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The Law of the Lisbon Treaty

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The Law of the Lisbon Treaty

    The Law of the Lisbon Treaty

    Royal Irish Academy

    11 May 2009

    Fundamental Rights Protection Post Lisbon: the Impact of Incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

    Dr Angela Ward

    Adjunct Professor in European Union and Human Rights Law

    University College Dublin

This paper will address the following themes.

    1. What meaning might the Court of Justice attribute to the

    phrase “the same legal value as the Treaties” in Article 6(1)

    TEU?

    2. Do any other provisions of the Lisbon Treaties expand the

    scope of fundamental rights protection in Europe?

    3. What are the principle drawbacks or difficulties with the

    Charter?

    4. How do the provisions on accession of the Union to the

    ECHR relate to the Charter?

    5. Is there a better way in which fundamental rights protection

    might be enhanced in the Union, aside from vesting the

    Charter with “the same legal value as the Treaties”?

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    1. The meaning of “the same legal value as the Treaties” in

    Article 6(1) TEU.

The text of Article 6 of the TEU is as follows.

    “(1) The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.

    The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.

    The rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.

    (2) The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union‟s competences as defined in the Treaties.

    (3) Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union‟s law.”

    1.1 The “legal value” of the Treaties was set by the Court of Justice in the van Gend en Loos case (Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos (1963)

    1). The two salient paragraphs are as follows;

    “In addition the task assigned to the Court of Justice under

    Article 177 [Article 234], the object of which is to secure

    uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and

    tribunals, confirms the states have acknowledged that

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    Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their

    nationals before those courts and tribunals.

    The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community

    constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit

    of which states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit in

    limited fields and the subject of which comprise not only

    Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the

    legislation of the Member States, Community law therefore not

    only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to

    confer upon them rights which become part of their legal

    heritage. These rights arise not only where they are [1]

    expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of

    obligations which the Treaty imposes [2] in a clearly defined

    way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and

    upon the institutions of the Community” (emphasis added).

    This passage and subsequent case law of the Court of Justice established that some, but not all, provisions of the treaties are directly effective and vest individuals with rights. It will depend whether the obligation on the Member States and the Community institution is imposed “in a clearly defined way”. More recent case

    law has added an entitlement in the hands of individuals for national measures to be interpreted in conformity with Treaty articles. See eg. Case C 165/91 Simon J. Munster v. Rijksdienst

    voor pensionen [1994] ECR I 4661.

    1.2 The same distinctions on the extent to which individuals are entitled to legal enforcement of rights permeate the Charter. They range from rights that are sufficiently well defined to be directly effective, to those that are programmatic in nature, and on which individuals will not be able to base challenge the validity of EU measures, or national measures that implement Union law. The Munster duty of sympathetic interpretation may not extend to the Charter provisions, due to the distinction between principles and rights.

    1.3 Article 52 (4) of the Charter is central to the distinction. It provides as follows;

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    “The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially congisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.”

    National and Community courts are bound to pay due regard to the explanations to the Charter originally drawn up by the Praesidium of the constitutional convention and subsequently updated under the responsibility of the European Convention. It makes it clear that “principles” are to be respected in the promulgation of Union acts and their implementation by Member States, but they only become relevant when measures taken to secure their ends are subject to review. They do not however give rise to direct claims for positive actions.

    Examples of principles given in the explanation are Articles 25, 26, and 37. The explanation adds that the Charter may contain elements of a right and a principle, eg. Articles 23, 33, and 34.

    Significance can also be drawn from the fact that, throughout the explanations, there is a pattern of emphasis when there is substantial acquis addressing Charter right in question. Eg. Article 15, freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work; Article 16, freedom to conduct a business; Article 27, the right of workers to information and consultation with an undertaking. Breadth of competence and depth of acquis may be one of the

    factors weighed by the Court of Justice in determining whether a Charter provision merely states a principle, or confers a justiciable right.

    1.4 Three examples of principles are listed below. They are backed by limited legislative authority for the Union to Act. The Charter will only be relevant in the interpretation of the measures passed, and their implementation by Member States.

(i) Article 22 of the Charter.

    “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”.

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However, the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of “racial

    or ethnic origin” in Article 19 (1) FT a relative of cultural rights, is

    more likely to be enforceable by individuals

    The impact of Article 22 is further attenuated by the fact that Union competence in this field is narrow. Legislative competence, I would suggest, might be one of the guides deployed by the Court of Justice to determine whether Charter measure is a principle only, or whether it confers justiciable rights. Under Article 51(2) of the Charter, the Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law. Under the second paragraph of 6 (1) of the TEU, the provisions of the Charter are not to extend the competences of the Union.

    The authority of the Union to Act in the field of preservation of culture is limited. But it is a principle which requires respect when action is taken.

Article 13

    “In formulating and implementing the Union‟s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rights, cultural traditions, and regional heritage.”

A similar commitment appears in Article 167 (4).

“The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action

    under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.”

See also Article 3 of the TEU.

    The Union “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe‟s cultural heritage is safeguarded and

    enhanced.”

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    Article 167 FT, which commits the Union to the “flowering of the cultures of the Member States” while “respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.” An authority for the Union to act in this field appears in Articles 167 (2) and 167 (5). However, it is limited to encouraging cooperation, supplementing Member State action, and the adoption of incentive measures.

Article 2 TEU “The Union is founded on …..respect for human

    rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”