DOC

The enlargement impact on the EU-Russia Relations - The

By Bradley Weaver,2014-06-18 01:11
5 views 0
The enlargement impact on the EU-Russia Relations - The

Andrei BELYI

    PHD Candidate

    Thesis Director: Prof. E. Remacle Université Libre de Bruxelles Av. F. Roosevelt 50

    CP 135

    Telephone: 32/486962549

    e-mail: belyiand@hotmail.com

The enlargement impact on the EU-Russia relations in energy field

    1

    1

The present paper focuses on the energy security of the enlarged EU and its impact on Introduction

    relations with Russia. The impact of the enlargement can be observed from two major angles:

    (1) the gas trade is becoming increasingly important, (2) the security and threat perceptions

    become geographically closer. Indeed, Russian oil and gas exports are achieving an ever-

    increasing importance as a part of the country’s diplomacy. On the other hand, the deepening

    of the internal market, the Kyoto protocol implementation, as well as the enlargement process

    constitute new factors for the European attitude vis-a-vis energy security. EU has adapted its energy policy since mid 1990s. The White Paper for Energy Policy2, the departure point of

    the European energy policy, states three main directions: diversification of security of supply,

    competitiveness, and environmental protection. Although two of the three aspects of this

    energy policy, namely competitiveness and the environmental protection, are separated from

    security of supply these issues are still indirectly interrelated:

    ? The creation of internally harmonised and liberalised electricity and gas market

    favours a larger number of private actors playing in the field of energy supply,

    therefore enhancing the energy security of all member states;

    ? Environmental protection is linked to both the reduction of energy consumption and

    the promotion of new and renewable energy technologies, which would contribute to

    fossil fuel import reduction, and therefore decrease import dependency.

    On this basis, energy security is determined by three main dimensions: political, economic

    and environmental. The liberalisation of gas and electricity sectors is consequent to the

    economic dimension, which aims to establish a single and competitive energy market. The

    implementation of the Kyoto process and the integration of sustainable development affects

    many aspects of the EU energy security conception. Finally, the impending enlargement to

    countries historically dependent on Russia for their energy supply constitute a major

    challenge to the geopolitical dimension of energy supply.

    These factors confirm the tendency of reinforcing the supranational level in the EU system

    3,

    creating an output for the international role of the EU. The securisation process can be

    considered as an input to the security policy of the EU political system. On these grounds, the

    4EU system is defined according to the Eastonian definition of system, with factors

    constituting an input for a supranational security policy. Indeed, D. Easton defines inputs of

    demand and of support to a system, the duration of which is conditioned by the existence of

    its values. Such an input-output model is useful when applied to define the process of the

    Europeanisation of the energy policy. Europeanisation defines the process of the relocation of

    5decision-making to the supra-national level, thus allowing an understanding of the dynamics

    of the European energy security policy, which appears effectively to exist despite the lack of

    an “Energy Chapter” in the EU Treaties.

1 I wish to thank Dr. Jörg Matthies (MVV Consultants & Engineers GmbH) and Prof. Eric Remacle (Université

    Libre de Bruxelles) for their very useful comments and criticism to this paper as well as the Foundation Alice

    and David Van Buuren, Brussels for its financial support 2 European Commission (1996), White Paper for Energy policy, COM(95) 682. 3 Cf. European Commission, Progress report on the response to the Green Paper ? Towards a European

    strategy for the security of energy supply” December 2000 end October 2001, Brussels 3.12.2001 4 EASTON, Analyse du système politique, 1965. 5 FUERST, V., PRANGE, H., WOLF, D. (2002), Globalisation, Europeanisation and All That : Sorting Out the Issues. The Examples of European States, presented at ESCA-Canada Fifth Biannual Conference, Toronto, May 2 stst31 June 1 2002 Bigger and Better ? The European Union, Enlargement and Reform, p.3.

The Europeanisation implies that not all national policies can become European policies, but

    that there is a strong influence of the supra-national level on the states, their positions and

    their policies. Europeanisation leaves contradictions between the member states, but tends to

    create political and economic coherence at the EU level. The concept of Europeanisation also

    provides a background for the principle of subsidiarity, which is the framework for the

    Community energy policy used when a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore be better achieved by action on behalf of the Community. At

    the same time, a definition of subsidiarity underlines the importance of the member states in

    decision making: they remain dominant in the allocation of subsidiarity status, and can decide

    either to stop or to accelerate the process. Such an input-output model also provides an

    explanation of the role of industry associations: gas and electricity industries set up interest 6 (a ratio between growth of economic development and energy groups on the EU level that also play an important role in defining energy security priorities.

    consumption), rather than to analyse interdependency of political factors. However, such

    studies also stem directly from the energy security perspective: how to keep the economic In the field of the economics of energy, the input-output model has been used in order to

    growth less dependent on energy supply? As it has been pointed out by S. Strange, this define the energy intensity

    economic sector cannot be analysed in purely quantitative terms: the oil shock was partially

    7provoked by Israeli-Arab conflict of 1973, which clearly reveals its geopolitical importance.

    On these grounds, she stigmatises the existing theoretical barriers which already exist

    between three major social sciences, i.e. economy, political sciences and international

    relations, and stresses the need to analyse energy security from both economic and political

    angles. The specificity of her view is a structural comprehension of international political

    economy: the structures which shape global political and economic behavior for States, firms,

    and other social and economic actors8. Four primary structures, namely security, finance, 9production and knowledge, constitute a source for structural power. Energy, in turn, is a vital

    factor for this structural power; it plays a vital role in production (especially industry,

    residential and transport sectors), finance (in terms of benefits provided especially by oil

    trade), knowledge (related to technological development, including energy and environmental

    sectors), as well as security (setting up international institutions dealing with energy supply or

    10atomic energy or direct intervention in oil-producing regions).

    Indeed, taking into account the international structures also explains the patterns of capability

    of different states. For instance, P. Andrew-Speed proposes a scheme of international oil

    11interdependency, according to energy, financial and technology structures:

    1. Countries exporting finance and technology, but importing energy, such as the USA,

    Japan and the majority of the EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain) ;

    2. Countries exporting oil and gas, but also finance and technology, among which are the

    UK, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands ;

    3. Oil & gas exporting countries, but importing technology and finance, which constitute

    the majority of the oil producers; including the OPEC countries, Russia and the

    Caspian region (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) ;

    6 PROOPS, J. (1988), “Energy intensities, input-output analysis and economic development” in GIASCHINI, M. (ed. by), Input-Output analysis: current developments, Chapman and Hall, New York and London, pp. 201-212. 7 STRANGE, S. (1980), States and Markets, Pinter Publishers, London, p. 191. 8 STRANGE, S. (1980), States and Markets, Pinter Publishers, London, p. 25. 9 STRANGE, S. (1980), States and Markets, Pinter Publishers, London, p. 27-29. 10 STRANGE, S. (1980), States and Markets, Pinter Publishers, London, pp 186-206. 11ANDREW-SPEED, P., "The Energy Charter Treaty and International Petroleum Politics", CEPMLP,

    University of DUNDEE, http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/article3-6.htm.

    3

    4. Countries depending on technology, finance, and energy products: among these can be

    considered the majority of the applicant states, along with the developing countries of

    South-East and East Asia.

    Nevertheless, a structural analysis leaves open a debate on the various dimensions of energy

    security. For example, a position of strength in finance and technology of “category 3” does

    not diminish these countries’ energy security policies and preoccupations. To this extent, a

    definition of the term “security” remains unclear. With respect to the debate on security

    studies, an interesting approach has been proposed by the members of the Copenhagen School. 12. Therefore, security is defined as a non-linear According to them, the term “security” is not considered as a direct consequence of threat, but

    reaction to the threat. Having inherited a realist perspective towards international relations, as the result of the political interpretation of threat, a process called securisation. They point

    Copenhagen School considers anarchy as the basis of the international structure, which also out the need to construct a conceptualisation of security that means something much more explains states’ attitudes towards security. specific than just any threat or problem

Considering such a definition of the term “security”, energy security is viewed as a dynamic

    concept, which includes new elements throughout history. A consensus seems to exist on the

    issue of energy security achieving a particular importance since the energy shocks of the

    1970s. Already existing asymmetries between the geographical distribution of resources and

    energy consumers had been consolidated by oil shortages in the petroleum-dependent

    countries13. Oil supply became a subject of vulnerabilities, either perceived or real, of consumer countries. Currently, the enlargement of the EU stimulates new dimensions of

    energy security in relations with Russia, particularly in light of the new security dimensions

    of the EU energy security.

By analyzing the influence of the new factors of energy security upon the enlarging EU the

    following questions are treated in the present study:

    What are the main issues related to the securisation of external energy policy for the enlarged-

    EU ? What will be the consequences on EU-Russia relations in the energy security field? Do

    the new factors of energy security create conditions for cooperation in the Pan European area?

    In order to have a comprehensive answer to these issues, the study is broken down into two

    main parts: the consequences of the enlargement on the EU energy security and its

    consequences of the EU energy security on relations with Russia.

12 BUZAN, B., WAEVER, O., DE WILDE, J. (1998), Security : a new framework for analysis, London, p. 7. 13 CHOUCRI, N. (1977), International Politics of Energy Interdependence, Lexington Books, pp. 185-186.

    4

     141. Consequences of the enlargement on the EU energy security . Prospects of energy dependency confirm a decrease of the

     EU domestic production of fossil fuels: North Sea oil production, which currently provides

    The enlargement constitutes an important input to the EU energy policy decisions. Already in nearly 10 % of the European oil markets, is likely to decline. European gas reserves

    2000, the Green Paper on the security of energy supply underlined the importance of the EU (concentrated in the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands) will not be sufficient to satisfy

    enlargement for energy securityconsumption needs. Its internal production will decrease by 30 % by 2020, from the current

    15204 Bcm to 140Bcm in 2020, with gas demand increased, gas import dependency will rise 16from current 40% to 60% by 2020. In all candidate countries, the economic depression of 17the last 10 years made the energy demand fall, but following a stabilisation, the fossil fuel

    consumption will keep rising, especially for gas (estimation of 55 % in 2020 compare to 18current level). In addition, the applicant countries do not have any significant oil and gas

    production, as demonstrates the Table 1.1.

     Table 1.1. Energy dependency, Candidate Countries, 1998

    Country Oil Gas

    Bulgaria 98.5% 99.7%

    Cyprus 98.8% -

    Czech Rep 99.8% 99.9%

    Estonia 85.4% 100%

    Hungary 80.9% 72.4%

    Lithuania 87.8% 105.4%

    Latvia 105.4% 106.4%

    Malta 99.9% -

    Poland 96.6% 66.8%

    Romania 43.9% 25.3%

    Slovak Rep 99.8% 99.1%

    Slovenia 108.6% 92.2

    Turkey 90.1% 94.6%

    Total applicant countries 87.7% 72.2%

     Source: Eurostat, 1999

The enlargement will broaden the spectrum of the energy security preoccupations related to

    energy security : liberalisation and market reforms, Kyoto commitments of greanhouse gas

    emission reduction, diversification of energy supply by source and by region. All these factors

    14 European Commission, Green Paper towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, technical document, 2000, pp. 4-9. 15 FORTUM, Northern Dimension Gas Study, Sept. 1999, pp. 27 35. 16 European Commission, Green Paper towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, technical document, 2000, p. 27. 17 International Energy Agency (IEA), Oil information - 1997, II 9-10. 18 DG ENERGY, Economic Foundation for Energy Policy, The European Commission, 1999, p. 60.

    5

influence the short term and long term security of energy supplies : short term by possible

    energy shortage, lack of gas interconnections and long term by a decrease of energy potential

    through a lack investments in the supply countries as well as the long-term take-or-pay

    contracts in gas sector.

1.1. Liberalisation and market reform

The economic aspect of security in general is defined by the Copenhagen School as the

    vulnerability stemming from the market economy. Energy, in turn, is the key input for an

    economic system and is widely used in industry, residential and transport sectors. Therefore,

    the price of energy can influence the overall competitiveness of an economic system. And the

    liberalization of electricity and gas markets aims to create a more competitive economy and to

    ensure the security of supply by a better interconnection of pipelines and grids among the EU 19countries, in line with an objective of becoming the most competitive economy by 2010 . According to the EU Directives 96/92 (liberalisation

    (reaffirmed at the Barcelona Summit). The liberalisation includes a new dimension in the of electricity) and 98/30 (liberalisation of gas), the liberalisation consists in the possibility for

    security of supply: along with supply disruptions, price volatility is considered as an large energy consumers to choose the most competitive supplier (Third Party access) and it

    important issue in the energy securityaims to create a transnational EU energy trade. In the short term, the liberalisation of gas and

    electricity, both grid-bound energies, requires a diversification of grids and gas-pipelines, as

    well as the diversity of physical supply, needed to avoid supply interruptions and to maintain

    the possibility to choose a more competitive supplier. In the longer term, security of supply

    requires a favorable investment climate and incentives for new gas supply projects and

    infrastructure20, and consequently, stable relations with extra-EU gas supply countries.

The enlargement of the EU will have to take into account network interconnections with

    Russia. The Baltic states as well as Finland have strong interconnections with Russia all

    four countries are dependent on Russian gas, and Latvia and Finland also import electricity

    from Russia. The main short-term obstacles that can create disturbances for the liberalised

    energy markets in Central and Eastern Europe are as follows :

? Obstacles to electricity imports that appear following environmental standardization and

    electricity generation from unsafe nuclear power plants;

    ? The removal of cross-subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe and non-removal of

    subsidies in Russia will create an unbalanced competition, already pointed out as a major

    obstacle by the electricity producer association Eurelectric;

    ? Problems with gas transit, particularly, the unlawful taking of gas in Ukraine, which is the

    main transit country between Russia and Europe and where the unlawful taking amounted

    at the level of the gas demand of Spain.

    The long-term gas security in Europe is conditioned by the investment climate in the energy producing countries, especially category 3 of the Andrew-Speed scheme. As Central and

    Eastern Europe imports almost 2/3 of its gas from Russia, EU dependency on Russian

    supplies are increasing in the long term period (Table 1.2.).

19 European Commission, Towards a European Strategy for the security of energy supply, December 2000-

    October 2001, p. 3. 20 Theoretical definition made by IEA, Regulatory Gas Reform : European Gas, Paris, 2000, p. 12.

    6

Table 1.2. Natural Gas Supply to Europe, 2001 21.52% 17.84% 38.71% 11.28% 10.51% EU-15 gas Norway Russia Middle East North Africa

    21production 23.95% 19.85% 30.87% 13.09% 12.05% EU-15 All potential 20.79% 16.46% 41.28% 10.44% 10.88% EU+10 22applicants applicant Source : BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2002, Oil and Capital, 09.12.2002 countries

    Gazprom, which detains the monopoly of the Russian gas exports, has expressed its concern

    23that Siberian gas might become uncompetitive in the context of liberalisation. Its supply

    costs vary from 1,93 et 2,30 USD/MBTU, while it is around 1,49USD/MBTU for Caspian 24(Turkmenistan) and 1,63 0,90 USD/MBTU for Algeria. Indeed, the transport costs of

    Russian gas from Yamal, Western Siberia (Nardym-Pur and Pur Taz) are much higher than of

    its European and Middle Eastern competitors. Only Urals gas seems to be in a favorable

    position (Figure 1.1.).

    Figure 1.1. Production & Transport costs

    3,5

    3

    2,5

    2Sie2MBtu1,5

    1

    0,5

    0

    Algeria via Medgaz

    Algeria via Sardinia

    Egypt to Turkey

    Russia (Urals)-Ukraine

    Russia (Urals)-Blue Stream

    Libya to ItalySource: OME, 2001Turkmenistan via Caspian

     UK to continental Europe

     Norway North Sea21Russia (NadymPurTaz) via BelarusCzech Rep., Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovak Rep, Slovenia 22Turkmenistan via Iran EU-15 + 10 applicants + Bulgaria, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey. 23Russia (NadymPurTaz) via Ukraine Referring to an interview if Yryi Komarov, managing director of Gasexport daughter company of Gasprom,

    published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 August 2001. Russia (NadymPurTaz) via Baltic24 OME (L’Obsérvatoire Mediterranéen de l’Energie), Assessment of Internal and External Gas Supply Options Russia (Yamal) Belarusfor the EU, Evaluation of the Supply Costs of New Natural gas Supply Projects to the EU and Ivestigation of Turkmenistan via Russia/UkraineRelated Financial Requiremenets and Tools, 2001, p. 10. Russia (Barents) via Baltic

    Russia (Yamal) Baltic7

    In this context, projects of cooperation with China (e.i. Kovykhta reserves in Eastern Siberia) 25are becoming more advantageous in the event of the replacement of long-term contracts by . But, that might contradict the spirit of the liberalisation, which aims short term spot markets. In order to avoid risks related to long term gas import shortages, the to create European spot markets. Moreover, the International Energy Agency considers that

    association of European gas suppliers, Eurogas, suggests energy partnerships not only with long-term contracts might hamper further energy liberalisation, while the lack of investment

    Russia, but also with Caspian countries, and, a reinforcement of thedialogue with 26projects in the applicant countries hinders the diversification of external supplies. Mediterranean partners

    1.2. Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol

    The issue of climate change is one of the major issues considered in the European energy

    policy. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) requires a worldwide reduction of greenhouse gas

    emissions by 5.2 % in 2010 from its level of 1990 (target agreed at the Marrakech Conference

    of Parties, November 2001). The EU has committed itself to reducing its greenhouse gases by

    8% below 1990 levels, by the period 2008 2012. The objective of sustainable development

    is to attain a reasonable balance between security of supply, satisfaction of social needs,

    competitive energy services and environmental protection27. The integration of sustainable

    development into energy strategy creates a new context for energy security, as it constitute a

    challenge for energy consumption in Europe. Development and application of new energy

    technologies, such as fuel cells, energy conservation technologies, as well as the targets of

    doubling of the renewable energy by the year 2010 will contribute to a strong decrease of the

    28energy dependency. According to past experience, the dependency towards oil demand has strongly decreased since the energy crisis because of the introduction of energy efficient

    technologies: from 1973 to 1995 energy consumption has increased only by de 0.7 %, while

    29the GDP has increased by 2.5 %/year. Coupled with energy intensity improvement, the

    environmental dimension of the EU policy can affect its geopolitical position towards the

    energy dependency. Consequently, the technological boost will further reinforce structural

    power of countries of category 1 and 2 in contrast to those of categories 3 and 4.

The greenhouse gas emission abatement makes natural gas the fastest growing energy of the

    21st century, contributing to the decrease of nuclear energy and coal in the Inland Energy

    Consumption. The increase of gas demand for environmental reasons is far more important

    for the applicant countries. Together they bring with them a coal-mining industry larger than

    the EU-15, while the coal industry is one of the most harmful in terms of greenhouse gas

    effect. In particular the coal industry remains dominant in the Inland Energy Consumption of

    30Poland (66 %), Czech Republic (52 %), Estonia (51.8%) and Bulgaria (35.8%). Upon the

    implementation of Kyoto objectives, the share of hard coal will be reduced and replaced by

    natural gas. In the same direction, unsafe nuclear power plants are going to be closed in

    Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia, will again be a replacement by natural gas infrastructures.

25 Cf. Eurogas response on European Commission Green Paper for security of supply, summarised by Energy

    Europe, 30 March 2001, n 578, Europe Information Service, Brussels, p. I 5. 26 IEA, Regulatory Gas Reform : European Gas, Paris, 2000, p. 25. 27 Cf. European Commission, Integrating Environmental Aspects and Sustainable Development into Enegy Policy, 2001. 28 CAPROS, P., MANTZOS, L., CRIQUI, P., KOUVARITAKIS, N., SORIA RAMINEZ, A.,

    SCHRATTENHOLZER, L., VOUYOUKAS, E.L., Centre for European Economic Research, Climate

    Technology Strategies 1, 2001, pp. 211-212. 29 Cf. IEA, Energy efficiency Initiative, vol. 1, 1997, p. 42. 30Figures of International Energy Agency

    8

    31. So far few Accession countries have precise measures for the promotion

    of alternative energies. For the time being, the investment climate of clean energy technologies remains

     underdeveloped : the post-socialist countries are lacking available information on

    In the meantime, replacement of internal coal production and of nuclear power by natural gas technologies, qualifications and management capacities, besides the low energy prices due to

    imports will reduce the energy self-sufficiency of many Central and Eastern European the cross-subsidies

    countries (Figure 1.3.).

    Figure 1.2. Energy selfsufficiency, in per cent

    100

    90

    80

    70

    60

    50Sie140

    30

    20

    10

    0

    Bulgaria

    Czech Rep Source: IEA (2001), Energy Balances of OECD countries, European

    Parliament, New Cronos data, 2002Estonia

    Hungary

    With a lack of internal gas production (Table 1.1.), the Kyoto Protocol implementation leads Latviato an increase of energy dependency of these countries. In the meantime, shortage of natural

    gas will become an obstacle to decreasing the coal production in these countries, thus to the Lithuania

    greenhouse gas reduction.

    Poland

    Romania1.3. External diversification of energy supplies: global system issues

     Slovak Rep The international level of geopolitical dimension appeared after oil became the most

    important resource among world energy supplies at the end of 1960’s. Almost two thirds of Sloveniaconsumption is concentrated in the Western developed countries, defined as the OECD

    (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). The largest part of the petroleum Turkeyreserves is located outside the OECD, with two thirds of the total reserves situated in the

31 New Energy: magazine for renewable energies, n 5, 2001, pp. 16-17.

    9

    3233, when the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

    reduced the oil exports to the West. Since then, relations with the oil cartel has become a

    strategic issue, as the oil price depends on export quotas imposed by OPEC, as well as

    fluctuations of demand in the energy importing countries. This also influences the trade of Persian Gulf. The security preoccupation with oil supply has been in focus since the oil

    natural gas, the price of which is indexed to that of oil. shocks of 1970s

    The energy supply diversification has become a policy matter for Western countries, and,

    with the constitution of national strategic oil reserves, it is one of the main policy

    recommendation of the International Energy Agency. Therefore, relations with non-OPEC

    countries became a vital element. Price volatility depends on the energy flows: international

    negotiations on oil prices between the OPEC and consumers (the US and the EU) had

    revealed the importance of an “appropriate price” for the Western countries (between 22 and

    25 USD per barrel). Indeed, high taxes imposed on oil for environmental reasons are pushing

    the price even higher in the context of higher world energy prices. On the contrary, low

    energy prices are unfavorable for future investments in producing countries, especially

    outside OPEC where the exploration costs are very high, as in the North Sea.

    Whereas the OPEC is dominated by Islamic countries (Persian Gulf reserves account for two

    thirds of oil world reserves), the main political security perceptions are related to the stability

    of the region and relations of the West with the region. Likewise, recent terrorists attacks

    against the US and the subsequent military campaign in Afghanistan has influenced the

    market studies made by the major oil companies. The company Royal/Dutch Shell evaluates

    gas transactions as being more reliable than oil trade, which has been made vulnerable by

    political developments. Therefore, according to Shell, the international “Business class” will

    be discouraged in investing in the politically unstable Middle East

    34. In this regard Russia

    appears as an alternative for energy supplies from the Middle East and as a partner in fighting Islamic terrorism in Central Asia, where Moscow is preserving its influence. Whereas reliance on Russian energy supplies seems to be improving, other issues of policy securisation can also influence the EU position towards Russia in the current context. Indeed, a deterioration of the economic, political and military situation in the CIS, and particularly in Russia, stimulates a new sort of security scares, related to soft security such immigration, nuclear safety, control of weapon arsenal35.

Under these conditions, Caspian energy becomes an interesting alternative energy supply

    option. The EU enlargement influences the European attitude towards energy security in two

    directions: increasing the dependency on gas supply (mainly concentrated in Algeria, Norway

    and Russia) and EU expansion to the Middle East through the potential accession of Turkey.

    Three particular points should be underlined in order to overview the importance of Ankara in

    energy geopolitics:

    ? Turkey is the only Candidate country having strong energy links with the Gulf: its oil

    sector accounts for almost 50% of its final energy consumption, with only 12,7% of oil

32 The first oil shock in 1973-4 resulted from political decision of the OPEC countries because of the Western

    support for Israel in Israeli-Arab conflict ; the second in 1979 was due to the Iranian Islamic revolution. Both

    shocks had a negative impact in terms of employment, economic growth and financial losses in all OECD

    countries. Cf. MAULL, H., W., ? Energy and resources : the strategic dimensions ? in Survival, Nov.-Dec. 1989,

    pp. 500-517. 33 Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries : Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi

    Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela. 34 Royal Dutch Shell (2002), People and Connections Global scenarios to 2020, pp. 43-52, 89. 35 LIGHT, M., "Security Implications of Russia's Foreign Policy for Europe", in European Foreign Affairs

    Review, vol. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 57-61.

    10

Report this document

For any questions or suggestions please email
cust-service@docsford.com