III DASEIN'S AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEINGA-WHOLE, AND
TEMPORALITY AS THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE
? 61. A Preliminag Sketch of the Methodological Step from the Definition of Dasein's Authentic Being-a-whole to the Laying-bare of Temporality as a Phenomenon
An authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole on the part of Dasein has been 302
projected existentially. By analysing this phenomenon, we have revealed that iauthentic Being-towards-death is anticipation. Dasein's authentic
potentiality-for-Being, in its existentiell attestation, has been exhibited, and 1at the same time existentially Interpreted, as resoluteness. How are these
two phenomena of anticipation and resoluteness to be brought together? Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole
led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of
resoluteness? What can death and the 'concrete Situation' of taking action have in common? In attempting to bring resoluteness and anticipation
forcibly together, are we not seduced into an intolerable and quite
unphenomenological construction, for which we can no longer claim that it
has the character of an ontological projection, based upon the phenomena?
Any superficial binding together of the two phenomena is excluded. There still remains one way out, and this is the only possible method: namely, to take as our point of departure the phenomenon of resoluteness, as attested in its existentiell possibility, and to ask: "Does
resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of Being, point forward to anticipatory resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility?" What if resoluteness, in accordance with its
own meaning, should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which just-lie closest, but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of 2every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, and, as such, enters more or less
____________________ 1'In seiner existenziellen Bezeugung wurde, das eigentliche Seinkönnen, des Daseins als
Entschlossenheit aufgezeigt und zugleich existenzial interpretiert.' In the earlier editions the
words 'aufgezeigt und zugleich existenzial interpretiert' are inserted between 'Bezeugung' and 'wurde', not in their present position. 2'. . . die allem faktischen Seinkönnen des Daseins vorgelagert ist . . . ' Cf. note 1, p. 303, H.
undisguiscdly into every potentiality-for-Being of which Dasein factically takes hold? What if it is only in the anticipation of [zum] death that resoluteness, as Dasein's authentic truth, has
reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? What, if it is only in the anticipation if death
that all the factical 'anticipatoriness' of resolving would be authentically understood — in other 1words, that it would be caught up with in an existentiell way?
In our existential Interpretation, the entity which has been presented to us as 303 our theme has Dasein's kind of Being, and cannot be pieced together into
something present-at-hand out of pieces' which are present-athand. So long
as we do not forget this, every step in our Interpretation must be guided by
the idea of existence. What this signifies for the question of the possible
connection between anticipation and resoluteness, is nothing less than the
demand that we should project these existential phenomena upon the
existentiell possibilities which have been delineated in them, and 'think these
possibilities through to the end' in an existential manner. If we do this, the working-out of anticipatory resoluteness as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole
such that this potentiality is authentic and is possible in an existentiell way,
will lose the character of an arbitrary construction. It will have become a way of Interpreting whereby Dasein is liberated for its uttermost possibility of
In taking this step, the existential Interpretation makes known at the same time its ownmost methodological character. Up till now, except for some remarks which were occasionally necessary, we have deferred explicit discussions of method. Our first task was to 'go forth' towards the phenomena. But, before laying bare the meaning of the Being of an entity which has
been revealed in its basic phenomenal content, we must stop for a while in the course of our investigation, not for the purpose of 'resting', but so that we may be impelled the more keenly. Any genuine method is based on viewing in advance in an appropriate way the basic constitution of the 'object' to be disclosed, or of the domain within which the object lies. Thus any genuinely methodical consideration — which is to be distinguished from empty discussions of technique —
must likewise give information about the kind of Being of the entity which has been taken as our theme. The clarification of the methodological possibilities, requirements, and limitations of the existential analytic in general, can alone secure the transparency which is necessary if we are to ____________________ 1'Wenn im Vorlaufen zum Tode erst alle faktische "Vorläufigkeit" des Entschliessens eigentlich
verstanden, das heisst existenziell eingeholt wäre?' Our translation of 'Vorlaufen' as
'anticipation' again fails to bring out the metaphor of 'running ahead', with which the notion of 'catching up' is here clearly connected. (Cf. our note 3, p. 306, H. 262 above.) Similarly our translation of 'Vorläufigkeit' as 'anticipatoriness', which brings out the connection with
'vorlaufen' is out of line with our usual translation of the adjective 'vorläufig' as 'provisional'.
take the basic step of unveiling the meaning of the Being of care. But the Interpretation of the
ontological meaning of, care must be performed on the basis of envisaging phenomenologically in a full and constant manner Dasein's existential constitution as we have exhibited it up till now.
Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its 'subsistence' is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the 'Self-subsistence' of the 1existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care. The phenomenon of the Self — a
phenomenon which is included in care — needs to be defined existentially in a way which is
primordial and authentic, in contrast to our preparatory exhibition of the inauthentic they-self.
Along with this, we must establish what possible ontological questions are to be directed towards the 'Self', if indeed it is neither substance nor subject.
In this way, the phenomenon of care will be adequately clarified for. the first 304
time, and we shall then interrogate it as to its ontological meaning. When this meaning has been determined, temporality will have been laid bare. In
exhibiting this, we are not led into out-of-the-way and sequestered domains
of Dasein; we merely get a conception of the entire phenomenal content of Dasein's basic existential constitution in the ultimate foundations of its own ontological intelligibility. Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally
primordial way in Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of
anticipatory resoluteness. If temporality makes itself known primordially in
this, then we may suppose that the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness is
a distinctive mode of temporality. Temporality has different possibilities and 2different ways of temporalizing itself. The basic possibilities
____________________ 1'Sein "Bestand" gründet nicht in der Substanzialität einer Substanz, sondern in der
"Selbständigkeit" des existierenden Selbst, dessen Sein als Sorge begriffen wurde.'
In this sentence Heidegger has used no less than five words derived from the IndoEuropean base 'stā-' (Cf. English 'stand', Latin 'stare', German 'stehen'): 'Bestand', 'Substanz',
'Substantialität', 'Selbständigkeit', 'existierenden'. In each case we have used an English
equivalent derived from the same base.
The important word 'Bestand', which we have here translated somewhat arbitrarily as 'subsistence', and have often handled elsewhere in other ways, corresponds to the verb 'bestchen' ('to subsist', 'to remain', 'to consist in', even 'to exist' in a broader sense than Heidegger's). It thus may stand for 'subsistence' in the broadest sense, or more particularly for 'continued subsistence'; and it may also stand for that of which something 'consists' — its
'content', the whole 'stock' of things of which it consists. This is the sense in which Heidegger most frequently uses it, especially in such phrases as 'der phänomenale Bestand' ('the phenomenal content', 'the stock of phenomena'). We have also somewhat arbitrarily translated
'Selbständigkeit' as 'Self-subsistence', in accordance with our translation of the adjective 'selbständig' on H. 291-292. But as we shall see later ( H. 322 ), 'Self-constancy' would
perhaps be more appropriate. 2'Zeitlichkeit kann sich in verschiedenen Möglichk eiten und in verschiedener Weise zeitigen.'
In ordinary German the verb 'zeitigen' means 'to bring about' or more strictly, 'to bring to maturity'; this is how we have translated it in the earlier portions of this work. In the present section, however, and in those which follow, Heidegger is exploiting the etymological connection of 'zeitigen' with such words as 'Zeit' ('time') and 'Zeitlichkeit' ('temporality'); we have accordingly ventured to translate it as 'to temporalize.' We have
of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible temporalizations of temporality.
1If the ascendancy of the falling understanding of Being (of Being as presence-at-hand) keeps
Dasein far from the ontological character of its own Being, it keeps it still farther from the primordial foundations of that Being. So one must not be surprised if, at first glance, temporality does not correspond to that which is accessible to the ordinary understanding as 'time'. Thus neither the way time is conceived in our ordinary experience of it, nor the problematic which arises from this experience, can function without examination as a criterion for the appropriateness of an Interpretation of time. Rather, we must, in our investigation, make ourselves familiar beforehand with the primordial phenomenon of temporality, so that in terms of
this we may cast light on the necessity, the source, and the reason for the dominion of the way it is ordinarily understood.
The primordial phenomenon of temporality will be held secure by
demonstrating that if we have regard for the possible totality, unity, and
development of those fundamental structures of Dasein which we have
hitherto exhibited, these structures are all to be conceived as at bottom
'temporal' and as modes of the temporalizing of temporality. Thus, when
temporality has been laid bare, there arises for the existential analytic the task of repeating our analysis of Dasein in the sense of Interpreting its
essential structures with regard to their temporality. The basic directions of
the analyses thus required are prescribed by temporality itself. Accordingly the chapter will be divided as follows: anticipatory resoluteness as the way in 2which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity
(Section 62); the hermeneutical Situation at which we have arrived for
Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care, and the methodological
character of the existential analytic in general (Section 63); care and
Selfhood (Section 64); temporality as the ontological meaning of care
(Section 65); Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of
repeating the existential analysis in a primordial manner (Section 66). 305
? 62. Anticipatory Resoluteness as the Way in which Dasein's Potentiality-forBeing-a-whole has Existentiell Authenticity
When resoluteness has been 'thought through to the end' in a way corresponding to its ownmost tendency of Being, to what extent does it
already called attention to earlier passages (H. 122, 178) where 'zeitigen' has been changed to
'zeigen' in the later editions. If these changes are not simple misprints, they may indicate a deliberate intention to avoid the use of this verb in any sense but the special one here introduced. (Contrast H. 152, where no such correction has been made.) 1'. . . (Sein als Vorhandenheit) . . .' The 'als' of the later editions replaces an equalitysign which we find in the earlier editions. 2'Das existenziell eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins als vorlaufende Entschlossenheit.'
lead us to authentic Being-towards-death? How are we to conceive the connection between wanting to have a conscience and Dasein's existentially projected, authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole? Does welding these two together yield a new phenomenon? Or are we left with the resoluteness which is attested in its existentiell possibility, and can this resoluteness undergo an existentiell modalization through Being-towardsdeath? What does it mean 'to think through to the end' existentially the phenomenon of resoluteness?
We have characterized resoluteness as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and exacting anxiety of oneself. Being-guilty belongs to Dasein's Being, and signifies the null Being-thebasis of a nullity. The 'Guilty!' which belongs to the Being of Dasein is something that can be neither augmented nor diminished. It comes before any quantification, if
the latter has any meaning at all. Moreover, Dasein is essentially guilty — not just guilty on
some occasions, and on other occasions not. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience resolves upon this
Being-guilty. To project oneself upon this Being-guilty, which Dasein is as long as it is, belongs
to the very meaning of resoluteness. The existentiell way of taking over this 'guilt' in resoluteness, is therefore authentically accomplished only when that resoluteness, in its disclosure of Dasein, has become so transparent that Being-guilty is understood as something constant. But this
understanding is made possible only in so far as Dasein discloses to itself its potentiality-for-Being, and discloses it 'right to its end'. Existentially, however, Dasein's "Being-at-an-end"
implies Being-towards-the-end. As Being-towards-the-end which understands — that is to say,
as anticipation of death — resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not just 'have' a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbours in
itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity.
This 'connection' must be elucidated phenomenally.
By "resoluteness" we mean "letting onself be called forth to one's ownmost
Being-guilty". Being-guilty belongs to the Being of Dasein itself, and we
have determined that this is primarily a potentiality-for-Being. To say that
Dasein 'is' constantly guilty can only mean that in every case Dasein
maintains itself in this Being and does so as either authentic or inauthentic existing. Being-guilty is not just an abiding property of something constantly 306
present-at-hand, but the existentiell possibility of being authentically or
inauthentically guilty. In every case, the 'guilty' is only in the current factical
potentiality-for-Being. Thus because Being-guilty belongs to the Being of
Dasein, it must be conceived as a potentiality-forBeing-guilty. Resoluteness
projects itself upon this potentiality-for-Being
— that is to say, it understands itself in it. This understanding maintains itself, therefore, in a primordial possibility of Dasein. It maintains itself authentically in it if the resoluteness is
primordially that which it tends to be. But we have revealed that Dasein's primordial Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is Being-towards-death — that is to say, towards that
distinctive possibility of Dasein which we have already characterized. Anticipation discloses this possibility as possibility. Thus only as anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being
towards Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Only when it 'qualifies' itself as Being-1towardsdeath does resoluteness understand the 'can' of its potentiality-for-Beingguilty.
When Dasein is resolute, it takes over authentically in its existence the fact that it is the null basis
of its own nullity. We have conceived death existentially as what we have characterized as the possibility of the impossibility of existence — that is to say, as the utter nullity of Dasein. Death
is not "added on" to Dasein at its 'end'; but Dasein, as care, is the thrown (that is, null) basis for its death. The nullity by which Dasein's Being is dominated primordially through and through, is revealed to Dasein itself in authentic Being-towards-death. Only on the basis of Dasein's whole
Being does anticipation make Being-guilty manifest. Care harbours in itself both death and guilt equiprimordially. Only in anticipatory resoluteness is the potentiality-for-Being-guilty iiunderstood authentically and wholly — that is to say, primordially.
When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the "they" is revealed. 307
Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentialityfor-Being-its-
Self. When one has an understanding Being-towards-death — towards death
as one's ownmost possibility — one's potentiality-for-Being becomes
authentic and wholly transparent.
The call of conscience passes over in its appeal all Dasein's 'worldly' prestige and potentialities. Relentlessly it individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-Being-guilty, and exacts of it that it should be this potentiality authentically. The unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-forBeing, discloses the anticipation of [zum] death as the possibility which is non-relational. Anticipatory resoluteness
lets the potentiality-for-Beingguilty, as one's ownmost non-relational possibility, be struck wholly into the conscience.
Any factical Dasein has been determined by its ownmost Being-guilty both before any factical
indebtedness has been incurred and after any such
____________________ 1'Das "kann" des Schuldigseinkönnens verst eht die Entschlossenheit erst, wenn sie sich als
Sein zum Tode "qualifiziert".'
indebtedness has been paid off; and wanting-to-have-a-conscience signifies that one is ready for the appeal to this ownmost Being-guilty. This prior Being-guilty, which is constantly with us, does not show itself unconcealedly in its character as prior until this very priority has been enlisted in [hineingestellt] that possibility which is simply not to be outstripped. When, in
anticipation, resoluteness has caught up [eingeholt] the possibility of death into its potentiality-
for-Being, Dasein's authentic existence can no longer be outstripped [überholt] by anything.
The phenomenon of resoluteness has brought us before the primordial truth
of existence. As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical
potentiality-for-Being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing 308
and Being-revealed. To any truth, there belongs a corresponding holding-for-
true. The explicit appropriating of what has been disclosed or discovered is
Being-certain. The primordial truth of existence demands an equiprimordial Being-certain, in which one maintains oneself in what resoluteness discloses. 1It gives itself the current factical Situation, and brings itself into that
Situation. The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like
something present-at-hand which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It
merely gets disclosed in a free resolving which has not been determined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such determination. What, then,
does the certainty which belongs to such resoluteness signify? Such certainty
must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means that it simply cannot become rigid as regards the Situation, but must
understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a
disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factical possibility. The
certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free for the 2possibility of taking it back — a possibility which is factically necessary.
However, such holding-for-true in resoluteness (as the truth of existence) by
no means lets us fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-
for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself-free for taking back, is authentic 3resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself. Thus, in
____________________ 1Heidegger's ambiguous pronoun refers to 'resoluteness', as is clear from H. 326, below. 2'Die Gewissheit des Entschlusses bedeutet: Sichfreihalten für seine mögliche und je faktisch
notwendige Zurücknahme.' It is not grammatically clear whether the possessive adjective 'seine' refers back to 'Entschlusses' ('resolution') or to the 'Sich-' of 'Sichfreihalten' ('oneself').
We have chosen the former interpretation as somewhat more natural. But it is tempting to construe this and the following sentence as preparing the way for Heidegger's. remark a few lines below that 'In seinem Tod muss sich das Dasein schlechthin "zurücknehmen"' — which
might be translated as 'In its death, Dasein must 'withdraw' itself utterly.' In that case it would
be attractive to translate the present sentence by writing '. . . holds oneself free for one's own
withdrawal . . .' 3'. . . eigentliche Entschlossenheit zur Wiederholung ihrer selbst.' The idea seems to be that
authentic resoluteness keeps reiterating itself in the face of a constant awareness that it may have to be retracted or taken back at any time.
an existentiell manner, one's very lostness in irresoluteness gets undermined. The holding-for-true which belongs to resoluteness, tends, in accordance with its meaning, to hold itself free constantly — that is, to hold itself free for Dasein's whole potentiality-for-Being. This constant
certainty is guaranteed to resoluteness only so that it will relate itself to that possibility of which
it can be utterly certain. In its death, Dasein must simply 'take back' everything. Since resoluteness is constantly certain of death — in other words, since it anticipates it —
resoluteness thus attains a certainty which is authentic and whole.
But Dasein is equiprimordially in the untruth. Anticipatory resoluteness gives Dasein at the same time the primordial certainty that it has been closed off. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein holds itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the "they" — a lostness which is
possible from the very basis of its own Being. As a constant possibility of Dasein, irresoluteness is co-certain. When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the indefiniteness of
one's potentiality-for-Being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current Situation. It knows about the indefiniteness by which an entity that exists is dominated through and through. But if this knowing is to correspond to authentic resoluteness, it must itself arise from an authentic disclosure. The indefiniteness of one's own potentiality-for-Being, even when this
potentiality has become certain in a resolution, is first made wholly manifest in Beingtowards-
death. Anticipation brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility. Anticipation makes it manifest that this entity has been thrown into the indefiniteness of its 'limit-Situation'; when resolved upon the latter, Dasein gains its authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to itself. The "nothing" with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined; and this basis itself
is as thrownness into death.
Our analysis has revealed seriatim those items of modalization towards 309
which resoluteness tends of itself and which arise from authentic Being
towards death as that possibility which is one's ownmost, non-relational, not
to be outstripped, certain, and yet indefinite. Resoluteness is authentically
and wholly what it can be, only as anticipatory resoluteness.
But on the other hand, in our Interpretation of the 'connection' between resoluteness and anticipation, we have first reached a full
existential understanding of anticipation itself. Hitherto this could amount to no more than an ontological projection. We have now shown that anticipation is not just a fictitious possibility which we have forced upon Dasein; it is a mode of an existentiell potentiality-for-Being that is
attested in Dasein — a mode which Dasein exacts of itself, if indeed it authentically understands itself as resolute. Anticipation 'is' not some kind of freefloating behaviour, but must be conceived as the possibility of the authenticity of that resoluteness which has been attested in an existentiell way — a possibility hidden in such resoluteness, and thus attested therewith. Authentic 'thinking
about death' is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has become transparent to itself in an existcntiell manner. If resoluteness, as authentic, tends towards the mode delimited by anticipation, and if anticipation goes to make up Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, then in the resoluteness which is attested in an existentiell manner, there is attested with it an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole which belongs to Dasein. The question of the
polentiality-for-Being-a-whole is one which is factical and existentiell. It is answered by Dasein as resolute. The question of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has now fully sloughed off iiithe character indicated at the beginning, when we treated it as it if were just a theoretical or
methodological question of the analytic of Dasein, arising from the endeavour to have the whole of Dasein completely 'given'. The question of Dasein's totality, which at the beginning we discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but only because the ground for that justification goes back to an ontical possibility of Dasein. By thus casting light upon the 'connection' between anticipation and
resoluteness in the sense of the possible modalization of the latter by the
former, we have exhibited as a phenomenon an authentic potentialityfor-
Being-a-whole which belongs to Dasein. If with this phenomenon we have
reached a way of Being of Dasein in which it brings itself to itself and face to face with itself, then this phenomenon must, both ontically and ontologically, remain unintelligible to the everyday common-sense manner in which Dasein
has been interpreted by the "they". It would be a misunderstanding to shove
this existentiell possibility aside as 'unproved' or to want to 'prove' it
theoretically. Yet the phenomenon needs to be protected against the grossest
Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive
Selfconcealments. Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has been made' determinate as Being-towards-death, signify a kind of seclusion in
which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without Illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'. Neither does anticipatory resoluteness stem from 'idealistic' exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'incidentals' with which busy curiosity keeps 1providing itself — primarily from the events of the world. But the analysis of these basic
moods would transgress the limits which we have drawn for the present Interpretation by aiming towards fundamental ontology.
Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence? That is so indeed. But not only is this Fact one which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of the object which we have taken as the theme of
our investigation. Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presuppositions', but neither may it simply admit them. It conceives them, and it unfolds with more and more penetration both the presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions. The methodological considerations now demanded of us will have this very function.
? 63. The Hermeneutical Situation at which we have Arrived for Interpreting the Meaning of the Being of Care; and the Methodological Character of the Existential Analytic in 2General
In its anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has now been made phenomenally 311
visible with regard to its possible authenticity and totality. The hermencutical ivSituation which was previously inadequate for interpreting the meaning of
the Being of care, now has the required primordiality. Dasein has been put
into that which we have in advance, and this has been done primordially —
that is to say, this has been done with regard to its authentic potentiality-for-
Being-a-whole; the idea of existence, which guides us as that which we see
in advance, has been made definite by the clarification of our ownmost
potentiality-for-Being; and, now that we have concretely worked out the
structure of Dasein's Being, its peculiar ontological character has become so plain as compared with everything present-at-hand, that Dasein's
existentiality has been grasped in advance
____________________ 1'In ihr wird das Dasein frei von den "Zurfälligkeiten" des Unterhaltenwerdens die sich die
geschäftige Neugier primär aus den Weltbegebenheiten verschafft.' 2'Die für eine Interpretation des Seinssinnes der Sorge gewonnene hermeneutische Situation
und der methodische Charakter der existenzialen Analytik überhaupt.'
with sufficient Articulation to give sure guidance for working out the existentialia conceptually.
The way which we have so far pursued in the analytic of Dasein has led us to a concrete vdemonstration of the thesis which was put forward just casually at the beginning — that the
entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest. The reason for
this lies in care itself. Our Being alongside the things with which we concern ourselves most closely in the 'world' — a Being which is falling — guides the everyday way in which Dasein is
interpreted, and covers up ontically Dasein's authentic Being, so that the ontology which is directed towards this entity is denied an appropriate basis. Therefore the primordial way in which this entity is presented as a phenomenon is anything but obvious, if even ontology proximally follows the course of the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The laying-bare of Dasein's primordial Being must rather be wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that
taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation.
Not only in exhibiting the most elemental structures of Being-in-theworld, in delimiting the concept of the world, in clarifying the average "who" of this entity (the "who" which is closest to us — the they-self), in Interpreting the 'there', but also, above all, in analysing care, death, conscience, and guilt — in all these ways we have shown how in Dasein itself concernful
common sense has taken control of Dasein's potentialityfor-Being and the disclosure of that potentiality — that is to say, the closing of it off.
Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological Interpretation 312 which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality,