Wake BM 2ac v Most FG GSU Round 4.doc - deaconsource

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Wake BM 2ac v Most FG GSU Round 4.doc - deaconsource


C/IUSFG is all 3 branches thBlack’s Law Dictionary 90 (6 Edition, p. 695)

    In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.

    Biotechnology Add-On

    Foreign entrepreneurs are crucial to the biotechnology

    Monti et. al 07

    [Daniel J. Monti, PhD, Professor and Associate Chair, Laurel Smith-Doerr, PhD, Assistant Professor, James McQuaid, BA, Doctoral Candidate, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry”, Boston University, Study Prepared for the Immigrant Learning Center, June 2007,


    Our data shows that at least one immigrant was involved in founding 25.7 percent of all biotechnology firms in New

    England with most firms located in Massachusetts. Our percentage may be slightly lower than the national study by Wadhwa et al. They looked only at Massachusetts companies founded since 1995, finding that 29 percent had an immigrant founder. However, we studied all firms in the Massachusetts biotechnology industry regardless of founding date. The majority of immigrant-founded companies are more recent. A dramatic perspective arises when looking only at

    the firms for which we were able to obtain data on immigrant status of founders. There we found about 40 percent of the biotechnology firms in Massachusetts and New England had at least one immigrant founder.6 The pool of immigrant-founded companies is responsible for contributing an estimated $7.6 billion in revenue and 4,352 jobs to the New England economy in 2006. Immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely to found biotechnology firms that specialize in human therapeutics, the most science-intensive area of biotechnology which seeks to develop cures for human diseases. In

    Massachusetts and New England, biotechnology is an important industry for current and future economic growth. It is a small field with a large footprint. While there are fewer workers employed in biotechnology, the jobs are highly skilled and contribute to the knowledge economy. Manufacturing provides about 297,000 jobs; transportation and utilities about 572,000 jobs; and financial services about 225,000 jobs. However, these sectors are either stable or declining in employment and market share.7 Biotechnology, together with high technology generally, is an area that promises to spur economic growth into the future. This is not to say that there are no risks involved in the pursuit of such knowledge-based industries. The outcomes of scientific research are uncertain. Nevertheless, having a region that provides the best available resources, including drawing in many of the world’s brightest minds, gives Massachusetts an edge in this high-risk, high-

    reward field. This research finds that U.S. immigrants are an important component of one of the “crown jewels” of the nation’s innovative contributions to the global economy. Biotechnology was not only born in the U.S. but has flourished here, particularly in Massachusetts and California. The solutions to some of the worst health crises that humanity faces may well be found right here in Massachusetts in a company started by an immigrant.

    Biotech is critical to stopping all major diseases - their impact arguments are propaganda San Diego Union-Tribune- 6-26-01

    The anti-biotechnology people aren't "saving the world" in any way. If they had their way, millions of people would die and untold additional numbers would lead impoverished lives due to disease and malnutrition. Biotechnology is our only hope to stop the AIDS epidemic, especially in underdeveloped areas. This includes not only finding effective vaccines and treatments, but increasing resistance to disease by developing food products with higher yields and greater resistance to a

    variety of bacterial, viral, fungal and environmental threats. The same is true for a myriad of other illnesses -- sleeping

    sickness, elephantiasis, TB, malaria and cholera; to name a few. Obviously, implementation will require political and

    social changes also. The ignorance of those who would block these important developments amounts to the murder of millions. Failure to take the time and effort to be really informed, rather than to adopt biased ideological stands without thought, is criminal.

Spread of disease causes extinction (gender modified)

    Col. William Fox, M.D., Commander of Bayne-Jones Army Hospital, Command Surgeon of the Joint Readiness Training Center, medical degree from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Services, Winter 1997-98, Parameters, Vol.

    XXVII, No. 4, “Phantom Warriors: Disease as a Threat to US National Security,” http://carlisle-

    HIV is a pandemic killer without a cure, and viruses such as Ebola-Zaire are merely a plane ride away from the population

    centers of the developed world. Viruses like Ebola, which are endemic to Africa, have the potential to inflict morbidity and mortality on

    a scale not seen in the world since the Black Plague epidemics of medieval Europe, which killed a quarter of Europe's population in the

    13th and 14th centuries. These diseases are not merely African problems; they present real threats to [humankind] mankind. They should be

    taken every bit as seriously as the concern for deliberate use of weapons of mass destruction.

    Alternative Energy Add-On

Plan is key to alternative energy

    Herman and Smith 10

    [Richard Herman and Robert L. Smith, “Why Immigrants Can Drive the Green Economy”, Huffington Post, 06-29-2010,]

    Raymond Spencer, an Australianborn entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future--and a gusto for

    investing after founding a hightechnology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. "I have

    investments in maybe 10 startups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a 'green' theme," he said. "And it's

    interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants." It should

    come as no surprise that immigrants will help drive the green revolution. America's young scientists and engineers,

    especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered

    the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision

    millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, the leading expert on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that much of the cleantechnology talent lies overseas, in

    nations that began pursuing alternative energy sources decades ago. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while

    accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Expanding our own cleantech industry will require working closely with foreign

    nations and foreignborn scientists, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His lab's efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab, for example, were stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers. "We can't get researchers over here," Arvizu, the son of a onceundocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his

    voice tinged with dismay. "It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach." Dr. Zhao Gang, the

    Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. "The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.China

    collaboration on clean energy development," he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what's the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fastpaced world of

    greentech development. "We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork," he said. We need an immigration system that prioritizes the attraction and retention of scarce, highend talent needed to invent and commercialize

    alternative energy technology and other emerging technologies.

Stops energy wars that escalate to nuclear war

    Cabral 10

    [Jim Cabral, “Beyond BP: Michael Klare on US Energy Policy”, Valley Advocate, 8-12-2010]

    The preoccupation of states with securing the reliability of energy through exploration and extraction might seem benign enough (leaving aside for a moment the weighty issues of diminishing and increasingly remote supplies). But understood as a matter of state security, energy procurement is inextricably bound up with military proliferation. Hence Klare's "new

    geopolitics of energy" is fraught with the potential for conflict, especially given the urgency that state leaders attach to finding new sources of energy. Energy competition among what Klare calls the "energy deficit" states typically involves arms-for-energy tradeoffs with their suppliers, the "energy surplus" states. In the case of oil, arms transfers to the

    governments of surplus states pave the way for the deficit states' NOCs (and any IOCs headquartered in their countries) both to exploit their hosts' oilfields and to search for new ones. For deficit states, the top priority accorded to "energy security" renders considerations of surplus states' integrity (Do they respect international norms? Do they allow their citizens to exercise civil liberties?) irrelevant, for the most part. Not surprisingly, the accelerating militarization of energy

    procurement increases the possibilities for armed international conflict. Klare explains how nationalism lends momentum

    to this process: "The long-term risk of escalation is growing even more potent because major energy importers and exporters regularly appeal to that most dangerous of emotions, nationalism, in making their claim over the management of

    energy flows. Nationalistic appeals, once they have gripped a populace, almost invariably promote fierce emotion and irrationality. Add to this fact that the leaders of most countries involved in the great energy race have come to view the

struggle over hydrocarbon assets as a 'zero-sum' contestone in which a gain for one country almost always represents a

    loss for others. A zero-sum mentality leads to a loss of flexibility in crisis situations, while the lens of nationalism turns the pursuit of energy assets into a sacred obligation of senior government officials." The "competitive arms transfers" that

    represent the militarization of energy procurement also have another disturbing upshot: strengthening and legitimizing repressive, corrupt foreign regimes. In the case of U.S. arms recipients, the list is long and growing. It includes long-time allies in the Persian Gulf regionmost notably Saudi Arabiawhose anachronistic social policies effectively reduce

    women to the status of second-class citizens; corruptible African governments in Nigeria, Chad, and Angola, where

    along with off-shore drilling sites along the continent's west coastU.S.-based oil companies such as Exxon and Chevron

    currently operate; and more recent allies in the energy-rich Caspian Sea region, including those Klare refers to as the "autocratic regimes" of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. While the governments of the oil-rich Persian Gulf have long been wooed with energy deficit countries' military largess, the emergence of the Caspian Sea region's governments as coveted allies may come as a bit of a surprise to some. Klare soberly sketches out a "three-way struggle for geopolitical advantage" in the Caspian Sea basin, as the U.S., Russia (Caspian states having formerly been Soviet republics) and China

    funnel arms and other forms of military assistance into the region in competition for influence there. Again stressing the

    dangers of an escalation of conflict, Klare notes that "This three-way militarizing the Caspian basin, inundating the region with advanced arms and an ever-growing corps of military advisers, instructors, technicians, and combat-support personnel. [It will] heighten traditional suspicions and rivalries that have long plagued the region. The Great Powers are not only adding tinder to possible future fires, but also increasing the risk that they will be caught in any conflagration."

    Terrorism PIC

    Counterplan creates uncertainty—it makes it so that investors and immigrants don’t know if they will be eligible for the visa, that uncertainty turns solvency

    Koester and Weaver 10

    [Eric Koester and Bryn Weaver, “The Startup Visa-A White Paper”, Prepared for Submission to Congress, 8-18-2010]

    The Startup Visa should be available through a clear application process that leads to issuing a visa in a timely manner. As discussed above, the timing and complexity of the current visa process are reasons that existing visas are inadequate to

    meet the needs of immigrant founders seeking investment. For example, even assuming an Immigrant-Founder could overcome the other inherent limitations of the H-1B Visa, the process would be unwieldy in the context of founding a business. H-1B Visa submissions can (and often must) be submitted beginning on April 1 of a particular year, but they are only effective for employment beginning on October 1. Procedures that yield uncertain or delayed results prevent

    investments. Investors in an early stage startup company are likely to invest in a particular founder or group of founders

    in addition to the business plan or technology. Also, startup companies often derive a significant portion of their potential from their ability to move quickly and adapt flexibly. It is impracticable to put a new business on hold for several months while the founder waits for a visa to become effective or to rely on a process that may or may not ever provide a long-term visa. Having a quick, clear application process with criteria that are as objective as possible will reduce uncertainty and delay for investors and founders and allow the visa process to proceed at a speed that meets the timing of the investment process.

No WMD terrorism- they see it as counterproductive.

    Brad Roberts, Inst Dfnse Analyses, and Michael Moodie, Chem & Bio Arms Cntrl Inst, ‘2 (Defense

    Horizons 15, July)

    The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they

    have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as

    both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have

    succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key

    constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins'

    famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the

    lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had

    been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They

    seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with

    biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international

    community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

Terrorism is essential to BMD deployment

    Tertrais 01 Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, 12/4/’1 (What are the Strategic and Geopolitical Consequences of the War Against Terrorism?, p. Google)

    Other trends that are or will be accelerated by 9/11 and the "war on terrorism" include the reform of Western armed forces. That is certainly true for the United States. Before 9/11, the fate of Secretary Rumsfeld's ambitious transformation projects were uncertain. He now has a golden opportunity to advance his agenda.

    Likewise, the missile defense program benefits from 9/11. First, the political context in Washington is different: the Democrats have decided

    that it was not a good time to criticize the Bush missile defense plans. Second, missile defense benefits from the priority

    given to the overarching concept of "homeland security". In other words, even though some critics of missile defense were arguing before 9/11 that the "real"

    threat was that of terrorism, the idea according to which "We don't know where the next surprise will come from" has come to the support of missile defense. And third, the international

ramifications of the issue have been "de-dramatized", due to the new atmosphere of cooperation between Washington, Moscow and Beijing. In a nutshell, the net effect of 9/11 is to bolster the missile defense project.

    Missile defense is key to everything solves nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks, pre-emptive WMD strikes on America, the economy, hegemony, soft power, US military adventurism, and world stability LAMBAKIS, 07 Fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy, Managing Editor of Comparative Strategy, A Leading International Journal of Global Affairs and Strategic Studies, National Security and International Affairs Analyst Specializing in Space Power and Policy Studies, (Steven, “Missile Defense From Space”, 2-17-07,

    The ballistic missile threat to the United States, its deployed forces, and allies and friends has been well defined.6 This is a threat

    we downplay at our peril. Nations such as North Korea and Iran -- which also have significant programs to develop

    nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons -- as well as nonstate groups can pose significant, even catastrophic,

    dangers to the U.S. homeland, our troops, and our allies. Russia and China, two militarily powerful nations in transition, have

    advanced ballistic missile modernization and countermeasure programs. Indeed, despite the reality that trade relations with China continue to expand, its rapid military modernization represents a potentially serious threat. Whether these nations become deadly adversaries hinges on nothing more than a political change of heart in their respective capitals. The intelligence community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats is, by many measures, poor. Our leaders have been consistently surprised by foreign ballistic missile developments.

    Shortened development timelines and the ability to move or import operational missiles, buy components, and hire missile experts from abroad mean the United States may have little or no warning before it is threatened or attacked. There is no escaping the uncertainty we face. And the stakes couldn't be higher. A ballistic missile delivering a nuclear payload to an American city would be truly devastating. For comparison, the Insurance Information Institute estimates total economic loss so far from Hurricane Katrina at more than $100 billion. By some calculations, it is going to take New Orleans 25 years to recover fully, and the cost of rebuilding the city is predicted to be as high as $200 billion. The direct cost to the New York City economy following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was

    between $80 billion and $100 billion. These figures do not include indirect costs or the incalculable human losses. Now just imagine the costs

    imposed by a ballistic missile nuclear strike against a U.S. city. The economic toll from a single nuclear attack

    against a major city, which would involve extensive decontamination activities and impact the national economy, could rise above $4 trillion.7 The economy could also be devastated by the electromagnetic pulse generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion. The resulting electromagnetic shock would fry transformers within regional electrical power grids.8 The interdependent telecommunications (including computers), transportation, and banking and financial infrastructures that people and businesses rely on would be significantly damaged. Such an event would leave us, in some cases, with nineteenth-century technologies. This situation could jeopardize the very viability of society and the survival of the nation. Moreover, the paralysis leaders would experience would leave the country and its allies exposed to highly lethal twenty-first century threats. The blackmail possibilities of these weapons are as mind-numbing as they are terrifying. After more than 60

    years of advances in ballistic missile technologies, we have only just begun to address our vulnerability to them. Missile defense is a policy and

    budgetary reality today, and it enjoys strong bipartisan support. Current U.S. efforts to dissuade other countries from investing in ballistic missiles, to assure U.S. allies, and to deter aggression put missile defense in a place of prominence. Bush Administration policy is to evolve the fielded system incrementally to defend against these threats. The system is intended to adapt to new threats as they emerge and integrate advanced missile defense technologies as they are introduced. The fielded system today consists of space-based detection sensors, ground-based and seaborne early warning and tracking sensors, ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California for long-range defense, transportable ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 units, and sea-based interceptors to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. There are also several development programs to field new ground- and sea-based and airborne weapons to give the layered defense system new capabilities for engaging all ranges of ballistic missiles.

    Multiple defensive layers, with system elements working together synergistically to enhance the capability of the whole, are central to the approach adopted by U.S. defense leaders. No one layer or interceptor design can fulfill this global mission on its own. Several capabilities for intercepting a ballistic missile or its payload just after launch, or as it flies through its midcourse phase in

    space, or as it reenters Earth's atmosphere on a terminal trajectory will enhance overall system effectiveness by providing a defense in depth. Such a

    defense not only can enable several shot opportunities against an in-flight missile, but also can address the problem of missile defense countermeasures, which generally work in only one phase of flight. The current U.S. approach, in other words, is the right one. Limits of the current system Over the long term, will the currently configured and planned terrestrial-based missile defense system be sufficient to deal with increasingly sophisticated countermeasures and shifting threats? The answer, I believe, is no. The system being deployed today is fixed firmly to Earth. Whether they are sea-based or land-based weapons, or even the boost-engagement Airborne Laser, we are essentially talking about terrestrial platforms for basing weapons. As we move into the future, there are plans to make those platforms, the sensors and interceptors, more mobile. Why? Because greater mobility can provide greater flexibility for dealing with unpredicted threats. Mobility also allows a commander to concentrate his forces or disperse them as the requirements of the battlefield demand. It matters where we locate sensors and interceptors. It is important to put sensors close to the threat, because they will be in position to provide critical cueing and tracking data early in a ballistic missile's flight. These data can help enlarge the engagement battle space. To perform boost-phase intercept from the ground or sea, the weapons platforms must be very near the target launch site. These terrestrial boost-phase weapons can defend many targets around the globe by covering a single launch site. The disadvantage of such basing, a disadvantage that is mitigated somewhat with a mobile platform like the Airborne Laser, is that the threat launch site or region must be predicted. Terrestrial-based weapons that engage in space, in the middle or midcourse of a missile's or warhead's flight, offer perhaps the greatest flexibility in terms of addressing possible flight azimuths, trajectories, and launch points. While ground-based midcourse interceptors may have to be oriented to large threat regions, they can defend against multiple launch points. Conversely, ground interceptors that are near the target can defend only a small area, but they can potentially protect that point from launches anywhere in the world. Yet it is simply unaffordable to do a point defense for every place you want to defend in the United States, every place that U.S. forces go, or everywhere that our allies are. The ability to do area defense -- to defend against multiple launch points as opposed to doing point defense of a very limited area -- is fundamental to successful missile defense. Political, strategic, and technological uncertainties could change the missile defense scenario by causing a shift in the threat from one region to another. Given that it takes years to field, test, and make operational new fixed interceptor and sensor sites, a shift in the threat could leave the nation vulnerable. Because many of the interceptors and sensors in the current system are fixed to geographic points, we are limited in our ability to defend the homeland, for example, against missiles launched from surprise locations such as a ship off our shoreline. We also might face an adversary tomorrow that deploys tens or even hundreds of ballistic missiles or one that has more sophisticated countermeasure and reentry technologies. Those, too, would be expected to stress the current system, which is designed at the moment to deal with more limited threats. Planned transportable land-based and mobile sea-based and airborne systems also suffer limitations. The need to base sensors and interceptors forward, closer to threat launch sites, in order to enlarge the engagement battle space makes our security dependent on political decisions by foreign governments. Projected boost

defense systems, which may be deployed to the periphery or littoral of an adversary, would have very limited or no utility against a ballistic missile launched from several hundred miles inside a threat country's border. The inability to engage a missile in boost means we would be left with only midcourse or terminal intercept possibilities, if those are available, and this removes a layer from the effectiveness calculations. It's all about position Today we base missile-defense weapons on Earth, yet most engagements actually take place high above the Earth's surface, in space -- unless, of course, those engagements occur very early in boost or late in terminal. Putting interceptors in space to engage ballistic missiles could offer efficiencies that go a long way towards improving national defense, protecting more areas around the world, and reacting more effectively to threat surprises. The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (ekv), deployed on top of a long-range ground-based interceptor in Alaska and California, is really a euphemism for "space weapon." Space is the only environment in which the ekv will operate. In order to perform the missile defense mission, it must be boosted into space where it is "based" for a short time and operates semi-autonomously to put itself onto a collision path with a hostile warhead. In other words, the ekv is a "space weapon" that just happens to spend most of its time on the ground. The Standard Missile-3 interceptor, while it is carried on Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, also executes the intercept endgame in space against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles using a sensor-propulsion package designed to collide with the target. Thus, despite the fact that space is the recognized battleground in many missile defense engagements, we are deploying "space weapons" that are restricted to terrestrial launching just prior to operation. They must fight a space war from Earth. So, in a sense, these terrestrial-based interceptors are out of position before the battle even begins. At the very least, they are not in the most advantageous position to accomplish the mission for which they were designed. Before we can even begin the launch sequence, battle managers must wait for the attacker to make his move. The attacker has a head start and the ability to pre-position before the defender can get to the point where he must engage, especially if we are talking about engagement in the midcourse phase of flight. These engagements take place over a matter of minutes, of course, so any time wasted getting into position could lead to a failed intercept and possibly devastation for a city. By not basing interceptors in space, by not pre-positioning assets in the environment where we know intercepts will take place, the defense is surrendering a fundamental positional advantage. On this point, there is relevance in Carl von Clausewitz's observation that a "benefit [of defensive action], one that arises solely from the nature of war, derives from the advantage of position, which tends to favor the defense."9 To give up this advantage is detrimental to the cause. While space assets generally follow predictable orbital paths, they do provide a unique form of mobility -- they can be present and persistent over many places on the globe. Indeed, in 2007, the Missile Defense Agency will begin demonstrations with two satellites hosting sensors designed to provide very fine surveillance and tracking data on in-flight ballistic missiles and payloads. A constellation of these satellites would become the sensor backbone of a global missile defense capability and would make possible the global mission endorsed by the Bush administration: the protection of the United States, its deployed forces, and allies and friends. Similarly, a space-based interceptor layer would enable a global on-call missile defense capability and a timely response to rapidly evolving threats, even threats emanating from unpredicted locations with very different azimuths from those we plan to be able to defeat today.10 A space-defense capability also would allow the country to engage longer-range threats originating from deep within the interior of a threat country. It is also known that enemies of the United States can put a nuclear weapon over U.S. territory using a ballistic missile. The detonation of this weapon at a high altitude could unleash an electromagnetic pulse that would wipe out satellite and airborne navigation, intelligence, and communications systems and impede any U.S. military response to the aggression. Such a pulse of energy would disable or destroy the unprotected technological infrastructure of a region or the nation. According to the emp Commission, "a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our nation. . . . [A]t some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country's ability to support its population." Space-based interceptors may be the only effective way to counter this threat and mitigate the effects of an electromagnetic pulse resulting from the intercept. Engaging the missile close to its launch point would release the resulting explosion of gamma rays closer to the attacker's territory. Relying on an intercept in space, in the midcourse of a missile's flight, risks damaging unprotected satellites (i.e., just about all commercial and civilian satellites), regardless of who owns them. Because the missile defense system is "layered" and will have multiple elements working together synergistically, sharing information, sharing existing sensors, communicating as a single system worldwide, even a small constellation of space-based interceptor platforms would allow the entire system to work more efficiently. The massive constellations projected back in the heady days of the Strategic Defense Initiative, in other words, do not seem to be necessary, especially when the targeted adversaries have very limited ballistic missile inventories. By attacking even just a portion of the threat missiles in boost and midcourse, the space layer has the effect of thinning out the number of attacking missiles so that the other elements of the system, which are based on the ground or at sea (midcourse and terminal systems), can be more effective. International law and arms control National indecision over how to regard the space environment has paralyzed successive administrations over what to do in space. The United States has conducted research and development in the space-weapon area for more than 40 years without a strategic vision. As progress in this area unfolds, U.S. leaders find it challenging just to talk about the use of space for combat purposes in a public forum. In August 2006, the Bush Administration issued a major, high-profile pronouncement about space arms control. The administration rightfully reminds us that arms control is not an end in itself, but rather a tool to help the nation realize its national security strategy. Officials believed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty posed a danger to security, impeding the development, testing, and deployment of effective missile defenses to defend the country and U.S. troops, allies, and friends. When Washington withdrew from the treaty in June 2002, the restrictions on deployment of missile defenses in the air, sea, and space environments went away. We effectively got rid of the single greatest obstacle to the deployment of non-nuclear space arms, although this was not the reason cited by officials for withdrawal. It is plain that the U.S. government believes there is no need today for new outer-space arms-control agreements. There are a number of standing agreements that already sufficiently regulate military activities in outer space. And so Washington supports the existing space law regime and the development of the rule of law in that environment. Unhindered access to space and freedom to navigate are accepted ideas in most countries today. Customary practice and international treaties and conventions have supported and promoted the idea that space is a great "commons," analogous to the high seas, and ought not to be subject to national restrictions or governance. The United States has always considered the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through and operation in space without interference, so long as those systems do not threaten U.S. security. Washington supports exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes. "Peaceful purposes," states U.S. policy, allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. Determining peaceful purposes, in other words, is done not by looking at whether an activity is military or nonmilitary. The determining factor, rather, is more directly tied to aggressive intent. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty enshrines the principle that outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all states in accordance with international law. The United States has consistently endorsed and abided by this treaty. Washington was among the first to endorse plans for a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in space. This treaty puts celestial bodies off-limits to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and it prohibits the stationing of such systems in orbit. The United States also sponsored in 1963 a treaty to ban nuclear testing in space, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Nuclear tests in space simply posed too many risks to our own communications and reconnaissance satellites, so it made sense to ban them. Space debris can create hazardous conditions for astronauts and hinder access to space, so Washington also has been an advocate of establishing responsible practices that minimize the impact of debris, although we must balance this too with the obligation to ensure national security. Our love of freedom, in other words, does not mean we have a love of anarchy. The United States has long recognized that freedom of action in space is not without limitation. Yet there are some who believe that the current space law regime is insufficient -- insufficient, that is, for constraining U.S. arms development in that arena.11 The bottom line is this: There are currently no legal restrictions on developing and deploying space-based interceptors that rely on hit-to-kill technologies to execute the missile defense mission. Policy consequences The policy benefits of a space-based missile defense layer are

    straightforward. A more effective missile defense system that fully leverages space would provide a true on-call global

    defensive capability, and this could lead to increased stability in the world. Defenses deter attacks by reducing confidence in the success of any attack. The more effective the missile defense system is, the greater will be its deterrence value, and the less likely will we be to have to use it at all. At some point, when the system is seen by other

    governments as highly effective, they could recognize a diminishing marginal rate of return in their own ballistic missile investments. As more allies

    invest in missile defense, U.S. space-basing activities could build on current missile defense cooperative

activities and open up new avenues for international collaboration, both to develop elements of the space-based layer and to participate in operations. Moreover, because no state can have sovereignty over the space above its territory, we could operate up there free of political constraints. The need for negotiating basing rights to locate sensors or interceptor fields would become less pressing. Improved system performance would give the U.S. leadership a better array of options. In the face of attempted blackmail, for example, the president and his advisors would have confidence in the nation's capabilities to defeat a missile, which would make it possible to avoid more destabilizing moves, such as offensive preventive attacks on enemy territory. It is equally true that strong defenses would support necessary offensive action. Effective defenses can buy time to understand the strategic consequences and overall impact of military action. Our choices are fundamental to making moral judgments. The moral issues surrounding a national security crisis are tied to considerations of operational effectiveness. Are we doing our best to provide protection against some of the worst weapons imaginable? What would the consequences of not acting be, or of not being able to act because of a blackmail threat? What would be the result if Washington were unable to respond to increased terrorist activity worldwide or an upswing in the global weapons of mass destruction trade?

    A space-based layer would reinforce American strength, which in turn would allow the U.S. to better defend its interests and pursue its foreign policy goals. A powerful and influential United States is good for world peace,

    stability, and enforcing the rule of law internationally.

Terrorism is key to U.S. presence in Central Asia.

    Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, 12/4/’1

    (What are the Strategic and Geopolitical Consequences of the War Against Terrorism?, p. Google) Finally, I should add the acceleration of another long-term trend, which is the growing US penetration in Central Asia. Until now, this presence was mostly political and economic, with a military dimension, but without permanent military

    presence. I doubt very much that, having established bridgeheads in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan in particular, the US

    military will just pack and go home in a few weeks. There are many reasons for the US to stay. One is simply that it is just too good a geostrategic opportunity. Another is that Washington does not want to appear as leaving Afghanistan to its own fate for the second time in two decades. A third is that the US military presence will be justified by a "deterrence" role, to avoid that other countries in the region become sanctuaries for Al-Qaida-like organizations.

B. Nuclear war.

    Dr. M. Ehsan Ahrari, Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College, 8/1/’1 (

    South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might help avoid crises or

    catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence-building. Insecurity has led the states

    of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or a thermonuclear

    exchange. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

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