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D - R - A - F - T

By Eric Willis,2014-06-18 00:19
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D - R - A - F - T ...

    Remarks by Lee H. Hamilton

    Presentation of a Special Achievement Award

    To the Staff of the 9/11 Commission

    By the American Society of Public Administration

    National Capital Area Chapter

    April 20, 2005

Thank you, Paul, for your kind introduction. I also want to thank the

    Capital Area Chapter of the American Society of Public Administration,

    and its president Tish Tucker; Government Executive magazine and its

    editor Tim Clark; and IBM Consulting Services for hosting tonight’s

    awards event.

At the outset, I want to acknowledge Governor Tom Kean, who chaired

    the 9/11 Commission. He provided outstanding leadership for the

    Commission. We worked together very closely. We developed a

    strong partnership and friendship. Governor Kean could not be here

    today. He is concluding his work as President of Drew University and

    so it is a very busy time for him. When the American Society for Public

    Administration decides to establish a Hall of Fame for Public Servants,

    Tom Kean will be elected on the first ballot.

I am here this evening on behalf of the Chair, but also on behalf of my

    fellow Commissioners: Richard Ben-Veniste, Fred Fielding, Jamie

    Gorelick, Slade Gorton, Bob Kerrey, John Lehman, Tim Roemer and

    Jim Thompson. They are extraordinary Americans of great stature and

    accomplishment. We needed all of their diverse talents. At crucial

    moments, each Commissioner made an indispensable contribution to

    our collective work.

The Commissioners, of course, take responsibility for the content of the

    report. Yet, as anyone in this town knows, a Commission is only as

    good as its staff.

By and measure, the staff was just exceptional. Several of my fellow

    Commissioners told me that in all their years in Washington, they had

    never seen a better staff. One Commissioner told Ambassador

    Negroponte last week that the 9/11 Commission staff is a national

    treasure and indeed they are.

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    Under the direction of Executive Director Phil Zelikow, Deputy Director

    Chris Kojm, General Counsel Dan Marcus and his Deputy Steve Dunne,

    the staff:

o Reviewed over 2 million pages of documents;

    o Conducted over 1200 interviews, including every senior national

    security official of the past two Administration; o Traveled and met senior officials in 10 countries; o Prepared 19 days of hearings with over 160 witnesses; o Wrote 19 statements of fact to introduce each of the hearings;

    and

    o Drafted 13 chapters of the final report, accompanied by over 1700

    footnotes; and

    o Prepared the 41 recommendations included in the final report.

The Commissioners worked intensively on the final report and

    recommendations and so did the staff.

Every chapter drafted by staff had at least 3 reviews and edits by

    Commissioners. The chapters on policy had 6 reviews by

    Commissioners. I am not sure we kept track, but there were

    probably double that number of editing sessions by the staff. So,

    some chapters were reviewed 20 times. These were not quick

    read-throughs. Each editing session typically lasted six hours.

    The longest, I think, was about 14 hours.

So, the work load was unrelenting. The pressure was intense.

    Average work weeks of 60 hours ramped upward to 120 hour

    work weeks before we finished. We were probably paying below

    the minimum wage when calculated on an hourly basis. Tom and

    I ofrent remarked in those closing days that we were fortunate

    that we didn’t have lawsuits filed against us!

We asked the staff to do extraordinary things. Time and again, after

    lengthy discussions among the Commissioners and with the

    result anything but clear a Commissioner would say, “Well, the

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    staff can write it up.” And to my amazement, they did. They met,

    and exceeded, our expectations time and time again.

Who made up this remarkable staff?

Tom and I insisted that the staff be professional, non-partisan, and

    committed. Before hiring we inquired not about their politics, but

    about their competence.

The Commission had a huge, sprawling mandate everything from

    foreign policy and covert action to airline and border security;

    everything from communications between the FAA and NORAD

    to communications between police and firefighters at the World

    Trade Center.

The Commission needed talent across many areas of expertise

    and we got it. Every adult, and many children, in America

    remember exactly where they were and what they doing when

    they heard about the 9/11 attacks. So, just as there was an

    outpouring of assistance after 9/11, the Commission, too,

    received a flood of resumes from citizens, inside and outside the

    government, who wanted to help us with our work.

We had staff who had served in the White House, on the National

    Security Council staff, and in the Departments of State, Treasury,

    Defense, Justice, and Energy. We had FBI special agents and

    CIA officers. We had Congressional staffers and military officers.

     We had federal prosecutors and distinguished professors. We

    had budget analysts and investigators. We had some two dozen

    attorneys.

We had a former Federal Air Marshal, an NYPD officer, and an

    historian whose last assignment had been the Spy Museum

We had an immigration inspector and a private eye who had been a

    postal inspector.

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We had a CIA officer whose last assignment for the previous 15

    months had been running operations in Afghanistan.

We had a former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA.

We had a former Attorney General of New Jersey, and a sitting

    Deputy Attorney General of the State of New York.

In many cases, staff connections to 9/11 were wrenching, and

    intensely personal.

One of our family liaison officers, Ellie Hartz, lost her husband on

    9/11. The other, Emily Walker, had been able to escape safely

    from WTC Building Seven.

Two other staff in our New York office lost family and loved ones.

One of our staffers, Kevin Shaeffer who is with us tonight had

    been working at the Naval Command Center in the Pentagon the

    morning of September 11

    th, tracking events unfolding in New

    York. When Flight 77 struck the Pentagon, everyone in his

    section was killed. Kevin nearly died, and signed his military

    retirement papers to improve benefits for his family. Kevin

    survived, and underwent months of rehabilitation and skin grafts.

     His first day on the job with us was March 11, 2003 eighteen

    months after the attack. He was hired to work on the review of the

    emergency response in New York, and the emergency response

    at the Pentagon that had saved his life. He signs all of his e-mails:

    “Never Forget.” His dedication to the work of the Commission

    inspired us all.

What exactly did the Commission and its staff accomplish? Did we

    fulfill our purpose?

Basically, we had two tasks:

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    ??First, to tell the story of 9/11: the facts and circumstances

    surrounding the attacks of September 11;

    ??Second, to make recommendations, to make our country safer

    and more secure.

    Telling the Story. As to the first question, we fulfilled our task. We told the

    story of September 11th. We had unparalleled access to documents and to witnesses. We placed an unprecedented amount of classified

    material into the public record. We told the story of the hijackers. We

    told stories of covert actions. We cited missed opportunities to disrupt

    the plot. We corrected false stories about FAA and NORAD on the

    thmorning of September 11. We put to rest many theories of

    conspiracy. We told stories of heroism, on Flight 93 and in the Towers

    of the World Trade Center.

We do not know what future evidence historians will uncover. But we

    know that we saw every document we asked for. We believe that

    future accounts of 9/11 will build on the one we have written.

Surely, for the present, the 9/11 Commission Report -- which for a while

    was keeping pace with Harry Potter in book sales -- is the definitive

    account of 9/11.

    Making recommendations. We made 41 recommendations. Congress has acted on a number of them, most notably the intelligence reform act

    signed into law by the President in December.

    That law created, as we recommended, a Director of National

    Intelligence, a National Counterterrorism Center, and a Privacy and

    Civil Liberties Board. It carried out several of our border and

    transportation security recommendations. It spoke favorably, if not

    substantively, about several of our recommendations in “sense of Congress” language. Much, however, remains to be done.

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    No law is self-executing. We will need to pay close attention and monitor the creation of new institutions in the Intelligence Community,

    and the implementation of the statute.

    Our chief disappointment was failing to persuade the Congress to reform its own institutions. We proposed, and Congress and the

    President created, strong authorities in the Executive branch. But we

    also need strong authorities in the Congress to serve as a check and

    balance on the Executive. Power, wherever located, must be checked.

     Congress needs to conduct robust oversight, as a watchdog and a

    partner in helping the President carry out reform.

    Congress has too much overlapping jurisdiction. Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff has to report to some four score

    committees and subcommittees. When you report to eighty bosses,

    you cannot possibly get consistent guidance and direction.

    Because of overlapping jurisdiction, the intelligence and homeland security committees are weak. They need exclusive