanoweapons cause a world war this leads to extinction.

    Lev Navrozov, Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, 7/17/08, ―China Poses a Threat?‖

    http://www.newsmax.com/navrozov/china_threat/2008/07/17/113782.html

    China or any other country that had in 1945 several hundred or thousand nuclear bombs of the kind of the two bombs the

    US dropped on Japan, could become the sovereign of the world. Professor Rosemont did not say a word about the nano or

    other post-nuclear weapon being developed in China since the 1980s. Yet post-nuclear global war requires post-nuclear

    global weapons. As soon as China acquires such weapons, its rulers will be likely to launch a world war to expand their rule

    globally in order to preserve it in China. The Internationale is still the Marxist-Leninist anthem of China, and the sentence

    of the anthem worth recalling says: ―The entire world in which we are nothing we shall smash to smithereens, and in our

    new world, which we will build, we will be everything.‖

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    1AC (6/17)

Alliance key to solve Middle East conflict and stem the rise of terrorism

    Yukio Okamoto, President Special Adviser to the Cabinet and Chair of the Japanese Prime Minister‘s Task Force on Foreign

    Relations, 2002 ―Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance‖ – The Washington Quarterly, lexis

    Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States and Islamic countries, which,

    with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested that Japan can become a potential intermediary between the

    United States and the Muslim world because of Japan‘s close relations with Arab governments, Muslim oil-producing

    states, and the nations of Central Asia; its relatively more flexible stance on human rights policies; and the absence of a

    strong tie to Israel. Japan can contribute to a U.S.-Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and

    an inconsistent U.S. commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of stemming the rise of terrorism in the

    Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the industrialized

    world that extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States also needs to explain

    its reluctance to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights standards as those

    applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia.

Causes extinction

    John Steinbach, March 3, 2002, Center for research on Globalization,

    http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm

    Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for

    future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, " Should

    war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear

    escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) Ezar Weissman, Israel's

    current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia

    and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the

    principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super

    sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer

    needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control

    negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and

    dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the

    familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever

    reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration.

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