The seven capital sins and their “daughters” (Summa Th., II-II)
1. Vainglory. Q132, a.5. Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned
to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love
Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [Praesumptio novitatum, literally
'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the
species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.
Objection 2. Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.
Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among
men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory. I answer that, As stated above (34, 5;35, 4; I-II, 84, A3,4), the vices which by their
very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the
end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated above (A1,4): and to this end a man
may tend in two ways. On one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if
they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if
they be false, it is hypocrisy. On another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that
he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have
"obstinacy," by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is
better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have "discord," whereby a man is unwilling to give up his
own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards "speech," and then we have "contention," whereby a
man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is "disobedience," whereby a man
refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (112, 1, ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is directed
sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.
Reply to Objection 2. Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.
Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter
for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this were
2. Sloth. Q35, a.4, ad 2. Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?
Objection 1. It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful acts, as stated above (34, 5). Now sloth does not move one to action, but on
the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be accounted a capital sin.
Objection 2. Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth, viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in
regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things." Now these do not seem in
reality to arise from sloth. For "spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated
above (34, 6); "malice" is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind
after unlawful things is to be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to be the
same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly
accounted a capital sin.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the vice of sorrow, saying (De
Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite, faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth is a capital sin, and has the
daughters aforesaid. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 84, 3,4), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above (2; I-II, 85, 8), it is fittingly reckoned a capital sin.
Reply to Objection 1. Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing things that cause
sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2. Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For since, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of "despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called "malice." On so far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to the others.
Reply to Objection 3. This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit.
Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above (2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of purpose.
3. Envy. Q36, a.4, ad 3. Whether envy is a capital vice?
Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the capital vices are distinct from
their daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "those
who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is not a capital vice.
Objection 2. Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the other vices which arise from
them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived
mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and
confuse the mind with their wild outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral.
v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into the heart of
man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to
enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a capital sin.
Objection 3. Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
45), who says that from envy arise "hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and
grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the
same as envy, as appears from what has been said above (3). Therefore these should not be assigned as
daughters of envy.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital
sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters thereto. I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual
good, so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated above (35, 4) that sloth is a capital
vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or of
satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices are so closely akin to
one another that one springs from the other. For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by
corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of an empty name, it
repines for fear lest another should acquire that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not
exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it should have some principal reason for
being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from
vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit.
Caenob. v, 1).
Reply to Objection 2. It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins,
but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the devil, death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).
There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another's
spiritual good, which envy is a sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our neighbor's
good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby a man envies, as it were, the
Holy Ghost Himself, Who is glorified in His works.
Reply to Objection 3. The number of envy's daughters may be understood for the reason that in the
struggle aroused by envy there is something by way of beginning, something by way of middle, and
something by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's reputation, and this either
secretly, and then we have "tale-bearing," or openly, and then we have "detraction." The middle consists in
the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and then we have "joy at
another's misfortune," or he is unable, and then we have "grief at another's prosperity." The term is hatred
itself, because just as good which delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (34, 6).
Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over
another's prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other
hand, "joy at another's misfortune" is not directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief
over our neighbor's good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.
4. Anger. Q158, a.7. Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?
Objection 1. It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by
Isidore [QQ. In Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of
Objection 2. Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.
Objection 3. Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of
the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger. I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is
on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [indignum] of acting
thus towards him, and this is called "indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far
as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2,
"Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind."
Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger.
One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (5, ad 3) of the man who
says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The
other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is
"blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely." Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding
to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of injuries
inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
Reply to Objection 1. The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Sirach 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride [Cf,
162, 07, ad 2; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a
disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
Reply to Objection 2. Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now
through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to
reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.
Reply to Objection 3. Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
5. Covetousness. Q118, a.8. Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?
Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness is
opposed to liberality, as stated above (3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence,
perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice,
insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness.
Objection 2. Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints
[kyminopristes], misers [kimbikes], who do illiberal deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom,
usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is
Objection 5. Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i.e.
covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above. I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the
desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things.
For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to
mercy," because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches [See030,
1. On the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness
may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. On this way it gives rise to "restlessness,"
by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money"
(Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution [effectu]. On this way the covetous man, in
acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to "violence," sometimes deceit,
and then if he has recourse to words, it is "falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if he confirm his
statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have "fraud"; if persons,
then we have "treachery," as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1. There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end;
seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.
Reply to Objection 2. These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.
Reply to Objection 3. These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a
special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to
restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same
as insensibility to mercy.
Reply to Objection 4. The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If
he gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is "tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance,
he is said to be kyminopristes [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about
things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving,
and this in two ways. On one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing
shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such
as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury,
or by laboring much to make little profit. On another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by
using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as
Reply to Objection 5. Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
6. Gluttony. Q148, a.6. Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?
Objection 1. It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding."
For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, "Who are glad when they have done evil,
and rejoice in most wicked things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to
Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil." Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
Objection 2. Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Is. 28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to
be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel, according to Sirach 31:25,
"If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." Therefore it should
not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony. I answer that, As stated above (1 and 2,3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking.
Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and
drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body.
on the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled
by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense
in the understanding," on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand,
abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, "I thought in my heart to
withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the. appetite,
which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast
asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions
are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of
3 Esdra 3:20, that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards inordinate
words, and thus we have "loquaciousness," because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were
carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day
would not have been so tortured in his tongue." Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we
have "scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the
speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish talking or scurrility,"
says that "fools call this geniality--i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both of these,
however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which
belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility." On the part of
the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind
of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, "But fornication and
all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust."
Reply to Objection 1. Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from
immoderate partaking of meat or drink. On like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as regards matters
of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony,
for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2. Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a
remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
Reply to Objection 3. Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.
7. Lust. Q153, a.5. Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?
Objection 1. It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or
despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence,
which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be
reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
Objection 2. Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (128, ad 6;137, 3). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.
Objection 3. Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
Objection 4. Further, Isidore [QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust. Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." On this respect we have "blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." On this respect there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (53, 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments." On this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must be referred.] [The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will undo those words." On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.
Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief
corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.
Reply to Objection 2. The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of
fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf, 35, 4, ad 2;118, 8, ad 1; 148, 6).
Reply to Objection 3. Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the
common origin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.
Reply to Objection 4. The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the
main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Mt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.