DOC

SECURITY KRITIK

By Antonio Harris,2014-11-11 23:07
8 views 0
SECURITY KRITIK

ENDI 2010 1

    Security K Wave 1

    SECURITY KRITIK

    Security kritik 1nc 3 Impact links:

     economic competitiveness link 57

     humanitarian assistance link 58 LINKS: environmental security link 59 Security generic links: environ. security t/o solvency 60 Threat construction link 7

    Realism/ psychological motives link 9 critical inequality link 61 Threat construction link positivism 10 inequality link - discrimination 64 Threats to homeland link 11 inequality link - discrimination 65 Crisis management link 12 inequality link international / capitalism 66 Securitization of non-military link 13

     Link helpers 67

    Agent links:

    Sovereignty link 14 IMPACTS:

    Hegemony link 15 Securitization bad kills criticism 68 Soft power link 19 Securitization bad violence 69

    Governmentality link 20 Securitization bad - resentment 70 International norms/Rulemaking link 21 Heg bad-imperialism 71

     Myths impact 72

    Representation links Kritik turns case-war 73 Terrorism discourse link 22

    AT: Terrorists are irrational 25 ALTERNATIVE(S):

    Borders link 26 2NC Alt solves 74

    Borders link - realism 27 Alt solves - violence 75 AT: Borders key to security 28 Alt solves - sovereignty 76

     Alt solves - Epistemology 77 Area links: Alt solves metanarratives 78 South China Sea link 30 Environ security alt - exclude securitization 79

    Middle East Link 31

    North Korea Link 34 FRAMEWORK:

    China link- threat 36 Discourse shapes reality/policy 80 China link economy/competitiveness 38 Discourse shapes reality metaphor 82

    China link hostile rise / power vacuum 39 security = speech act 83 stRussia link 40 Discourse 1 85

     AT: Rational actor 86

    Epistemology links:

    Peace link 41 2NC:

    Positivism/empiricism link 42 AT: No impact to representation 87 Positivism link - state 43 AT: Perm- positivism 88 Root cause link 44 AT: Case outweighs 90

    Neorealism link 45 AT: Predictions/Scenario planning good 92

     AT: Realism inevitable 93 Prolif specific: AT: Realism good 94

    proliferation link 46 AT: Realism good: nuclear war 97 proliferation link - state 48 AT: Realism good- Hobbes 98 proliferation link weapon label 49 AT: realism good - critical reasons 99 proliferation link stability 50 AT: Securitization key to action 101 proliferation link ‗wildfire‘ / cancer metaphor 51 AT: Post-structuralism bad 102 proliferation link weapons spread 52 AT: Criticisms that make fun of post-structuralism 104

    proliferation link peaceful/ military distinction 53 AT: Environmental securitization good 106 proliferation link rogue states/ loose nukes 54 AT: Link turns aff stops seeing x as enemy 107 proliferation link rogues/ monitoring 55 AT: Link turn we establish alliances 108 proliferation discourse turns case 56 AT: Kritik is ideological 109

ENDI 2010 2

    Security K Wave 1

     ******AFF****** 110

     Framework AT: Discourse first 111

     AT: Reps first 113

     Positivism good 114 AT: Scenario planning bad 116 AT: Predictions Fail 117 2AC Cede The Political 118 AT: State links 119 AT: Threat construction 120 AT: psychology links 121 AT: Middle East Link 122 AT: Terror Link 123 2AC impact calc - Consequences First 124 2AC impact calc AT: Value to life 125 AT: Value to life 126 AT: Structural Violence Impact 127 2AC-Permutation 128 Critical realism perm 130 2AC- Alt fails 131 Realism good 132

ENDI 2010 3

    Security K Wave 1

    SECURITY KRITIK 1NC

Security is a speech act that manufactures low probability threats and worst case scenarios in

    order to build up the state‘s defenses and defend its territory

    Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie, prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz, ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End,‖ On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]

    What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The logic of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection

    may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner

    hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude

    developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of

    those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking, the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Wæver points out. 3 Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic

    contexts within which such capabilities have been developed. Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most

    threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response. Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the

    capabilities will not be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats.

    Threats, in this context, thus become what might be done, not, given the "fog of war," what could or would be done, or the fog of

    bureaucracy, what might not be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus

    usually generates a proportionate response , in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state.

    Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears. It is important to recognize that, to the extent we make judgments about possibilities on the basis of capabilities, without reference to actual intentions, we are trying to imagine how those

    capabilities might be used. These imagined scenarios are not, however, based only on some idea of how the threatening actor might behave; they are also reflections of what our intentions might be, were we in the place of that actor, constructing imagined scenarios based on what s/he would imagine our intentions might be, were they in our place. . . . and so on, ad infinitum . Where we cut into this loop, and why we cut into the loop in one place and not another, has a great deal to do with where we start in our quest to understand the notion of security, the speech act.

ENDI 2010 4

    Security K Wave 1

    SECURITY KRITIK 1NC

The affirmative’s securitizing representations reduce human freedom and agency to a calculation- this is

    uniquely dehumanizing and destroys the value to life

    Dillon 1996 (Michael is a professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 26)

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of

    its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation

    does it seem capable of constructing that oplitical arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought

    insists upon, and which a world made uncreasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to

    require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human

    freedom, inducing either despair or the surender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further- the

    surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found its paradigmatic expression for

    example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and inclduing self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. The logic persists in the metaphysical

    core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse-

    even if the details have changed.

    And, treating security as an a priori legitimizes the WMD suicide pact and billions of deaths Der Derian 1998 [James, prof of political science at Brown, ―The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and

    Baudrillard On Security,‖ ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]

    No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states,

    all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name,

    weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations,