i. ( H. 1 ) Plato, Sophistes244a.
Introduction, Chapter One
i. ( H. 3 ) Aristotle, Metaphysica B 4, 1001 a 21.
1ii. ( H. 3 ) Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 11 Q. 94 art. 2.
iii. ( H. 3 ) Aristotle, Metaphysica B 3, 998 b 22.
6iv. ( H. 4 ) Cf. Pascal, Pensées et Opuscules (ed. Brunschvicg), Paris, 1912, p. 169; 'On ne
peut entreprendre de définir l'être sans tomber dans cette absurdité: car on ne peut définir
un mot sans commencer par celui-ci, c'est, soit qu'on l'exprime ou qu'on le sous-entende.
Donc pour définir l'être, il faudrait dire c'est, et ainsi employer le mot défini dans sa
v. ( H. 6 ) Plato, Sophistes 242c.
vi. ( H. 14 ) Aristotle, De Anima Γ8, 431 b 21; cf. ibid. Γ5, 430 a 14 ff .
vii. ( H. 14 ) Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Veritate, q. I, a 1 c; cf. the somewhat different
and in part more rigorous way in which he carries out a 'deduction' of the transcendentia in
his opuscule 'De Natura Generis'.
Introduction, Chapter Two 2i. ( H. 23 ) I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 180 f.
ii. ( H. 26 ) Aristotle, Physica Δ 10-14 (217b 29-224a 17).
iii. ( H. 26 ) I. Kant, op. cit., p. 121.
iv. ( H. 32 ) Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione1-6; also Metaphysica Z4, and Ethica Nicomachea
v. ( H. 38 ) If the following investigation has taken any steps forward in disclosing the things
themselves', the author must first of all thank E. Husserl, who, by providing his own incisive
personal guidance and by freely turning over his unpublished investigations, familiarized
the author with the most diverse areas of phenomenological research during his student
years in Freiburg.
Division One, Chapter One
i. ( H. 44 ) St. Augustine, Confessiones, X, 16. ['But what is closer to me than myself?
Assuredly I labour here and I labour within myself; I have become to myself a land of
trouble and inordinate sweat.'—Tr.]
ii. ( H. 44 ) Edmund Husserl's investigations of the 'personality' have not as yet been
published. The basic orientation of his problematic is apparent as early as his paper
"Philosophic als strenge Wissenschaft", Logos, vol. I, 1910, p. 319. His investigation was
carried much further in the second part of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und
phänomenologischen Philosophie (Husserliana IV), of which the first part (Cf. this
Jahrbuch [ Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung—Tr.] vol. I,
1913), presents the problematic of 'pure consciousness' as the basis for studying the
Constitution of any Reality whatsoever. His detailed Constitutional analyses are to be found
in three sections of the second part, where he treats: 1. the Constitution of material Nature;
2. the Constitution of animal Nature; 3. the Constitution of the spiritual world (the
personalistic point of view as opposed to the naturalistic). Husserl begins with the words:
'Although Dilthey grasped the problems which point the way, and saw the directions which
the work to be done would have to take, he still failed to penetrate to any decisive
formulations of these problems, or to any solutions of them which are methodologically
correct.' Husserl has studied these problems still more deeply since this first treatment of
them; essential portions of his work have been communicated in his Freiburg lectures.
iii. ( H. 47 ) This Jahrbuch, vol. I, 2, 1913, and II, 1916; cf. especially pp. 242 ff.
iv. ( H. 47 ) Ibid., II, p. 243 .
v. ( H. 47 ) Cf. Logos I, loc. cit.
vi. ( H. 48 ) Ibid., p. 246 .
vii. ( H. 48 ) Genesis I, 26. ['And God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness."
viii. ( H. 49 ) Calvin, Institutio I, XV, Section 8. ['Man's first condition was excellent because of
these outstanding endowments: that reason, intelligence, prudence, judgment should suffice
not only for the government of this earthly life, but that by them he might ascend beyond,
even unto God and to eternal felicity.'—Tr.]
ix. ( H. 49 ) Zwingli. Von der Klarheit des Wortes Gottes ( Deutsche Schriften I, 56). ['Because
man looks up to God and his Word, he indicates clearly that in his very Nature he is born
somewhat closer to God, is something more after his stamp, that he has something that
draws him to God—all this comes beyond a doubt from his having been created in God's
x. ( H. 50 ) But to disclose the a priori is not to make an 'a-prioristic' construction. Edmund
Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine
philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. 'A-priorism' is the
method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself. There is nothing
constructivistic about it. But for this very reason a priori research requires that the
phenomenal basis be properly prepared. The horizon which is closest to us, and which must
be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness.
xi. (H. 51) Ernst Cassirer has recently made the Dasein of myth a theme for philosophical
Interpretation. (See his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, vol. II, Das mythische
Denken, 1925.) In this study, clues of far-reaching importance are made available for
ethnological research. From the standpoint of philosophical problematics it remains an open
question whether the foundations of this Interpretation are sufficiently transparent—
whether in particular the architectonics and the general systematic content of Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason can provide a possible design for such a task, or whether a new and
more primordial approach may not here be needed. That Cassirer himself sees the
possibility of such a task is shown by his note on pp. 16 ff., where he alludes to the
phenomenological horizons disclosed by Husserl. In a discussion between the author and
Cassirer on the occasion of a lecture before the Hamburg section of the Kantgesellschaft in
December 1923 on 'Tasks and Pathways of Phenomenological Research', it was already
apparent that we agreed in demanding an' existential analytic such as was sketched in that
Division One, Chapter Two
i. ( H. 54 ) Cf. Jakob Grimm, Kleinere Schriften, vol. VII, p. 247.
ii. ( H. 56 ) Cf. Section 29.
Division One, Chapter Three
i ( H. 72 ) The author may remark that this analysis of the environment and in general the
'hermeneutic of the facticity' of Dasein, have been presented repeatedly in his lectures since
the winter semester of 1919-1920.
ii. ( H. 77 ) Cf. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie, I. Teil, this Yearbook [ Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische
Forschung] vol. I, Section 10 ff., as well as his Logische Untersuchungen, vol. I, Ch. 11.
For the analysis of signs and signification see ibid., vol. II, I, Ch. 1 .
iii. ( H. 90 ) Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, I, Pr. 53. ( œuvres, ed. Adam and Tannery, vol.
VIII, p. 25.) ['And though substance is indeed known by some attribute, yet for each
substance there is pre-eminently one property which constitutes its nature and essence, and
to which all the rest are referred.'—Tr.]
iv. ( H. 90 ) Ibid. ['Indeed extension in length, breadth, and thickness constitutes the nature of
corporeal substance! The emphasis is Heidegger's.—Tr.]
v. ( H. 90 ) Ibid. ['For everything else that can be ascribed to body presupposes extension! —
vi. ( H. 90 ) Ibid., Pr. 64, p. 31 . ['And one and the same body can be extended in many
different ways while retaining the same quantity it had before; surely it can sometimes be
greater in length and less in breadth or thickness, while later it may, on the contrary, be
greater in breadth and less in length.'—Tr.]
vii. ( H. 91 ) Ibid., Pr. 65, p. 32 . ['. . . if we think of nothing except what has a place, and do not
ask about the force by which it is set in motion . . .'—Tr.]
viii. ( H. 91 ) Ibid., II, Pr. 4. p. 42 . ['For, so far as hardness is concerned, the sense shows us
nothing else about it than that portions of hard bodies resist the movement of our hands
when they come up against those portions. For if whenever our hands are moved towards a
certain portion, all the bodies there should retreat with the same velocity as that with which
our hands approach, we should never feel any hardness. Nor is it in any way intelligible that
bodies which thus recede should accordingly lose their corporeal nature; hence this does not
consist in hardness.'—Tr.]
ix. ( H. 91 ) Ibid. ['And by the same reasoning it can be shown that weight and colour and all
the other qualities of this sort which are sensed in corporeal matter, can be taken away from
it, while that matter remains entire; it follows that the nature of this depends upon none of
x. ( H. 92 ) Ibid., I, Pr. 51, p. 24 . ['Indeed we perceive that no other things exist without the
help of God's concurrence.'—Tr].
xi. ( H. 92 ) Ibid. [. . . only one substance which is in need of nothing whatsoever, can be
understood, and this indeed is God.'—Tr.]
xii. ( H. 92 ) Ibid. ['Indeed we perceive that other things cannot exist without the help of God's
xiii. ( H. 93 ) Ibid. [The complete passage may be translated as follows: 'The name "substance"
is not appropriate to God and to these univocally, as they say in the Schools; that is, no
signification of this name which would be common to both God and his creation can be
xiv. ( H. 93 ) In this connection, cf. Opuscula omnia Thomae de Vio Caietani Cardinalis,
Lugduni, 1580, Tomus III, Tractatus V; 'de nominum analogia', pp. 211-219.
xv. ( H. 93 ) Descartes, op. cit., I, Pr. 51, p. 24. ['No signification of this name <"substance">
which would be common to God and his creation can be distinctly understood.'—Tr.]
xvi. ( H. 94 ) Ibid., I, Pr. 52, p. 25 . ['Yet substance cannot first be discovered merely by the fact
that it is a thing that exists, for this alone by itself does not affect us.'—Tr.]
xvii. ( H. 94 ) Ibid., I, Pr. 63, p. 31 . ['Indeed we understand extended substance, or thinking
substance more easily than substance alone, disregarding that which thinks or is
xviii. ( H. 96 ) Ibid., II, Pr. 3, p. 41 . ['It will be enough if we point out that the perceptions of the
senses are not referred to anything but the union of the human body with the mind, and that
indeed they ordinarily show us in what way external bodies can be of help to it or do it
xix. ( H. 97 ) Ibid., II, Pr. 3, pp. 41-42 . ['. . . but they do not teach us what kinds of things
bodies> exist in themselves.'—Tr.]
xx. ( H. 97 ) Ibid., II, Pr. 4, p. 42 . ['If we do this, we shall perceive that the nature of matter, or
of body as regarded universally, does not consist in its being something hard or heavy or
coloured or affecting the senses in some other way, but only in its being something
extended in length, breadth, and thickness.'—Tr.]
xxi. ( H. 109 ) Immanuel Kant: "Was Heisst:"Sich im Denken orientieren? ( 1786) Werke (Akad.
Ausgabe), Vol. VIII, pp. 131-147.
xxii. ( H. 112 ) Cf. O. Becker, Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und
ihrer physikalishen Anwendungen, in this Yearbook [ Jahrbuch für Philosophie und
phänomenologische Forschung], vol. VI ( 1923), pp. 385 ff.
Division One, Chapter Four
i. ( H. 116 ) Cf. what Max Scheler has pointed out phenomenologically in his Zur
Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle, 1913, Anhang, pp. 118 ff.; see also his
second edition under the title Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 1923, pp. 244 ff.
ii. ( H. 119 ) "Über die Verwandtschaft der Ortsadverbien mit dem Pronomen in einigen
Sprachen" ( 1829), Gesammelte Schriften (published by the Prussian Academy of Sciences),
vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 304-330.
Division One., Chapter Five
i. ( H. 131 ) Cf. Section 12, H. 52 ff.
ii. ( H. 131 ) Cf. Section 13, H. 59-63.
iii. ( H. 137 ) Cf. Section 18, H. 83 ff.
iv. ( H. 138 ) Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica A 2, 982 b 22 sqq. ['comfort and recreation' — Ross].
v. ( H. 139 ) Cf. Pascal, Pensées, [ed. Brunschvicg, Paris, p. 185]. 'Et de là vient qu'au lieu
qu'en parlant des choses humaines on dit qu'il faut les connaître avant que de les aimer, ce
qui a passé en proverbe, les saints au contraire disent en parlant des choses divines qu'il
faut les aimer pour les connaître, et, qu'on, n'entre dans la vérité que par la charité, dont ils
ont fait une de leurs plus utiles sentences.' ['And thence it comes about that in the case
where we are speaking of human things, it is said to be necessary to know them before we
love them, and this has become a proverb; but the saints, on the contrary, when they speak
of divine things, say that we must love them before we know them, and that we enter into
truth only by charity; they have made of this one of their most useful maxims'.—Tr.) Cf.
with this, Augustine, Opera, ( Migne Patrologiae Latinae, tom. VIII), Contra Faustum, lib.
32, cap. 18: 'non intratur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem.' ['one does not enter into truth
except through charity'.—Tr.]
vi. ( H. 140 ) Cf. Aristotle, Rhetorica B 5, 1382 a 20-1383 b 11.
vii. ( H. 143 ) Cf. Section 18, H. 85 ff.
viii. ( H. 147 ) Cf. Section 4, H. 11 ff.
ix. ( H. 156 ) Cf. Section 13, H. 59 ff.
x. ( H. 166 ) On the doctrine of signification, cf. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen,
vol. II, Investigations I, IV-VI. See further the more radical version of the problematic in his
Ideen I, Sections 123 ff., pp. 255 ff.
xi. ( H. 171 ) Aristotle, Metaphysica A 1, 980 a 21 x.
xii. ( H. 171 ) Augustine, Confessiones, X, 35.
xiii. ( H. 175 ) Cf. Section 9, H. 42 ff.
Division One, Chapter Six
i. ( H. 180 ) Cf. Section 12, H. 52 ff.
ii. ( H. 188 ) Cf. Section 12, , H. 53 ff.
iii. ( H. 189 ) Cf. Section 27, H. 126 ff.
iv. ( H. 190 ) It is no accident that the phenomena of anxiety and fear, which have never been
distinguished in a thoroughgoing manner, have come within the purview of Christian
theology ontically and even (though within very narrow limits) ontologically. This has
happened whenever the anthropological problem of man's Being towards God has won
priority and when questions have been formulated under the guidance of phenomena like
faith, sin, love, and repentance. Cf. Augustine's doctrine of the timor castus and servilis,
which is discussed in his exegetical writings and his letters. On fear in general cf. his De
diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, qu. 33 (de metu); qu. 34 (utrum non aliud amandum
sit, quam metu carere); qu. 35 (quid amandum sit). ( Migne, Patrologiae Latinae tom. VII,
pp. 23 ff.)
Luther has treated the problem of fear not only in the traditional context of an Interpretation
of poenitentia and contritio, but also in his commentary on the Book of Genesis, where,
though his treatment is by no means highly conceptualized, it is all the more impressive as
edification. Cf. Enarrationes in genesin, cap. 3, Werke( Erlanger Ausgabe ), Exegetica
opera latina, tom. I, pp. 177 ff.
The man who has gone farthest in analysing the phenomenon of anxiety—and again in the
theological context of a 'psychological' exposition of the problem of original sin—is Soren
Kierkegaard. Cf. Der Begriff der Angst (The Concept of Dread], 1844, Gesammelte Werke
( Diederichs), vol. 5.
v. ( H. 197 ) The author ran across the following pre-ontological illustration of the existential-
ontological Interpretation of Dasein as care in K. Burdach's article. "Faust und die Sorge"
( Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, vol. I, 1923,
pp. 1 ff.). Burdach has shown that the fable of Cura (which has come down to us as No. 220
of the Fables of Hyginus) was taken over from Herder by Goethe and worked up for the
second part of his Faust. Cf. especially pp. 40 ff. The text given above is taken from F.
Bücheler ( Rheinisches Museum, vol. 41, 1886, p. 5); the translation is from Burdach, Ibid.,
pp. 41 ff .
vi. ( H. 198 ) Cf. Herder's poem: "Das Kind der Sorge" (Suphan XXIX, 75).
vii. ( H. 199 ) Burdach, op. cit., p. 49. Even as early as the Stoics, μέριμνα was a firmly
established term, and it recurs in the New Testament, becoming "sollicitudo" in the Vulgate.
The way in which care' is viewed in the foregoing existential analytic of Dasein, is one
which has grown upon the author in connection with his attempts to Interpret the
Augustinian (i.e., Helleno-Christian) anthropology with regard to the foundational
principles reached in the ontology of Aristotle.
viii. ( H. 201 ) Cf. H. 89 ff. and H. 100.
2ix. ( H. 203 ) Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 274 ff., and further the corrections
added in the preface to the second edition, p. xxxix, note: see also 'On the Paralogisms of
the Pure. Reason', ibid., pp. 399 ff., especially p. 412 .
x. ( H. 203 ) Ibid. , Preface, note.
xi. H. 203 ) Ibid., p. 275 .
xii. ( H. 203 ) Ibid., p. 275 .
xiii. .( H. 204 ) Ibid., p. 275 .
xiv. ( H. 205 ) Ibid., Preface, note .
xv. ( H. 205 ) Cf. W. Dilthey, "Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vorn Ursprung unseres
Glaubens an die Realität der Aussenwelt und seinem Recht" ( 1890), Gesammelte
Schriften, Vol. V, i, pp. 90 ff. At the very beginning of this article Dilthey says in no
uncertain terms: 'For if there is to be a truth which is universally valid for man, then in
accordance with the method first proposed by Descartes, thought must make its way from
the facts of consciousness rather than from external actuality.' ( Ibid., p. 90 .)
xvi. ( H. 208 ) Following Scheler's procedure, Nicolai Hartmann has recently based his
ontologically oriented epistemology upon the thesis that knowing is a 'relationship of
Being'. Cf. his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, second enlarged edition,
1925. Both Scheler and Hartmann, however, in spite of all the differences in the
phenomenological bases from which they start, fail to recognize that in its traditional basic
orientation as regards Dasein, 'ontology' has been a failure, and that the very 'relationship
of Being' which knowing includes (see above, H. 59 ff.), compels such 'ontology' to be
revised in its principles, not just critically corrected. Because Hartmann underestimates the
unexpressed consequences of positing a relationship-of-Being without providing an
ontological clarification for it, he is forced into a 'critical realism' which is at bottom quite
foreign to the level of the problematic he has expounded. On Hartmann's way of taking
ontology, cf. his "Wie ist kritische Ontologic ürhaupt möich?", Festschrift für Paul
Natorp, 1924, pp. 124 ff.
xvii. ( H. 209 ) Cf. specially Section 16, H. 72 ff. ('How the Worldly Character of the
Environment Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world'); Section 18, H. 83 ff.
('Involvement and Significance; the Worldhood of the World'); Section 29, H. 134 ff.
('Dasein as State-of-Mind'). On the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world, cf. H. 75 f.
xviii. ( H. 209 ) Dilthey, op. cit., p. 134.
xix. ( H. 210 ) Cf. Scheler's lecture, "Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung", 1925, notes 24
and 25. In reading our proofs we notice that in the collection of Scheler's treatises which
has just appeared ( Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, 1926) he has published his
long-promised study ' Erkenntnis und Arbeit' (pp. 233 ff.). Division VI of this treatise (p.
455) brings a more detailed exposition of his 'voluntative theory of Dasein', in connection
with an evaluation and critique of Dilthey.
xx. ( H. 212 ) Diels, Fragment 5. [This passage may be translated in more than one way: e.g.,
for thought and being are the same thing' (Fairbanks); 'it is the same thing that can be
thought and that can be' (Burnet).—Tr.]
xxi. ( H. 212 ) Aristotle, Metaphysica A.
xxii. ( H. 213 ) Ibid., A, 984a 18 ff. ['. . . the very fact showed them the way and joined in
forcing them to investigate the subject.' (Ross)—Tr.]
xxiii. ( H. 213 ) Ibid. , A, 986b 31.
xxiv. ( H. 213 ) Ibid. , A, 984b 10.
xxv. ( H. 213 ) Ibid. , A, 983b 2. Cf. .988a 20.
xxvi. xxvi.( H. 213 ) Ibid. , aI, 993b 17.
xxvii. ( H. 213 ) Ibid. , aI, 993b 20.
xxviii. ( H. 213 ) Ibid. , I', I, 1003a 21.
xxix. ( H. 214 ) Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a. 6. [This is not an exact quotation.—Tr.)
xxx. ( H. 214 ) Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, qu. I, art. I.
xxxi.. ( H. 215 ) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2 p. 82.
xxxii. ( H. 215 ) Ibid., p. 83 . [Two trivial misprints in this quotation which appear in the earlier
editions have been corrected in the later editions.—Tr.]
xxxiii. ( H. 215 ) Ibid., p. 350 . [Another trivial misprint has been corrected in the later
xxxiv. ( H. 218 ) On the idea of demonstration as 'identification' el. Husserl, Logische 2Untersuchungen, Vol. II, part 2, Untersuchung VI. On 'evidence and truth' see ibid. ,
Sections 36-39, pp. 115 ff. The usual presentations of the phenomenological theory
of truth confine themselves to what has been said in the critical prolegomena (vol. 1),
and mention that this is connected with Bolzano's theory of the proposition. But the
positive phenomenological Interpretations, which differ basically from Bolzano's theory,
have been neglected. The only person who has taken up these investigations positively
from outside the main stream of phenomenological research, has been E. Lask whose
Logik der Philosophie ( 1911) was as strongly influenced by the sixth Untersuchung
( "Über sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen", pp. 128 ff.) as his Lehre vom Urteil
( 1912) was influenced by the above-mentioned sections on evidence and truth.
xxxv. ( H. 219 ) Cf. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Heracleitus fragment B 1.
xxxvi. ( H. 220 ) Cf. H. 32 ff.
xxxvii. ( H. 221 ) Cf. H. 134 ff.
xxxviii. ( H. 221 ) Cf. H. 166 ff.
xxxix. ( H. 223 ) Karl Reinhardt (Cf. his Parmenides und die Geschichte der grieschischen
Philosophie, 1916) was the first to conceptualize and solve the hackneyed problem of
how the two parts of Parmenides' poem are connected, though he did not explicitly point
out the ontological foundation for the connection between ἐλ?，?Θεια and δó?α, or its
xl. ( H. 223 ) Cf. Section 33 above, H. 153 ff. ('Assertion as a derivative mode of
xli. ( H. 223 ) Cf. Section 34, H. 160 ff.
xlii. ( H. 225 ) Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea Z and Metaphysicae ? 10.
Division Two, Section 45
i. ( H. 231 ) Cf. Section 9, H. 41 ff.
ii. ( H. 231 ) Cf. Section 6, H. 19 ff.; Section 21, H. 93 ff.; Section 43, H. 201.
iii. ( H. 232 ) Cf. Section 32, H. 148 ff.
iv. ( H. 232 ) Cf. Section 9, H. 41 ff.
v. ( H. 233 ) Cf. Section 41, H. 191 ff.
vi. ( H. 235 ) In the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard explicitly seized upon the problem
of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But
the existential problematic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he remained 1completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it. Thus, there is
more to be learned philosophically from his 'edifying' writings than from his theoretical
ones—with the exception of his treatise on the concept of anxiety. [Here Heidegger is
referring to the work generally known in English as The Concept of Dread.—Tr.]
Division Two, Chapter One
i. ( H. 240 ) Cf. Section 9, H. 41 ff.
ii. ( H. 241 ) Cf. Section 10, H. 45 ff.
iii. ( H. 244 ) The distinction between a whole and a sum, ὅλον and πâν, totum and
compositum, has been familiar since the time of Plato and Aristotle. But admittedly no one
as yet knows anything about the systematics of the categorial variations which this division
already embraces, nor have these been conceptualized. As an approach to a thorough
analysis of the structures in question, cf. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol.
II, Untersuchung III: "Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen".
iv. ( H. 245 ) Der Ackermann aus Böhmen, edited by A.Bernt and K. Burdach. ( Vom
Mittelalter zur Reformation. Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung, edited by
K. Burdach, vol. III, 2. Teil) 1917, chapter 20, p. 46.
v. ( H. 246 ) On this topic, of the comprehensive presentation in E. Korschelt's Lebensdauer,
Altern und Tod, 3rd Edition, 1924. Note especially the full bibliography, pp. 414 ff.
vi. ( H. 249 ) In its Interpretation of 'life', the anthropology worked out in Christian theology—
from Paul right up to Calvin's meditatio futurae vitae—has always kept death in view.
Wilhelm Dilthey, whose real philosophical tendencies were aimed at an ontology of 'life',
could not fail to recognize how life is connected with death: '. . . and finally, that
relationship which most deeply and universally determines the feeling of our Dasein—the
relationship of life to death; for the bounding of our existence by death is always decisive
for our understanding and assessment of life.' ( Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 5th Edition,
p. 230.) Recently, G. Simmel has also explicitly included the
____________________ 1Here we follow the older editions in reading '. . . und der durch diesen gesehencn antiken
Philosophie . . .' In the new editions 'gesehenen' has been changed to 'geschehenen'.
phenomenon of death in his characterization of 'life', though admittedly without clearly
separating the biological-ontical and the ontological-existential problematics. (Cf. his
Lebrnsanschauung:Vier Metaphysische Kapitel, 1918, pp. 99-153.) For the investigation
which lies before us, compare especially Karl Jaspers' Psychologie der Weltanschauungen,
3rd Edition, 1925, pp. 229 ff., especially pp. 259-270. Jaspers takes as his clue to death the
phenomenon of the 'limit-situation' as he has set it forth—a phenomenon whose
fundamental significance goes beyond any typology of 'attitudes' and 'world-pictures'.
Dilthey's challenges have been taken up by Rudolf Unger in his Herder, Novalis und Kleist.
Studien über die Entwicklung des Todesproblems im Denken und Dichten von Sturm und
Drang zur Romantik, 1922. In his lecture 'Literaturgeschichte als Problemgeschichte. Zur
Frage geisteshistorischer Synthese, mit besonderer Bezichung auf Wilhelm Dilthey'
( Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, 1.
Jahr, Heft 1, 1924), Unger considers the principles of Dilthey's way of formulating the
question. He sees clearly the significance of phenomenological research for laying the