A CHOICE FOR CHINA
Ending the destruction of Burma’s northern frontier forests
A Briefing Document by Global Witness. October 2005.
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1 RECOMMENDATIONS
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The international community bears a responsibility for guaranteeing the fundamental arights of all the people of Burma. It is essential therefore, that the international
community supports moves towards a more democratic and inclusive Burma and the end of military rule. The international community should also encourage the development of civil society through its participation in the decision making process and promote transparency and freedom of information at all levels.
The international community must ensure that its demand for timber and timber products does not provide funding to a regime that represses people who oppose it. It should also ensure that this demand does not lead to an increase in poverty amongst Burma‟s rural poor or to large-scale destruction of Burma‟s northern frontier forests,
the focus of this report.
The International Community should:
; Adopt legislation to prohibit the importation and sale of timber, which has been bharvested, transported, bought or sold in violation of national laws. This
should include timber imported either directly from the country where the
timber was logged or via intermediate countries.
; Establish a working group with representatives from the SPDC, ceasefire
groups, civil society, United Nations agencies and the Chinese authorities to
facilitate measures to combat illegal logging in northern Burma and support
initiatives to promote sustainable development in Kachin State.
; Support independent assessments of the extent of illegal logging and forest loss,
and the extent and composition of the forest resource base, in Kachin State
through a combination of satellite imagery and photography, aerial
photography and ground-truthing.
; Facilitate a forest value assessment for Kachin State, under the auspices of the
working group referred to above, to be followed by participatory forest zoning
(see „Box 7: Forest Values‟, page 28).
; Help rebuild society at a local level in northern Burma through the promotion
of educational projects including environmental awareness, encourage the
continuation of sustainable resource use and protection, and support grassroots
environmental initiatives.
a The military government renamed Burma as Myanmar in 1989 and this name is used by the United Nations. In this report, however, Global Witness will use Burma, and Myanmar will only be used where
it is quoted by name. b It is currently entirely legal to import and market timber and timber products, produced in breach of the laws of the country of origin, into all timber importing countries including China. China should lead the way in rectifying this anomaly.
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; Support Thai proposals for the creation of a new „Southeast Asian Regional
Law Enforcement Network to Combat Nature Crimes‟, including measures to c tackle the illegal trans-boundary timber trade.
Timber importing companies should not:
; Import timber, or processed timber products, that have been produced from
wood illegally exported from northern Burma to China.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE‟S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The Chinese authorities at a national, provincial and local level should ensure that economic development in China, particularly in Yunnan Province, is not detrimental to Burma‟s peoples.
In relation to the management of Burma‟s forests the government of the People‟s Republic of China should:
; Suspend the importation of logs and processed timber across the China-Burma
border pending a review of the legality of all logging operations in Kachin State.
Make data relating to the importation of timber from Burma publicly available. ;
This should include timber volume, value, legal provenance and details of the
contracting parties.
; Help the ceasefire groups carry out Environmental and Social Impact
Assessments (ESIAs) for all current and future development projects and for
any commercial activities concerning the exploitation of natural resources that
involve Chinese companies operating in areas under their control. Such a
process should include meaningful public consultation.
; Abide by international environmental commitments including the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), and end the illegal importation of Himalayan Yew trees from
northern Burma.
The government of the People‟s Republic of China, in accordance with its
commitments made in the September 2001 East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) Declaration, should:
; Take immediate action to strengthen bilateral cooperation with the Burmese
Forestry Department, and establish a dialogue with relevant officials within
ceasefire group administrations, to address the issue of illegal logging in
northern Burma, the illegal timber trade with China and corruption linked to
this timber.
c In his address at the opening ceremony of the 13th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES on 2 October 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra proposed that Thailand take the lead in the formation of such a network and to host a meeting in 2005 to work out the details for creating this network.
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; Play a more proactive role in the Regional Taskforce on Forest Law
Enforcement and Governance, which was established to advance the objectives
of the FLEG Declaration.
; Develop mechanisms for the effective exchange of experience relating to forest
protection and forestry, and information including log and timber import data.
; Encourage the participation of the Burmese Forestry Department, relevant
officials within ceasefire group administrations, and civil society in the FLEG
initiative (see ‟13 Appendix I‟, pages 89-91).
THE STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
In order to bring about an equitable, long-term solution to the conflicts, natural resource management and effect a transition to civilian rule the SPDC must enter into a meaningful and inclusive dialogue with all political parties and the armed opposition groups.
The SPDC‟s failure to stop illegal timber exports to China in particular has resulted in widespread forest destruction, and a corresponding increase in concern amongst local people in Kachin State. A minority, many of them soldiers under the control of the SPDC Northern Command, have enriched themselves at the expense of the majority.
In relation to the management of forests in Burma the SPDC should:
; Stop the illegal and unsustainable logging facilitated by SPDC troops in Kachin
State, and end the illegal cross-border timber trade with China.
; Ensure that natural resources, including forests, are managed in an equitable,
sustainable and transparent manner.
; Increase aid and development to the ceasefire areas, and other impoverished
border regions, and ensure that the local economies are not reliant on
unsustainable natural resource exploitation.
THE CEASEFIRE GROUPS IN KACHIN STATE.
Widespread forest loss is leading to serious environmental and social problems, and is ultimately undermining development in the ceasefire areas and beyond. The ceasefire groups bear a responsibility for helping to end this illegal and destructive trade, particularly logging operations in areas under their control and timber exports that pass through their territory.
The Ceasefire Groups in Kachin State should:
; Notify the relevant authorities in both Burma and China of all illegal timber
transportation as and when it passes through areas under their control and prior
to its export to China. This information should also be made available to the
international community, particularly to members of the East Asia FLEG
Regional Taskforce, and to the public.
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; Suspend logging activities, development projects and commercial operations
that are unsustainable or are of questionable economic and social value.
; Ensure the equitable distribution of the benefits of any development project, or
commercial activity involving the exploitation of natural resources in ceasefire
areas.
; Give full support and access to grassroots initiatives that aim to protect the
environment and to other sustainable development activities at a community
level.
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
A CHOICE FOR CHINA ............................................................................. 1
1 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................... 2
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... 5
3 PREFACE ................................................................................................................ 7
4 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 10
5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... 11
Box 1: Key Findings………………………………………………………………..11
PART ONE: THE CASE FOR CHANGE .................................................. 13
6 REGIONAL STABILITY AND TRADE ............................................................... 14
Box 2: Khin Nyunt‟s fall from power .................................................................... 16
6.1 Chinese government leadership: the key to conflict-resolution in Burma? ........ 17
Box 3: Chinese foreign policy and conflict in Burma ............................................. 19
6.2 Unsustainable logging, conflict and instability on the China-Burma border ...... 20
6.3 The spread of HIV/AIDS ................................................................................. 21
6.4 Opium, drug abuse and logging ....................................................................... 22
7 THE ILLEGAL BURMA-CHINA TIMBER TRADE ............................................ 23
7.1 Chinese demand and illegal logging ................................................................. 24
7.2 China‟s international commitment to end illegal logging and associated trade .. 26
Box 4: EU Action to combat illegal logging in Burma ........................................... 27
7.3 Illegal timber exports from Burma to China – a statistical analysis ................... 28
7.4 The illegal nature of the Burma-China timber trade (Chinese law) ................... 30
7.4.1 Illegal importation of CITES-listed Himalayan Yew trees from Burma to
China ................................................................................................................. 31
Box 5: Logging and the Beijing Olympics ............................................................. 32
7.5 The illegal nature of the Burma-China timber trade (Burmese law) .................. 33
Box 6: Forest law enforcement in Burma ............................................................... 34
8 THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF DESTRUCTIVE LOGGING IN NORTHERN BURMA ...................................................................... 35
8.1 China‟s environmental commitments in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS)
.............................................................................................................................. 36
8.2 The ecological importance of Burma‟s frontier forests ..................................... 37
8.3 Environmental impacts in northern Burma ....................................................... 38
8.3.1 Flooding ................................................................................................... 39
Box 8: A personal account of the impacts of logging ............................................. 40
8.4 Impacts on development in northern Burma ..................................................... 41
8.4.1 Hollow promises of development .............................................................. 41
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PART TWO: GLOBAL WITNESS RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATIONS
.................................................................................................................. 42 9 THE TIMBER TRADE ON THE CHINA-BURMA BORDER .............................. 43 9.1 Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture .............................................................. 44
9.1.1 Liuku ........................................................................................................ 44
9.1.2 Pian Ma .................................................................................................... 45 9.1.3 Fugong ...................................................................................................... 46 9.1.4 Gongshan .................................................................................................. 46 9.2 Baoshan Prefecture .......................................................................................... 47 9.2.1 Tengchong ................................................................................................ 48 9.2.2 Gudong ..................................................................................................... 49 9.2.3 Guyong ..................................................................................................... 49 9.2.4 Houqiao .................................................................................................... 49 9.2.5 Dian Tan ................................................................................................... 49 9.2.6 Tze Tze ..................................................................................................... 50 9.3 Dehong Dai Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture ..................................................... 50 9.3.1 Ruili .......................................................................................................... 51 9.3.2 Zhangfeng ................................................................................................. 52 9.3.3 Ban Li ....................................................................................................... 52 9.3.4 Yingjiang .................................................................................................. 52 9.3.5 Car Zan ..................................................................................................... 52 9.3.6 Sudien ....................................................................................................... 53 9.3.7 Longling ................................................................................................... 53 10 KACHIN STATE ................................................................................................. 53 10.1 A brief history of conflict in Kachin State ...................................................... 54 10.2 The nature of the ceasefire deals .................................................................... 55 10.3 Kachin nationalist movement in turmoil ......................................................... 57 10.4 Logging in Kachin State ................................................................................ 58 Box 9: Logging and the new constitution. .............................................................. 59 10.4.1 Territorial control and logging within Kachin State ................................. 60 10.4.2 The KIO and logging in Kachin State ...................................................... 61
Box 10: Power stations in exchange for logging rights ................................... 62 10.4.3 The NDA(K) and logging in Kachin State. .............................................. 64 10.4.4 The expansion of KIO and NDA(K) logging interests ............................. 66
10.4.4.1 The Southern Triangle ...................................................................... 66
10.4.4.2 NDA(K) expansion into KIO-controlled areas south of Gongshan .... 67 10.4.5 The SPDC and logging in Kachin State ................................................... 68 10.4.6 The N‟Mai Hku (Headwaters) Project ..................................................... 70 10.4.7 Kachin-run logging companies operating in Kachin State ........................ 72 11 WA STATE.......................................................................................................... 74 12 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 76
Appendices: BACKGROUND ................................................................... 77 13 Appendix I: CONFLICT AND POLITICS IN BURMA ....................................... 78 Box 11: Power and control in Burma ..................................................................... 80 13.1 Recent developments ..................................................................................... 80 13.1.1 Recent internal political developments ........................................................ 81 13.1.2 External relations ........................................................................................ 83 14 Appendix II: FORESTS AND FORESTRY IN BURMA ...................................... 85 14.1 The economic importance of the timber trade................................................. 88 14.2 The scale of world timber imports from Burma .............................................. 92
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14.2 The scale of timber exports from Burma worldwide. ...................................... 94
14.3 Illegal timber exports from Burma worldwide – a statistical analysis ............. 96
15 APPENDIX III: FOREST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
(FLEG) .................................................................................................................. 99
East Asia FLEG Ministerial Declaration ................................................................ 99
16 APPENDIX IV: The G8 in 2005: priorities for action on illegal logging (joint NGO statement) ................................................................................................................ 106
17 GLOBAL WITNESS‟ PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS ........................................ 110
18 REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 114
3 PREFACE
This report makes the case for ending the illegal logging in Burma‟s northern forests.
Although the management of Burma‟s forests is primarily the responsibility of the relevant authorities in Burma, the vast majority of the timber cut in northern Burma is subsequently exported illegally to China. The Chinese authorities are, therefore, ideally placed to help the Burmese end the illicit trade. It is also in China‟s long term self-
interest to end destructive logging in northern Burma (see „Part One: The Case for
Change‟, pages 11-36‟).
For these reasons this report is aimed largely at the Chinese authorities, both in Yunnan Province and in Beijing. In particular the report is aimed at the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, which is responsible for trade, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The General Administration of Customs, and the Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), also have a role to play in stopping the illegal importation of Burmese timber into China (see „7.4 The illegal nature of the Burma-
China timber trade (Chinese law)?, pages 23-24).
The Chinese State Forest Administration (SFA), on the other hand, has no power to halt the illicit cross-border trade – except in relation to enforcement of CITES (see
„7.4.1 Illegal importation of CITES-listed Himalayan Yew trees from Burma to China‟,
page 25) but it could advise the armed ethnic opposition groups about good forest management.
Abbreviations
AAC Annual Allowable Cut
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFPFL Anti-Fascist People‟s Freedom League
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ATS Amphetamine Type Stimulants
AQSIQ Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
BOCOG Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad
BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party
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CEP Core Environment Program
CPB Communist Party of Burma
CPC Communist Party of China
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora
DDSI Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence DZGD Dry Zone Greening Department
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment FLEG Forest Law Enforcement and Governance FSC Forest Stewardship Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GMS Greater Mekong Sub-region
HIV Human Immune Deficiency Virus IFI International Finance Institution IFM Independent Forest Monitoring ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization KDA Kachin Defence Army
KIA Kachin Independence Army (The armed wing of the KIO) KIO Kachin Independence Organisation
KNA Karen National Association
KNCA Kachin Nationals‟ Consultative Assembly
KNU Karen National Union
KSC Kachin Solidarity Council
MCSO Myanmar Central Statistical Office
MoF Ministry of Forestry
MI Military Intelligence
MTE Myanmar Timber Enterprise
NATALA Ministry for the Development of Border Areas and National Races
NCFP Natural Forest Conservation Programme NCGUB National Coalition Government Union of Burma NDA(K) New Democratic Army (Kachin)
NDF National Democratic Front
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NLD National League for Democracy
OSS Office of Strategic Studies
PRC People‟s Republic of China
RWE Round Wood Equivalent
SFA Chinese State Forest Administration SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council SPDC State Peace and Development Council
SSA(S) Shan State Army (South)
SSNA Shan State National Army
UMEHL Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited MEC Myanmar Economic Corporation
UNAIDS United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNDCP United Nations International Drug Control Program USDA Union Solidarity & Development Association UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime UWSA/P United Wa State Army/Party
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WHO World Health Organization
A note on methodology:
Global Witness conducted primary research along the China-Burma border in 2004 and 2005 and interviewed people from many different backgrounds. To the best of our knowledge, this report reflects the reality of timber trade in these border areas.
A note on sources:
Not all of the information contained in this report was witnessed at first hand by Global Witness. Global Witness has also relied on media reports from trusted sources and interviews with individuals familiar with logging in Burma. Where possible the identity of these sources has been made clear, although many of these individuals remain anonymous to maintain their safety. It should be noted that accounts of natural resource exploitation in Burma might be politically biased. Global Witness has therefore treated such information with caution, and has attempted to convey this in the text. Furthermore, the opinions expressed by some of the interviewees do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Global Witness.
A note on statistics:
Where appropriate, to facilitate comparison between timber statistics, wood volume data has been converted to Round Wood Equivalent (RWE) volume. This has been done by multiplying wood volume by standard conversion factors, such as 1 for logs, 1 1.8 for sawn wood, and 2.3 for plywood.
Various sources of such data were consulted. The data selected for analysis are those that we regard as being from the most representative source. It should be noted however, that there appears to be little correlation between a number of these sources. In addition it is often unclear which products have or have not been included in a given dataset, or indeed which units of measure are being used. Consequently, the analysis presented in this report should be considered as indicative rather than precise.
A lack of clear, reliable and disaggregated data is another sign that Burma is not in a position to manage its forests sustainably. Unfortunately, the provision of incomplete, inaccurate, contradictory and confused data is a global problem.
A note on conversion rates:
Unless otherwise stated, the conversion rate of the Myanmar kyat and the Chinese yuan, to the United States dollar is based on the unofficial 2004 exchange rate of US$ 1 = 900 kyat or 8.4 yuan. All currencies are stated to two significant figures.
Burma uses the unusual measurements of Cubic Ton and Hoppus Ton to measure timber volumes. 1 Cubic ton = 50 cubic feet = 1.416 cubic metres. For logs, 1 Hoppus 1Ton is equal to 1.8027 cubic metres.
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4 INTRODUCTION
“The earth, water, mountain forests and climate are the basic resources of a country. If the mountain forests are destroyed, the earth and water will be degraded. This in turn will lead to climate deterioration. Hence forest destruction must be prevented and looked at with caution. Amongst all our basic resources, forests are the most 2important.” Senior General, Than Shwe, October 1993
Burma is made up of temperate and tropical landscapes that range from the Himalayas in the north and east to the lowland forest, mangroves and coral reefs in the south. Rugged mountain ranges form a horseshoe surrounding the fertile plains of the Irrawaddy River in the centre, whilst in the west the Arakan Yoma mountain range extends almost to the Irrawaddy Delta creating a barrier between Burma, India, and Bangladesh. In the east, the Shan Plateau and the Bilauktaung mountain range comprise part of the border with Thailand. In the far north, the border with China follows the line of the Gaoligongshan Mountains.
Part of Burma‟s global conservation significance derives from the fact that it contains ecotypes, such as lowland peninsular rainforest, that are already depleted in neighbouring countries. The forests of this region are unusually rich in plants and animals, and as such are protected in China. In northern Burma however, these frontier forests are under threat from illegal, unsustainable and destructive logging. The vast majority of the resultant timber is illegally exported to China.
Burma‟s Kachin State, sandwiched between China and India, has been described as some of the most valuable real estate in the world, due in large part to its forests, but also its jade, gold and mineral reserves. The forests of Kachin State form part of an 3area said to be “very possibly the most bio-diverse, rich, temperate area on earth;”
they also suffer from the highest rate of deforestation in Burma.
This report, based largely on investigations carried out in China and Burma during 2004 and 2005, details both the mechanics and scale of logging in Kachin State and the associated illegal cross-border timber trade with China. It also looks at the impact that the logging is having on the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities, and how it is undermining the prospect for future sustainable development in Burma‟s northern
border areas.
Readers familiar with the issues contained in „A Conflict of Interests - the uncertain
future of Burma‟s forests‟, published in October 2003, will find „Part One: The Case
for Change‟ of particular interest. The Case for Change argues that bringing about an end to the illegal logging in Kachin State is ultimately in the best interests of the Chinese authorities in both Yunnan Province and in Beijing. Not only will ending this destructive trade benefit the Chinese authorities directly, it will also improve their international standing, their relationship with the people of Burma, with other countries in the region and beyond.
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