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001-Socrates

By Maurice Harper,2014-05-19 20:07
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Socrates

    Encyclop?dia Britannica Article

    Introduction

    born c. 470 BC, Athens [Greece]

died 399 BC, Athens

    *

    * Socrates, herm from a Greek original, second half of the 4th century BC; in the Capitoline „

    Greek philosopher whose way of life, character, and thought exerted a profound influence on ancient and modern philosophy.

    Socrates was a widely recognized and controversial figure in his native Athens, so much so that he was frequently mocked in the plays of comic dramatists. (The Clouds of Aristophanes, produced in 423, is the best-known example.) Although Socrates himself wrote nothing, he is depicted in conversation in compositions by a small circle of his admirersPlato and Xenophon first among them. He is portrayed in these works as a man of great insight, integrity, self-mastery, and argumentative skill. The impact of his life was all the greater because of the way in which it ended: at age 70, he was brought to trial on a charge of impiety and sentenced to death by poisoning (the poison probably being hemlock) by a jury of his fellow citizens. Plato's Apology of Socrates purports to be the speech Socrates gave at his trial in response to the accusations made against him (Greek apologia means “defense”). Its powerful advocacy of the examined life and its condemnation of Athenian democracy have made it one of the central documents of Western thought and culture. ?

    Philosophical and literary sources

    While Socrates was alive, he was, as noted, the object of comic ridicule, but most of the plays that make reference to him are entirely lost or exist only in fragmentary formClouds being the chief exception. Although Socrates is the central figure of this play, it was not Aristophanes' purpose to give a balanced and accurate portrait of him (comedy never aspires to this) but rather to use him to represent certain intellectual trends in contemporary Athensthe study of language and nature and,

    as Aristophanes implies, the amoralism and atheism that accompany these pursuits. The value of the play as a reliable source of knowledge about Socrates is thrown further into doubt by the fact that, in Plato's Apology, Socrates himself rejects it as a fabrication. This aspect of the trial will be discussed more fully below. Soon after Socrates' death, several members of his circle preserved and praised his memory by writing works that represent him in his most characteristic activityconversation. His interlocutors in these (typically adversarial) exchanges included people he happened to meet, devoted followers, prominent political figures, and leading thinkers of the day. Many of these “Socratic discourses,” as Aristotle calls them in his Poetics, are no longer extant; there are only brief remnants of the conversations written by Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, and Eucleides. But those composed by Plato and Xenophon survive in their entirety. What

    knowledge we have of Socrates must therefore depend primarily on one or the other (or both, when their portraits coincide) of these sources. (Plato and Xenophon also wrote separate accounts, each entitled Apology of Socrates, of Socrates' trial.) Most scholars, however, do not believe that every Socratic discourse of Xenophon and Plato was intended as a historical report of what the real Socrates said, word-for-word, on some occasion. What can reasonably be claimed about at least some of these dialogues is that they convey the gist of the questions Socrates asked, the ways in which he typically responded to the answers he received, and the general philosophical orientation that emerged from these conversations.

Xenophon

    Among the compositions of Xenophon, the one that gives the fullest portrait of Socrates is Memorabilia. The first two chapters of Book I of this work are especially important, because they explicitly undertake a refutation of the charges made against Socrates at his trial; they are therefore a valuable supplement to Xenophon's Apology, which is devoted entirely to the same purpose. The portrait of Socrates that Xenophon gives in Books III and IV of Memorabilia seems, in certain passages, to be heavily influenced by his reading of some of Plato's dialogues, and so the evidentiary value of at least this portion of the work is diminished. Xenophon's Symposium is a depiction of Socrates in conversation with his friends at a drinking party (it is perhaps inspired by a work of Plato of the same name and character) and is regarded by some scholars as a valuable re-creation of Socrates' thought and way of life. Xenophon's Oeconomicus (literally: “estate manager”), a Socratic conversation concerning household organization and the skills needed by the independent farmer, is Xenophon's attempt to bring the qualities he admired in Socrates to bear upon the subject of overseeing one's property. It is unlikely to have been intended as a report of one of Socrates' conversations.

Plato

    Plato, unlike Xenophon, is generally regarded as a philosopher of the highest order of originality and depth. According to some scholars, his philosophical skills made him far better able than Xenophon was to understand Socrates and therefore more valuable a source of information about him. The contrary view is that Plato's originality and vision as a philosopher led him to use his Socratic discourses not as mere devices for reproducing the conversations he had heard but as vehicles for the advocacy of his own ideas (however much they may have been inspired by Socrates) and that he is therefore far more untrustworthy than Xenophon as a source of information about the historical Socrates. Whichever of these two views is correct, it is undeniable that Plato is not only the deeper philosopher but also the greater literary artist. Some of his dialogues are so natural and lifelike in their depiction of conversational interplay that readers must constantly remind themselves that Plato is shaping his material, as any author must.

    Although Socrates is the interlocutor who guides the conversation in most of Plato's dialogues, there are several in which he plays a minor role (Parmenides, Sophist,

    Statesman, and Timaeus, all of which are generally agreed to be among Plato's later works) and one (Laws, also composed late) in which he is entirely absent. Why did Plato assign Socrates a small role in some dialogues (and none in Laws) and a large role in others? A simple answer is that, by this device, Plato intended to signal to his readers that the dialogues in which Socrates is the major interlocutor convey the philosophy of Socrates, whereas those in which he is a minor figure or does not appear at all present Plato's own ideas.

    But there are formidable objections to this hypothesis, and for several reasons most scholars do not regard it as a serious possibility. To begin with, it is unlikely that in so many of his works Plato would have assigned himself so passive and mechanical a role as merely a recording device for the philosophy of Socrates. Furthermore, the portrait of Socrates that results from this hypothesis is not coherent. In some of the dialogues in which he is the principal interlocutor, for example, Socrates insists that he does not have satisfactory answers to the questions he poses—questions such as “What is courage?” (raised in Laches), “What is self-control?” (Charmides), and “What is piety?” (Euthyphro). In other dialogues in which he plays a major role, however, Socrates does offer systematic answers to such questions. In Books IIX of Republic, for example, he proposes an elaborate

    answer to the question, “What is justice?,” and in doing so he also defends his view of the ideal society, the condition of the human soul, the nature of reality, and the power of art, among many other topics. Were we to hold that all the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates is the main speaker are depictions of the philosophy of Socratesa philosophy that Plato endorses but to which he has made no contributions of his ownthen we would be committed to the absurd view that Socrates both has and lacks answers to these questions.

    For these reasons, there is a broad consensus among scholars that we should not look to works such as Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Philebus for a historically accurate account of the thought of Socrateseven though they contain a speaker called Socrates

    who argues for certain philosophical positions and opposes others. At the same time, we can explain why Plato uses the literary character of Socrates in many of his writings to present ideas that go well beyond anything that the historical Socrates said or believed. In these works, Plato is developing ideas that were inspired by his encounter with Socrates, using methods of inquiry borrowed from Socrates, and showing how much can be accomplished with these Socratic starting points. That is why he assigns Socrates the role of principal interlocutor, despite the fact that he did not intend these works to be mere re-creations of Socrates' conversations. Accordingly, the dialogues of Plato that adhere most closely to what he heard from Socrates are those in which the interlocutor called Socrates searches, without apparent success, for answers to questions about the nature of the ethical virtues and other practical topicsworks such as Laches, Euthyphro, and Charmides. This does not mean that in these dialogues Plato is not shaping his material or that he is merely writing down, word-for-word, conversations he heard. We cannot know, and it is implausible to suppose, that in these dialogues of unsuccessful search there is a pure rendering of what the historical Socrates said, with no admixture of Platonic

    interpretation or supplement. All we can reasonably suppose is that here, if anywhere, Plato is re-creating the give-and-take of Socratic conversation, conveying a sense of the methods Socrates used and the assumptions that guided him when he challenged others to defend their ethical ideas and their way of life.

    The portrait of Socrates in these dialogues is fully consonant with the one in Plato's Apology, and it serves as a valuable supplement to that work. For in the Apology, Socrates insists that he does not inquire into natural phenomena (“things in the

    sky and below the earth”), as Aristophanes alleges. On the contrary, he says, he devotes his life to one question only: how he and others can become good human beings, or as good as possible. The questions he asks others, and discovers that they cannot answer, are posed in the hope that he might acquire greater wisdom about just this subject. This is the Socrates we find in Laches, Euthyphro, and Charmidesbut not

    in Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus, or Republic. (Or, rather, it is not the Socrates of Books IIX of Republic; the portrait of Socrates in Book I is similar in many ways to that in Apology, Laches, Euthyphro, and Charmides.) We can therefore say this much about the historical Socrates as he is portrayed in Plato's Apology and in some of Plato's dialogues: he has a methodology, a pattern of inquiry, and an orientation toward ethical questions. He can see how misguided his interlocutors are because he is extremely adept at discovering contradictions in their beliefs.

    “Socratic method” has now come into general usage as a name for any educational strategy that involves cross-examination of students by their teacher. However, the method used by Socrates in the conversations re-created by Plato follows a more specific pattern: Socrates describes himself not as a teacher but as an ignorant inquirer, and the series of questions he asks are designed to show that the principal question he raises (for example, “What is piety?”) is one to which his interlocutor

    has no adequate answer. Typically, the interlocutor is led, by a series of supplementary questions, to see that he must withdraw the answer he at first gave to Socrates' principal question, because that answer falls afoul of the other answers he has given. The method employed by Socrates, in other words, is a strategy for showing that the interlocutor's several answers do not fit together as a group, thus revealing to the interlocutor his own poor grasp of the concepts under discussion. (Euthyphro, for example, in the dialogue named after him, having been asked what piety is, replies that it is whatever is “dear to the gods.” Socrates continues to probe,

    and the ensuing give-and-take can be summarized as follows: Socrates: Are piety and impiety opposites? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Are the gods in disagreement with each other about what is good, what is just, and so on? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: So the very same actions are loved by some gods and hated by others? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: So those same actions are both pious and impious? Euthyphro: Yes.) The interlocutor, having been refuted by means of premises he himself has agreed to, is free to propose a new answer to Socrates' principal question; or another conversational partner, who has been listening to the preceding dialogue, is allowed to take his place. But although the new answers proposed to Socrates' principal question avoid the errors revealed in the preceding cross-examination, fresh difficulties are uncovered, and in the end the “ignorance” of Socrates is revealed as a kind of wisdom, whereas

    the interlocutors are implicitly criticized for failing to recognize their ignorance. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that, because Socrates professes ignorance about certain questions, he suspends judgment about all matters whatsoever. On the contrary, he has some ethical convictions about which he is completely confident. As he tells his judges in his defense speech: human wisdom begins with the recognition of one's own ignorance; the unexamined life is not worth living; ethical virtue is the only thing that matters; and a good human being cannot be harmed (because whatever misfortune he may suffer, including poverty, physical injury, and even death, his virtue will remain intact). But Socrates is painfully aware that his insights into these matters leave many of the most important ethical questions unanswered. It is left to his student Plato, using the Socratic method as a starting point and ranging over subjects that Socrates neglected, to offer positive answers to these questions.

Aristotle

    Another important source of information about the historical

    SocratesAristotleprovides further evidence for this way of distinguishing

    between the philosophies of Socrates and Plato. In 367, some 30 years after the death of Socrates, Aristotle (who was then 17 years old) moved to Athens in order to study at Plato's school, called the Academy. It is difficult to believe that, during his 20 years as a member of that society, Aristotle had no conversations about Socrates with Plato and others who had been personally acquainted with him. There is good reason, then, to suppose that the historical information offered about Socrates in Aristotle's philosophical writings are based on those conversations. What Aristotle tells his readers is that Socrates asked questions but gave no replies, because he lacked knowledge; that he sought definitions of the virtues; and that he was occupied with ethical matters and not with questions about the natural world. This is the portrait of Socrates that Plato's writings, judiciously used, give us. The fact that it is confirmed by Aristotle is all the more reason to accept it.

Life and personality

    * Socrates, Roman fresco, 1st century BC; in the Ephesus Museum, Selcuk, Turkey. Although the sources provide only a small amount of information about the life and personality of Socrates, a unique and vivid picture of him shines through, particularly in some of the works of Plato. We know the names of his father, Sophroniscus (probably a stonemason), his mother, Phaenarete, and his wife, Xanthippe, and we know that he had three sons. (In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates likens his way of philosophizing to the occupation of his mother, who was a midwife: not pregnant with ideas himself, he assists others with the delivery of their ideas, though they are often stillborn.) With a snub nose and bulging eyes, which made him always appear to be staring, he was unattractive by conventional standards. He served as a hoplite (a heavily armed soldier) in the Athenian army and fought bravely in several important battles. Unlike many of the thinkers of his time, he did not travel to other cities in order to pursue his intellectual interests. Although he did not seek high office,

    did not regularly attend meetings of the Athenian Assembly (Ecclesia), the city's principal governing body (as was his privilege as an adult male citizen), and was not active in any political faction, he discharged his duties as a citizen, which included not only military service but occasional membership in the Council of Five Hundred, which prepared the Assembly's agenda.

    Socrates was not well-born or wealthy, but many of his admirers were, and they included several of the most politically prominent Athenian citizens. When the democratic constitution of Athens was overthrown for a brief time in 403, four years before his trial, he did not leave the city, as did many devoted supporters of democratic rule, including his friend Chaerephon, who had gone to Delphi many years earlier to ask the oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. (The answer was no.) The expression of same-sex love was not unusual in Athens at this time, and Socrates was physically attracted to beautiful young men. This aspect of his personality is most vividly conveyed in the opening pages of Charmides and in the speech of the young and ambitious general Alcibiades at the end of Symposium. Socrates' long fits of abstraction, his courage in battle, his resistance to hunger and cold, his ability to consume wine without apparent inebriation, and his extraordinary self-control in the presence of sensual attractions are all described with consummate artistry in the opening and closing pages of Symposium.

    Socrates' personality was in some ways closely connected to his philosophical outlook. He was remarkable for the absolute command he maintained over his emotions and his apparent indifference to physical hardships. Corresponding to these personal qualities was his commitment to the doctrine that reason, properly cultivated, can and ought to be the all-controlling factor in human life. Thus he has no fear of death, he says in Plato's Apology, because he has no knowledge of what comes after it, and he holds that, if anyone does fear death, his fear can be based only on a pretense of knowledge. The assumption underlying this claim is that, once one has given sufficient thought to some matter, one's emotions will follow suit. Fear will be dispelled by intellectual clarity. Similarly, according to Socrates, if one believes, upon reflection, that one should act in a particular way, then, necessarily, one's feelings about the act in question will accommodate themselves to one's beliefone

    will desire to act in that way. (Thus, Socrates denies the possibility of what has been called “weakness of will”—knowingly acting in a way one believes to be wrong.) It follows that, once one knows what virtue is, it is impossible not to act virtuously. Anyone who fails to act virtuously does so because he incorrectly identifies virtue with something it is not. This is what is meant by the thesis, attributed to Socrates by Aristotle, that virtue is a form of knowledge.

    Socrates' conception of virtue as a form of knowledge explains why he takes it to be of the greatest importance to seek answers to questions such as “What is courage?” and “What is piety?” If we could just discover the answers to these questions, we would have all we need to live our lives well. The fact that Socrates achieved a complete rational control of his emotions no doubt encouraged him to suppose that his own case was indicative of what human beings at their best can achieve. But if virtue is a form of knowledge, does that mean that each of the virtuescourage,

    piety, justiceconstitutes a separate branch of knowledge, and should we infer that it is possible to acquire knowledge of one of these branches but not of the others? This is an issue that emerges in several of Plato's dialogues; it is most fully discussed in Protagoras. It was a piece of conventional Greek wisdom, and is still widely assumed, that one can have some admirable qualities but lack others. One might, for example, be courageous but unjust. Socrates challenges this assumption; he believes that the many virtues form a kind of unitythough, not being able to define

    any of the virtues, he is in no position to say whether they are all the same thing or instead constitute some looser kind of unification. But he unequivocally rejects the conventional idea that one can possess one virtue without possessing them all. Another prominent feature of the personality of Socrates, one that often creates problems about how best to interpret him, is (to use the ancient Greek term) his eir?neia. Although this is the term from which the English word irony is derived, there is a difference between the two. To speak ironically is to use words to mean the opposite of what they normally convey, but it is not necessarily to aim at deception, for the speaker may expect and even want the audience to recognize this reversal. In contrast, for the ancient Greeks eir?neia meant “dissembling”—a user

    of eir?neia is trying to hide something. This is the accusation that is made against Socrates several times in Plato's works (though never in Xenophon's). Socrates says in Plato's Apology, for example, that the jurors hearing his case will not accept the reason he offers for being unable to stop his philosophizing in the marketplacethat to do so would be to disobey the god who presides at Delphi. (Socrates' audience understood him to be referring to Apollo, though he does not himself use this name. Throughout his speech, he affirms his obedience to the god or to the gods but not specifically to one or more of the familiar gods or goddesses of the Greek pantheon). The cause of their incredulity, he adds, will be their assumption that he is engaging in eir?neia. In effect, Socrates is admitting that he has acquired a reputation for insincerityfor giving people to understand that

    his words mean what they are ordinarily taken to mean when in fact they do not. Similarly, in Book I of Republic, Socrates is accused by a hostile interlocutor, Thrasymachus, of “habitual eir?neia.” Although Socrates says that he does not have a good answer to the question “What is justice?,” Thrasymachus thinks that this is just a pose. Socrates, he alleges, is concealing his favoured answer. And in Symposium, Alcibiades accuses Socrates of “spending his whole life engaged in eir?neia and playing with people” and compares him to a carved figurine whose outer shell conceals its inner contents. The heart of Alcibiades' accusation is that Socrates pretends to care about people and to offer them advantages but withholds what he knows because he is full of disdain.

    Plato's portrayal of Socrates as an “ironist” shows how conversation with him could

    easily lead to a frustrating impasse and how the possibility of resentment was?ever present. Socrates was in this sense a masked interlocutoran aspect of his

    self-presentation that made him more fascinating and alluring to his audiences but that also added to their distrust and suspicion. And readers, who come to know Socrates through the intervention of Plato, are in somewhat the same situation. Our efforts

    to interpret him are sometimes not as sound as we would like, because we must rely on judgments, often difficult to justify, about when he means what he says and when he does not.

    Even when Socrates goes to court to defend himself against the most serious of charges, he seems to be engaged in eir?neia. After listening to the speeches given by his accusers, he says, in the opening sentence of Plato's Apology: “I was almost carried

    away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak.” Is this the habitual eir?neia of Socrates? Or did the speeches of his accusers really have this effect on him? It is difficult to be sure. But, by Socrates' own admission, the suspicion that anything he says might be a pose undermines his ability to persuade the jurors of his good intentions. His eir?neia may even have lent support to one of the accusations made against him, that he corrupted the young. For if Socrates really did engage in eir?neia, and if his youthful followers delighted in and imitated this aspect of his character, then to that extent he encouraged them to become dissembling and untrustworthy, just like himself.

Background of the trial

    The trial of Socrates in 399 BC occurred soon after Athens's defeat at the hands of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431404 BC). Not only were Sparta and Athens

    military rivals during those years, they also had radically different forms of government. Athens was a democracy: all its adult male citizens were members of the Assembly; many of the city's offices were filled by lot (election was regarded as undemocratic, because it effectively pronounced some citizens better qualified than others); and its citizens enjoyed a high degree of freedom to live and speak as they liked, provided that they obeyed the law and did nothing to undermine the democracy and the public good. Sparta, by contrast, was a mixed regime based on a complex power-sharing arrangement between various elite groups and ordinary citizens, and it exerted far more control than Athens did over education and the daily life of its citizens.

    There was in Athens, particularly among the well-born, wealthy, and young, a degree of admiration for certain aspects of Spartan life and government. These young men, who spent much of their time in the public gymnasia, prided themselves on their toughness, practiced a certain simplicity of style, and grew their hair longall

    in imitation of Spartan ways. (As Plato and Xenophon confirm, Socrates himself shared some of these qualities. In Aristophanes' Birds [414], the young who express their admiration for Sparta are said to be “Socratizing.”) No doubt the fact that Athens,

    an empire-building city with vast resources and a large population, could not defeat smaller and poorer Spartaand, in the end, lost its empire to that rival

    regimeadded to the allure of the Spartan political system and way of life. Ordinary Athenianspeople who had to work for a living and did not belong to any of the aristocratic familieswere proud of their democratic institutions and the

    freedoms they enjoyed, and they were well aware that their form of government had internal as well as external enemies and critics. Furthermore, they did not think of civic and religious matters as separate spheres but assumed instead that

    participation in the religious life of the city, as regulated by democratic institutions, was one of the duties of all citizens and that great harm could come to the city if the gods it recognized were offended or customary religious prohibitions were violated.

Religious scandal and the coup of the oligarchs

    During and soon after the war with Sparta, several events revealed how much damage could be done to Athenian democracy by individuals who did not respect the religious customs of the community, who had no allegiance to the institutions of democracy, or who admired their city's adversary. One night in 415, shortly before a major naval expedition to Sicily was to set sail, many statues of the god Hermes (who protected travelers) were mutilated, presumably by those who wished to prevent the expedition from proceeding. While the matter was being investigated, several men, including one of Socrates' greatest admirers, Alcibiadeswho had sponsored and helped to lead the

    Sicilian expeditionwere accused of mocking a religious ceremony and revealing its sacred secrets to outsiders. Some of them were tried and executed. Alcibiades, who had been charged with involvement in other religious scandals before, was called back from Sicily to face trial. The power of his enemies and the suspicion of him was so great, however, that he decided to escape to Sparta rather than return to Athens to face the likelihood of a death sentence. Athens condemned him and his associates to death in absentia, and he proceeded to offer counsel and leadership to Sparta in its fight against Athens. In 407 he returned to Athens and was cleared of the charges against him, though he never fully regained the trust either of the democrats or their opponents. Alcibiades was only one of many followers of Socrates mentioned in Plato's dialogues who were involved in the religious scandals of 415.

    In 411 a group of 400 opponents of Athenian democracy staged a coup and tried to install an oligarchy, but they were overthrown in the same year and democracy was restored. Some of them, who were associates of Socrates, went into exile after their revolution failed. In 404, soon after the Athenians' defeat, Sparta installed a group of 30 men (many years later dubbed the Thirty Tyrants) in Athens to establish a far less democratic regime there. The leader of the most extreme wing of this group, Critias, was part of the Socratic circle; so, too, was Charmides, another of the 30. The democrats, many of whom had left Athens when the 30 came to power, defeated them in battle, and democracy was restored the following year. (In Plato's Apology, Socrates refers to the reign of the 30 and their unsuccessful attempt to implicate him in their crimes.)

The perceived fragility of Athenian democracy

    The year in which Socrates was prosecuted, 399, was one in which several other prominent figures were brought to trial in Athens on the charge of impiety. That is unlikely to have been a coincidence; rather, it suggests that there was, at the time, a sense of anxiety about the dangers of religious unorthodoxy and about the political consequences that religious deviation could bring. Two attempts to put an end to Athenian democracy had occurred in recent years, and the religious scandals of 415

    were not so far in the past that they would have been forgotten. Because a general amnesty had been negotiated, no one, except the 30 and a few others, could be tried for offenses committed prior to 403, when the 30 were defeated. But this would not have prevented an accusation from being brought against someone who committed a crime after 403. If Socrates had continued, during the years after 403, to engage in the same practices that were so characteristic of him throughout his adult life, then not even the most ardent supporters of the amnesty would have objected to bringing him to trial. And once a trial had begun, it was common practice for prosecutors to mention anything that might be judged prejudicial to the accused. There was no legal custom or court-appointed judge that would have prevented Socrates' accusers from referring to those of his admirersAlcibiades, Critias, Charmides, and the likewho

    at one time had been enemies of democratic Athens or had been associated with religious scandal. The law that Socrates was alleged to have violated was a law against impiety, but in support of that accusation he also was accused of having corrupted the young. His jury might have taken his association with opponents of the democracy, or with persons convicted or suspected of religious crimes, to be grounds for considering him a dangerous man.

    The fact that one of those who assisted in the prosecution of Socrates and spoke against himAnytuswas a prominent democratic leader makes it all the more likely that worries about the future of Athenian democracy lay behind Socrates' trial. And even if neither Anytus nor the other prosecutors (Meletus and Lycon) harboured such fears, it is hard to believe that they were entirely absent from the minds of those who heard his case. In any event, because Socrates openly displayed his antidemocratic ideas in his defense speech, it would have been difficult for jurors to set aside his association with opponents of the democracy, even if they had been inclined to do so. Athenian democracy must have seemed extremely fragile in 399. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that we can see that its institutions were strong enough to last most of the rest of the 4th century.

    It is not known with certainty whether those who prosecuted Socrates mentioned Alcibiades and Critias at his trialthere is no record of their speeches, and it

    is difficult to interpret the evidence about what they did say. But it is very likely that specific names were mentioned. In Plato's Apology, Socrates notes that his accusers alleged of certain individuals that they were his students, an accusation he lamely denies on the grounds that, because he has never undertaken to teach anyone, he cannot have had students. Furthermore, Xenophon reports in Memorabilia that, according to “the accuser,” Alcibiades and Critias were followers of Socrates. The word accuser is taken by some scholars to be a reference to one of the three persons who spoke against Socrates in 399, though others take Xenophon to be defending Socrates against charges made against him in a pamphlet written several years later by Polycrates, a teacher of rhetoric. In any event, many years later, in the 4th century, the orator Aeschines, in his speech “Against Timarchus,” asserted in public that Socrates was convicted because he was “shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the thirty who had overthrown the democracy.”

    But even if Socrates' association with Critias and Alcibiades was an important factor

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