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There were two large pans (1 meter x 1 meter) of open oil (and water). by ISI specialists, certified at the level to at least IIa NDT education.

    RESTRICTED

This Report is submitted to the Krško Nuclear Power Plant. Its initial distribution is restricted

    to the authorities concerned, the contributors to the report and responsible Agency staff. The

    Report will be de-restricted within 90 days of the IAEA's transmittal letter unless a contrary

    response has been received from the Krško NPP. Only when it is known that the report has been „de-restricted‟ should this cover sheet be

    removed.

Division of Nuclear Safety

    International Atomic Energy Agency

    P.O. Box 100

    A-1400 Vienna, Austria

    RESTRICTED

    TC Project SLO-9011

    NSNI/OSART/03/121

     IAEA-TCR-02009

    ORIGINAL: English

     DRAFT

    REPORT OF THE

    OSART

    (OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW TEAM)

    MISSION

    TO THE

    KRŠKO

    Nuclear Power Plant

    SLOVENIA

    20 October to 6 November 2003

    DIVISION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATION SAFETY

    OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW TEAM MISSION Conducted under IAEA Technical Co-operation Project SLO-9011

    Support for Nuclear Safety Review

     DEPARTMENT OF TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY

     Division for Europe, Latin America and West Asia Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

    PREAMBLE

    This report presents the results of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant, Slovenia. It includes recommendations for improvements affecting operational safety for consideration by the responsible Slovenian authorities and identifies good practices for consideration by other nuclear power plants. Each recommendation, suggestion, and good practice is identified by a unique number to facilitate communication and tracking.

    Any use of or reference to this report that may be made by the competent Slovenian organizations is solely their responsibility.

    FOREWORD

    by the

    Director General

    The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme assists Member States to enhance safe operation of nuclear power plants. Although good design, manufacture and construction are prerequisites, safety also depends on the ability of operating personnel and their conscientiousness in discharging their responsibilities. Through the OSART programme, the IAEA facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience between team members who are drawn from different Member States, and plant personnel. It is intended that such advice and assistance should be used to enhance nuclear safety in all countries that operate nuclear power plants.

    An OSART mission, carried out only at the request of the relevant Member State, is directed towards a review of items essential to operational safety. The mission can be tailored to the particular needs of a plant. A full scope review would cover eight operational areas: management, organization and administration; training and qualification; operations; maintenance; technical support; radiation protection; chemistry; and emergency planning and preparedness. Depending on individual needs, the OSART review can be directed to a few areas of special interest or cover the full range of review topics.

    Essential features of the work of the OSART team members and their plant counterparts are the comparison of a plant's operational practices with best international practices and the joint search for ways in which operational safety can be enhanced. The IAEA Safety Series documents, including the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme and the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, and the expertise of the OSART team members form the bases for the evaluation. The OSART methods involve not only the examination of documents and the interviewing of staff but also reviewing the quality of performance. It is recognized that different approaches are available to an operating organization for achieving its safety objectives. Proposals for further enhancement of operational safety may reflect good practices observed at other nuclear power plants.

    An important aspect of the OSART review is the identification of areas that should be improved and the formulation of corresponding proposals. In developing its view, the OSART team discusses its findings with the operating organization and considers additional comments made by plant counterparts. Implementation of any recommendations or suggestions, after consideration by the operating organization and adaptation to particular conditions, is entirely discretionary.

    An OSART mission is not a regulatory inspection to determine compliance with national safety requirements nor is it a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of a plant's overall safety status, a requirement normally placed on the respective power plant or utility by the regulatory body. Each review starts with the expectation that the plant meets the safety requirements of the country concerned. An OSART mission attempts neither to evaluate the overall safety of the plant nor to rank its safety performance against that of other plants reviewed. The review represents a `snapshot in time'; at any time after the completion of the mission care must be exercised when considering the conclusions drawn since programmes at nuclear power plants are constantly evolving and being enhanced. To infer judgements that were not intended would be a misinterpretation of this report.

    The report that follows presents the conclusions of the OSART review, including good practices and proposals for enhanced operational safety, for consideration by the Member State and its competent authorities.

    CONTENT

INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS................................................................. 1

    1. MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION ................................ 3

    2. TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS........................................................................ 11

    3. OPERATIONS ............................................................................................................ 24

    4. MAINTENANCE ........................................................................................................ 35

    5. TECHNICAL SUPPORT............................................................................................. 45

    6. RADIATION PROTECTION ...................................................................................... 54

    7. CHEMISTRY .............................................................................................................. 61

    8. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS ................................................ 69

    9. SAFETY CULTURE ................................................................................................... 78

    DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................... 83

    TEAM COMPOSITION ...................................................................................................... 84

    INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

    At the request of the Government of Slovenia, an IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of international experts visited Krško Nuclear Power Plant from 20 October to 6

    November 2003. The purpose of the mission was to review operating practices in the areas of Management Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; and Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Also an enhanced review of Safety Culture was performed. In addition, an exchange of technical experience and knowledge took place between the experts and their plant counterparts on how the common goal of excellence in operational safety could be further pursued.

    The Krško OSART mission was the 121st in the programme, which began in 1982. The team was composed of experts from Canada, Brazil, United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Slovakia, and United States of America, together with the IAEA staff members and an observer from Ukraine. The collective nuclear power experience of the team was approximately 300 man years.

Before visiting the plant, the team studied information provided by the IAEA and the Krško NPP to

    familiarize themselves with the plant's main features and operating performance, staff organization and responsibilities, and important programmes and procedures. During the mission, the team reviewed many of the plant's programmes and procedures in depth, examined indicators of the plant's performance, toured areas in the plant, observed work in progress, and held in-depth discussions with plant personnel.

    Throughout the review, the exchange of information between the OSART experts and plant personnel was very open, professional and productive. Emphasis was placed on assessing the effectiveness of operational safety rather than simply the content of programmes. The conclusions of the OSART team were based on the plant's performance compared with good international practices.

    The team also noted the openness of the regulatory authority role in this mission. The regulator asked the team to maintain special focus on areas important to safety, which are reflected in this report.

    MAIN CONCLUSIONS

    The OSART team concluded that the Krško NPP has several good features that form the basis for future safe operation of the plant; most significantly, a well educated, highly motivated, professional and experienced staff.

     1 INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The senior management of Krško NPP is committed to improving the operational safety and

    reliability of their plant in a long-term perspective. The team found that Krško NPP has several

    strong attributes and programs, including the following:

    ? There is priority on nuclear safety at all levels of the organization.

    ? As a whole, the management of the plant has a depth of technical knowledge and a good

    background in nuclear plant operation.

    ? The plant has made effective use of computer technology to plan work, track activities and

    communicate within the plant.

However, although the Krško NPP has many good operational safety features, the team

    observed some areas for improvement. The most significant were:

    ? The industrial safety policy, practice and management involvement should improve.

    ? The plant should further address the volume and storage of low level waste.

    ? The plant should enhance the use and adherence to procedures in the field.

An important element of the OSART review is the identification of those findings that exhibit

    positive and negative safety cultural aspects of operational safety performance. The OSART team

    used the guidance provided in INSAG-4, INSAG-13, INSAG-15 and IAEA Safety Report Series

    No. 11 to assess various organizational and technological aspects of operational safety culture at the

    Krško NPP.

    The overall impression by the team is that the plant has a strong safety culture, driven from the

    top with conscious efforts to inculcate the safety thinking in employees from the very start, the

    sharing of vision and standards in long-term partnership with subcontractors and by fostering

    an open and good relationship with the local community.

     A stable work force with long experience in the plant has facilitated these developments.

    Although a strong safety culture is evident in many ways, the term safety culture has only

    recently been more systematically introduced in the company together with efforts focused at

    assessing the safety culture of the organization. The development of the codex of safety and

    business ethics, together with the training given, has been the main means of introducing the

    safety culture concept.

    The plant is in a transition phase with many future challenges in terms of aging plant, aging

    work force with soon to come retirements, increased economic pressures from owners and

    operating in a competitive market. A strong safety culture is paramount in being able the meet

    these challenges.

Krško NPP management expressed a determination to address the areas identified for improvement

    and indicated a willingness to accept a follow up visit.

     2 INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS

    1. MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1.1. CORPORATE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

    The Krsko Nuclear Power Plant is single reactor, 676 Mwe two-loop Westinghouse plant operated by Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko (NEK). The plant is jointly owned by the State Utilities of Croatia and Slovenia and is located in the Republic of Slovenia at the town of Krsko near the Croatian border. Croatia and Slovenia share equally in the cost of supporting the plant as well as the electrical output.

     While the operation the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant is funded by the governments of Croatia and Slovenia, the electrical power sector was opened to competition in 2001. This provides some incentive to ensure that the cost of the energy from the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) remains competitive with the open market.

    All corporate functions are at the Nuclear Power Plant Site. The company is overseen by the NEK Management Board, which consists of two individuals, a President from Slovenia and a Member from Croatia. The Management Board reports to a Supervisory Board of the Utility Owners representing equally Croatia and Slovenia.

    The Corporate Vision and Goals are clearly stated and widely promulgated through out the organization. The Vision includes being in the top quartile of performance for nuclear power plants in the world and the Mission focuses on Safety, Competitiveness and Favorable Public Opinion.

1.2. PLANT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

    The plant has a workforce of slightly greater than 600 personnel, which is consistent with other well-run single unit nuclear plants of this size and type. The plant organization, reports to the Management Board.

     A notable strength of the Krsko NPP is the plant staff, who have a strong focus on nuclear safety and plant operations. Most of the staff, both labor and management have long experience with the Krsko NPP, starting with the construction period and thus have a strong technical knowledge. Additionally, key members of the Management Team including the President of the Management Board have held Operating Licenses on the plant and have worked as Operating Shift Managers.

    The team noted that the plant staff has not been allowed to become complacent. Programs are in place to strive to meet or exceed international nuclear industry performance goals and standards. They include, for example, the use of industry experience, participation in Owners Groups, sending key staff members to INPO for personnel development, and providing MBA program training to key management personnel.

    Good alignment among the management team is facilitated by a comprehensive set of station goals, an annual offsite team building activity and strong senior leadership. The team noted that the plant staff, at all levels, had a positive attitude and took pride their contribution to the success of the plant.

     3 MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

    The corrective action program is effective and is supported at all levels in the organization. The plant recognizes the administrative burden of the corrective action program and has initiated a project to upgrade the program and the computer technology that supports it. The intent is to reduce the administrative burden, make the process more efficient and user friendly and reduce the reporting threshold.

Senior Management recognizes the “aging workforce” issue and is taking steps to manage the

    issue by hiring and training new, younger employees, and providing more detailed procedure guidance to the new less experienced personnel. Older, more experienced workers are being tasked to transfer their knowledge and experience to suitable, comprehensive procedures for conducting work.

    The team found some weaknesses in the use of, maintenance of, and adherence to procedures in the plant. The team recommends that using more stringent industry guidance, the plant should redetermine those activities, which require procedures, and provide these procedures in a suitable form for use in the field. Management should also ensure that the procedures are used as required and revised when necessary.

    Senior Management is also investing in major equipment replacements and upgrades as required. Recent examples include the steam generator replacement, the power uprate, the security system upgrade and a replacement low pressure turbine has been ordered.

    The team noted a Good Practice in the quality of the 5-Year Business Plan and the rigorous process that created it. The 5-Year Business Plan clearly supports the safe, long-term operation of the plant, which also contributes to high employee morale.

    The team noted that a plant aging management program is being developed and the team has a suggestion that the program be developed in a more integrated fashion across the plant organizations to ensure all necessary actions are planned and implemented.

1.3. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM

    The Quality Assurance and Control Program at the Krsko NNP is based on the 18 Quality Assurance Criteria for Power Plants in accordance with U.S. regulation 10CFR50, App B. This program was introduced during construction. The Quality Assurance and Control (QA/QC) organization is generally effective in its QC functions. The team determined that the external (vendor) QA audit and surveillance function is effective in conjunction with the contribution of the procurement engineering staff.

    The internal (plant) QA audit and reporting function was not as effective in providing management an accurate, in depth, assessment of plant quality and safety performance.

    The team has issued a recommendation for senior plant Management to use international industry guidance to take actions to ensure that the Quality Assurance functions provide an effective barrier to a potential decline in plant performance.

     4 MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

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