By Antonio Harris,2014-11-11 23:07
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    Security kritik 1nc 3 Impact links:

     economic competitiveness link 57

     humanitarian assistance link 58 LINKS: environmental security link 59 Security generic links: environ. security t/o solvency 60 Threat construction link 7

    Realism/ psychological motives link 9 critical inequality link 61 Threat construction link positivism 10 inequality link - discrimination 64 Threats to homeland link 11 inequality link - discrimination 65 Crisis management link 12 inequality link international / capitalism 66 Securitization of non-military link 13

     Link helpers 67

    Agent links:

    Sovereignty link 14 IMPACTS:

    Hegemony link 15 Securitization bad kills criticism 68 Soft power link 19 Securitization bad violence 69

    Governmentality link 20 Securitization bad - resentment 70 International norms/Rulemaking link 21 Heg bad-imperialism 71

     Myths impact 72

    Representation links Kritik turns case-war 73 Terrorism discourse link 22

    AT: Terrorists are irrational 25 ALTERNATIVE(S):

    Borders link 26 2NC Alt solves 74

    Borders link - realism 27 Alt solves - violence 75 AT: Borders key to security 28 Alt solves - sovereignty 76

     Alt solves - Epistemology 77 Area links: Alt solves metanarratives 78 South China Sea link 30 Environ security alt - exclude securitization 79

    Middle East Link 31

    North Korea Link 34 FRAMEWORK:

    China link- threat 36 Discourse shapes reality/policy 80 China link economy/competitiveness 38 Discourse shapes reality metaphor 82

    China link hostile rise / power vacuum 39 security = speech act 83 stRussia link 40 Discourse 1 85

     AT: Rational actor 86

    Epistemology links:

    Peace link 41 2NC:

    Positivism/empiricism link 42 AT: No impact to representation 87 Positivism link - state 43 AT: Perm- positivism 88 Root cause link 44 AT: Case outweighs 90

    Neorealism link 45 AT: Predictions/Scenario planning good 92

     AT: Realism inevitable 93 Prolif specific: AT: Realism good 94

    proliferation link 46 AT: Realism good: nuclear war 97 proliferation link - state 48 AT: Realism good- Hobbes 98 proliferation link weapon label 49 AT: realism good - critical reasons 99 proliferation link stability 50 AT: Securitization key to action 101 proliferation link ‗wildfire‘ / cancer metaphor 51 AT: Post-structuralism bad 102 proliferation link weapons spread 52 AT: Criticisms that make fun of post-structuralism 104

    proliferation link peaceful/ military distinction 53 AT: Environmental securitization good 106 proliferation link rogue states/ loose nukes 54 AT: Link turns aff stops seeing x as enemy 107 proliferation link rogues/ monitoring 55 AT: Link turn we establish alliances 108 proliferation discourse turns case 56 AT: Kritik is ideological 109

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     ******AFF****** 110

     Framework AT: Discourse first 111

     AT: Reps first 113

     Positivism good 114 AT: Scenario planning bad 116 AT: Predictions Fail 117 2AC Cede The Political 118 AT: State links 119 AT: Threat construction 120 AT: psychology links 121 AT: Middle East Link 122 AT: Terror Link 123 2AC impact calc - Consequences First 124 2AC impact calc AT: Value to life 125 AT: Value to life 126 AT: Structural Violence Impact 127 2AC-Permutation 128 Critical realism perm 130 2AC- Alt fails 131 Realism good 132

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Security is a speech act that manufactures low probability threats and worst case scenarios in

    order to build up the state‘s defenses and defend its territory

    Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie, prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz, ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End,‖ On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz,]

    What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The logic of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection

    may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner

    hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude

    developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of

    those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking, the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Wæver points out. 3 Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic

    contexts within which such capabilities have been developed. Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most

    threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response. Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the

    capabilities will not be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats.

    Threats, in this context, thus become what might be done, not, given the "fog of war," what could or would be done, or the fog of

    bureaucracy, what might not be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus

    usually generates a proportionate response , in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state.

    Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears. It is important to recognize that, to the extent we make judgments about possibilities on the basis of capabilities, without reference to actual intentions, we are trying to imagine how those

    capabilities might be used. These imagined scenarios are not, however, based only on some idea of how the threatening actor might behave; they are also reflections of what our intentions might be, were we in the place of that actor, constructing imagined scenarios based on what s/he would imagine our intentions might be, were they in our place. . . . and so on, ad infinitum . Where we cut into this loop, and why we cut into the loop in one place and not another, has a great deal to do with where we start in our quest to understand the notion of security, the speech act.

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The affirmative’s securitizing representations reduce human freedom and agency to a calculation- this is

    uniquely dehumanizing and destroys the value to life

    Dillon 1996 (Michael is a professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 26)

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of

    its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation

    does it seem capable of constructing that oplitical arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought

    insists upon, and which a world made uncreasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to

    require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human

    freedom, inducing either despair or the surender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further- the

    surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found its paradigmatic expression for

    example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and inclduing self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. The logic persists in the metaphysical

    core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse-

    even if the details have changed.

    And, treating security as an a priori legitimizes the WMD suicide pact and billions of deaths Der Derian 1998 [James, prof of political science at Brown, ―The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and

    Baudrillard On Security,‖ ed. Ronnie Lipschutz,]

    No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states,

    all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name,

    weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed

    while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that

    is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a

    widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western

    metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." 1 From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is

    never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full

    swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." 2 One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety

    and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite.

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The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s appeals to securitization. Questioning the conditions

    of possibility for power relations created through the affirmative’s representations refuses to

    participate in calculative and depoliticizing worst case scenario predictions.

Edkins 1999 [Jenny, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, Postructuralism and

    International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In, p. 1-3]

    Ironically, what we call "politics" is an area of activity that in modern Western society is "depoliticized" or "technologized." These two terms are more or less synonymous (as far as my usage here goes), but the latter is perhaps more useful as a term because of the sense it

    conveys that what is going on is something positive. We are not talking about an absence of the political through some sort of lapse or mistake but an

    express operation of depoliticization or technologization: a reduction to calculability. In this context ideology is the move that

    conceals the depoliticization of politics and hides the possibility-the risks-of "the political." Technologization has its

    dangers, too, and one of the fields where its perils can be seen is international politics. As examples, I examine briefly the technologization of famine relief and the notion of securitization as a form of extreme depoliticization. In the final section of this chapter, I outline how the

    authors whose work I discuss later in the book see processes of technologization and depoliticization. POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL The

    distinction I employ here between "politics" and "the political" is similar to that between what is sometimes called a "narrow" meaning

    of the political and a broader one. In the narrow sense, the political is taken to be that sphere of social life commonly called "politics":

    elections, political -parties, the doings of governments and parliaments, the state apparatus. and in the case of "international politics," treaties, international agreements, diplomacy, wars, institutions of which states are members (such as the United Nations), and the actions of statesmen and

    -women. As James Donald and Stuart Hall point out, what gets to be counted as politics in this narrow form is not in any sense given. It is the result of contestation. It is ideological, contingent on a particular organization of the social order, not natural.6 Donald and Hall refer to the struggle in the 1970s and 1980s by the women's movement to extend the range of politics to include, for example, relations of power within the home or between men and women more broadly. "The personal is political" was their slogan. A similar extension of international politics has been advocated by Cynthia Enloe, this time with the phrase "the personal is international. "7 In other words, the question of what gets to count as "politics" (in the narrow sense) is part of "the political" (in the broader sense): It is a political process. Or in Fred Dallmayr's words, "Whereas politics in the narrower sense revolves around daY7to-day decision making and ideological partisanship . . . "the political" refers to the frame of reference within which actions,

    events, and other phenomena acquire political status in the first place."8 In the broader sense, then, "the political" has to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a particular, historically specific account of what counts as politics and

    defines other areas of social life as not politics. For Claude Lefort, the political is concerned with the "constitution of the social space, of the form of society."9 It is central to this process that the act of constitution is immediately concealed or hidden: Hence, "the political is ... revealed, not in what we call political activity, but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured."10 How does this relate to the link that is generally made between "power" and the political? Following Lefort again, "the phenomenon of power lies at the centre of political analysis," but this is not because relations of power should be seen as autonomous and automatically defining "politics." Rather, it is because "the existence of a power capable of obtaining generalised obedience and allegiance implies a certain type of social division and articulation, as well as a

    certain type of representation ... concerning the legitimacy of the social order."" In other words, what is important about power is that it

    establishes a social order and a corresponding form of legitimacy. Power, for Lefort, does not "exist" in any sort of naked form, before legitimation: Rather, the ideological processes of legitimation produce certain representations of power. For a political analysis,

    in the broadest sense, what needs to be called into question are the conditions of possibility that produced or made conceivable this particular representation of power. The question is, "What change in the principles of legitimacy, what reshaping of the system of beliefs, in the way of apprehending reality, enabled such a representation of power to emerge?"12

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    Language matters- debating the affirmative’s representations is key to overcoming dominant descriptions of agents and objects in international relations

    Der Derian 98 (James, a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and directs the Information Technology, War, and Peace Project and the Global Media Project, International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics‖, Lexington Books, p.13)

Once we give adequate recognition to the texts within which the world emerges and provided an understanding of

    politics that focuses on such impositions of meaning and value, we can appreciate the intimate relationship between

    textual practices and politics. It is the dominant, surviving textual practices that give rise to the systems of meaning and value from which actions and policies are directed and legitimated. A critical political perspective is, accordingly, one

    that questions the privileged forms of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects,

    objects, acts, and themes through which the political world is constructed. In as much as dominant modes of understanding

    exist within representational or textual practices, criticism or resistant forms of interpretation are conveyed less through an explicitly argumentative form than through a writing practice that is resistant to familiar modes of representation, one that is self-reflective enough to show how meaning and writing practices are radically entangled in general or one that tends to denaturalize familiar reunites by

    employing impertinent grammars and figurations, by, in short, making use of an insurrectional textuality. To appreciate the effects of this

    textuality, it is necessary to pay special need to language, but this does not imply that an approach emphasizing textuality

    reduces social phenomena to specific instances of linguistic expression. To textualize a domain of analysis is to recognize, first of all, that any "reality" is mediated by a mode of representation and, second, that representations are not descriptions of a world of facility, but are ways of making facility. Their value is thus not to be discerned in their correspondence with something, but

    rather in the economies of possible representations within which they participate. Modes of reality making are therefore worthy of

    analysis in their own right. Such analysis can be a form of interpretation in which one scrutinizes the effects on behavior or policy that the dominance of some representational practices enjoy, or it can be a form of critique in which one opposes prevailing representational practices with alternatives. Therefore, a concern with textuality must necessary raise issues about the texuality

    (the meaning and value effects) of the language of inquiry itself. In order, then, to outline the textualist approach, we must develop further our understanding of the language analysis.

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Security threats are created through acts of interpretationrepresentations enable securitizing


    Mutimer 2000 [David, associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies, The Weapons State, pg 16-17]

     A further point is to be made concerning Campbell's work. The focus of Writing Security is not, in fact, on the way in which danger is interpreted- the

    manner by which the interpretation of risk and the consequent creation of threat occur. Rather, Campbell's argument shows the way in which

    the interpreting subject-in this instance the United States-is itself created by those acts of identifying danger. If we can

    accept that both the threats and the subjects of international security are created in acts of interpretation, it should be clear

    that the interests those subjects pursue are also consequences of these same acts. It would be difficult to argue that interests

    remain fixed when the bearer of those interests does not. Jutta Weldes has made the case with respect to interests: In contrast to the realist conception of "national interests" as objects that have merely to be observed or discovered, then, my argument is that national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world, particularly the international system and the

    place of the state in it, is understood. More specifically, national interests emerge out of the representations . .. through which state

    officials and others make sense of the world around them. 13 These "representations through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them" are central to my argument in this book. Rather than take the objects of study as given, I ask questions about the construction of a particular object, a particular set of identities and interests, and the specific practices through which proliferation is confronted. The key to answering these questions is to identify the way in which the problem is represented or, to use the language I deploy later, the image that is used to frame the issue in

    question. This image serves to construct the object of analysis or policy, to identify the actors, and to define their interests.

    It is therefore the image that enables the practices through which these actors respond to the problem of proliferation.

Constructing threats necessitates an other to fear and respond to

    Lipschutz 95- Professor of Politics and Associate Director of the Center for Global, International and Regional Studies at the UCSC ( Ronnie D. Lipshutz: On Security Pg. 8-9 1995)

Conceptualizations of security-from which follow policy and practice-are to be found in discourses of

    security. These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather

    the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them. Hence, there are not only struggles over security among nations, but also struggles over security among notions. Winning the

    right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discoursed of security, as well. As Karen Liftlin points out, ―As determinants of what can and cannot be thought, discourses delimit the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes … The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices. These discourses of security, however clearly articulated, nonetheless remain fraught with contradictions, as the chapters in this volume make clear. How do such discourses begin? In his investigation of historical

    origins of the concept, James Der Derian (Chapter 2: ―The Value of Seurity: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard‖) points out that, in the past, security

    has been invoked not only to connote protection from threats, along the lines of the conventional definition, but also to describe hubristic overconfidence as well as a bond or pledge provided in a financial transaction. To secure oneself is, therefore, a sort of trap, for one can never leave a secure place without incurring risks. (Elsewhere, Barry Buzan has

    pointed out that ―There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is ‗unable to escape‘. Security, moreover, is meaningless

    without an ―other‖ to help specify the conditions of insecurity. Der Derian, citing Nietsche, points out

    that this ―other‖ is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference the state of fear rather than a preferable coming to terms with the positive

    potential of difference.

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    The term security is used to allow states to use whatever means necessary to eliminate the threats they have created

    Lipschutz 95 (Ronnie D, a Professor of Politics and Codirector of the Center for Global, International, and Regional Studies at the University of CaliforniaSanta Cruz , On Security, p. 9-10)

    Operationally, however, this means: In naming a certain development a security problem, the ―state‖ can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political chance on a ruling elite is similar to playing a gam in which one‘s opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the

    instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security problem when the elites

    declare it to be so: and because the End of this Institution [the Leviathan, the Sovereign], is the Peace and Defense of them all; and whosoever has

    the right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think

    necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home and thus, that those who administer this order can easily use it for specific, self-serving purposes is something that cannot be easily avoided‖. What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard ―security‖ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to somethingmore rea; the

    utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promis, naming a ship). By uttering ―security‖, a state-

    representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary

    to block it. The clearest illustration of this phenomenon- on which I will elaborate below- occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, where ―order‖ was clearly, systematically, and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. Thinking about chainge in the East-West relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant, therefore, rying to bring about change without generating a ―securitization‖ response by elites, which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted. Consequentally, to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered, actors had to keep their challenges below a certain thershold and/or through the political process-wheter national or international- have the threshold negotiated upward. As Egbert Jahn put it, the task was to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on. As part of this exercise, a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of ―intervention‖ or ―interference in domestic affairs‖, whereby change-oriented agents tried, through international law, diplomacy, and various kinds of politics, to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible.

    The will to security is an incitement to violence- only a break from the politics of security gives meaning to international relations

    Dillon 1996 (Michael is a professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 19)

    We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d‘ etre (and, rason d‘ etat). More importantly, we now know that the very will to security-the will to power of sovereign

    presence in both metaphysics and modern politics- is not a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought, and to

    the globalization of its (inter)national politics, but also self defeating; in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but

    actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being, therefore, to be persuaded of the profundity- and of the profound danger- of this modern human condition. That, then, is why the crisis of Western though is as much a fundamental crisis of (inter)national politics, as the criss of (inter)national politics is a crisis of thought. Moreover, that is why in doubting the value of security, and doubting in a Nietzschean mode better than Descartes, we are also enjoined by the circumstances of this critical

    conjunction of the philosophical and the political to doubt metaphysical truth. For the political truth of security is the metaphysical truth of correspondence and adequation in declension to mathesis; the mere, but rigorously insistent, measuration of calculabilty. To bring the value of security into question in the radical way required by the way it now, ironically, radically endangers us, correspondingly requires that we attend to metaphysics‘ own continous process of deconstruction. In doing this, however, we go beyond mere doubting- which, after all, is the mere counterpart of the desire for certainty- and find non-apocalyptic ays of affirming and so continuing to enjoy and celebrate (in)security; that is to say human

    being‘s own obligatory freedom. Ultimately, now, our (inter)national politics of security is no longer even distinguished or

    driven by humanistic considerations. It is a security simply ordering to order. But it is only by virtue of the fact that our (inter)national politics of security has come to this end that we can in fact begin to consider the relationship between its end and its beginnning. Through this we do not, in a sense, go back to anything at all. Neither does this turn disguise some covert nostalgia for a phantom past. Rather, attention is turned towards consideration of what is entailed in the preparation and inception of continuous new political growth. This is also why, at the limit, it is useful to think about these origins and limits again. Not because they hold an answer that is now lost but because, antecedent to metaphysics, they make us think about the very liminal character of origins and limits, of the relationship which obtains between them, and of what proceeds from them, in ways that are not utterly determined by metaphysics. That way we may get some clues to some ways of thinking that are not metaphysical; nor, indeed, pre-

    metaphysical, because we cannot be pre-metaphysical at the end of metaphysics. What happens, instead, is that the whole question of emergence

    and origination, of the very possibility of repeating ourselves, opens-up again; specifically in the sense of the historical possibilities of the obligatory freedom of human being now terminally endangered globally by its very own (inter)national ‗civilising‘ practices.

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    We should critically analyze the very idea of beliefs and psychological motivations in order to de-stabilize the modern subject

    Der Derian 98 (James, a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and directs the Information Technology, War, and Peace Project and the Global Media Project,

    International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics‖, Lexington Books, p.18)

    What poststructuralist approaches have shown so far is that the orthodoxies of our social and political worlds are recreated in the process of writing, in the style of the texts through which our dominant understandings of the world have been constructed. And no form of writing is exempt; analysis itself is a textual practice that is intimately related to the political practices it aims to disclose. In order to exemplify analysis as a form of textual practice, it is useful once again to turn to a

    contrast between a textually oriented mode of reading and the more familiar, political psychology. The psychological approach to international relations, has focused, among other things, on the cognitive components through which

    individuals "perceive" aspects of policy. In order to textualize political psychology and, at the same time, demonstrate the

    difference in problematization between a psychological and textual approach, we offer a brief reading of what could best be

    termed the politics of fear. We begin this reading with the recognition that individuals, in their contributions to the meanings shaping public life, cannot be understood simply as mentalistic information processors, but rather as socially and temporally situated beings, connected to each other in a network of practices. This means, among other things, that we must resist many of modernity's professional and academic discourses that have produced modern "man" as psychological being

    (as Pltilip Rieff pointed out a few decades ago). Were we to treat this psychological identity as a fact rather than as a historically produced text, our analysis would be paralyzed in the same way as are these psychologizing practices. Rather than focusing on individual beliefs or other cognitive components, then, we argue that it is more enabling to understand

    how understandings are situated in domains of practice. Instead of exploring people's beliefs, for example, we can do a

    genealogy of belief itself, locating beliefs in the context of the history of practices related to the management of danger. Beliefs, as an identity for persons, are a kind of data, providing a way of reading the script of modernity, rather than an analytic device aiding interpretation. To note that modern individuals have "beliefs" is not to take cognizance of a fact about persons, but to notice the contemporary way of constructing them. By analyzing this practice for constituting the

    modern self, we can also move in the direction of disclosing the more cryptic modes of legitimating for public (and

    "foreign") policy.

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Threats are imagined and constructed in order to legitimate existing political dispositions and


    Lipschutz 2000, (Ronnie D, a Professor of Politics and Codirector of the Center for Global, International, and Regional Studies at the stUniversity of CaliforniaSanta Cruz, After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21 Century, ch. 3, p. 56)

    To return to an earlier question, who constructs and articuates contesting discourses of national security? Among such people are mainstream ―defense intellectuals‖ and strategic analysts, those individuals who, in sharing a particular political culture, can agree on a common framework for defining security threats and policy responses (what might be called a security ―episteme‖). While their discourse is constructed around the interpretation of ―real‖ incoming data, their analysis is framed in such a way as to, first, define the threat as they see it and,

    second, legitimate those responses that validate their construction of the threat (see, e.g., Schlesinger, 1991). To repeat: this does not mean that threats are imaginary. Rather they are imagined and constructed in such a way as to reinforce existing predispositions

    and thereby legitimate them. This legitimation, in turn, helps to reproduce existing policy or some variant of it as well as the material basis for that policy. Finally, we might ask why ―redifine‖ security? Who advocates such an idea? During the 1980‘s at the time this argument was first made (Ullman, 1983; Matthews, 1989), the individuals compromising this group were an amorphous lot, lacking an integrated institutional base or intellectual framework (a situation that has slowly changed during the 1990s). Most tended to see consensual definitions and dominant discourses of security as failing to properly percieve or understand the objective threat environment, but they did not question the logic whereby threats and security were defined. In other words, the redefiners proposed that the ―real‖ threats to security were different from those that policymakers and defense authorities were generally concerned about, but the threats were ―really out there‖.

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