2006 Gambian Presidential Election

By Catherine Lawson,2014-05-13 09:19
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2006 Gambian Presidential Election

     ballot voting was diligently processed.

     Difficulties in finding voter names on the

    Alphabetical or Numerical Voter Roll 2006 Gambian Presidential

    were resolved without too much delay. Election Although few voters got confused about the polling station they were assigned to,

     due to the late set up of additional polling

    stations and subsequent confusion in An overview

    sites numbering, most voters straightforwardly located the polling site By Jerome Leyraud where to cast their vote. Polling stations Election Specialist manned by three polling staff were missing in some places a well-trained ????? queue controller whose duty was to reorient misinformed voters before entering the queue. Voter crowd was The People of The Gambia were called however orderly handled by police ndon Friday 22 of September 2006 to the officers. poll to choose between Mr. Yahya Jammeh, front-runner of the ruling party, Heavy rains disturbed polling Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and countrywide and resulted in the extension Construction (APRC), and two of voting until 6.30 pm. Information was challengers, Mr. Ousainou Darboe and not properly disseminated and resulted in Mr. Halifa Sallah, respectively standard-confusion among polling officials over the bearers of opposition parties United appropriate closing time of the polls . Democratic Party (UDP) and National Although the IEC statement was Alliance for Democracy and Development broadcasted on national TV and radio, a (NADD). lot of poling stations weren’t made aware

     of the extension on due time. The “forgone conclusion” of the Presidential Election in The Gambia, An impressive election monitoring by prognosticated by most political party agents, domestic and international observers, materialized. The incumbent observers, by far the largest The Gambia President, Mr. Yahya Jammeh won by a had ever experienced, benefited the large margin of 67.33% of the votes credibility of the exercise. With although with only a 58.58%, the poll international financial support channeled registered the lowest participation of through the IEC, party agents were voters in the recent history of Gambian deployed to almost all polling sites. In elections. But despite all ruling party addition, more than 300 domestic and efforts to entice a landslide victory, a international observers monitored the majority of voters decided to “vote with polls on E-day. The concurrent heir feet”, expressing their dissatisfaction deployment of party agents, domestic with Gambian politics. and international observers helped

     improve people’s confidence and Election Day: perception of a technically sound voting

     and counting exercise. Polling day proceeded calmly and no security incident was reported. Vote Closing of the polls by 6.30 pm instead of started at 7.00 am in most of the 989 4.00 pm resulted in delays in tabulating polling stations countrywide. Electoral and reconciling votes. Although drums materials were timely dispatched and were diligently convoyed from most more than 3,000 trained polling staff polling stations to the 48 constituency-effectively attended voters. The token-based counting centres, under the

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    scrutiny of polling agents, in some leadership, as well as some development remote areas electoral materials retrieval achievements, and to some extend was delayed by lack of transportation people’s credit for restoring national pride,

    facilities. Observers pointed out that including the holding of the African Union logistical arrangements made by the IEC summit in Banjul early July 2006, offered were not always adequate. Invariably the the incumbent President an apparent late arrival of electoral materials further landslide victory. Although figures may delayed the beginning of the count. look extremely positive, a closer analysis

     shows worrisome trends. A large number of domestic and

    Electoral trends 2001- 2006international observers, polling-turned-

    counting agents as well as Media

    representatives closely monitored vote

    tabulation and reconciliation. Counting

    procedures were conveniently applied.

    The way counting was carried out, using 700 000sieves to retrieve sand and counting 600 000trays to aggregate tokens, was effective, 500 000transparent and swift.

    400 000 ElectorateHowever, because of the late release of 300 000Votesresults from the most populous 200 000APRCconstituencies, it was not until Saturday 100 000rd23 of September 2006 mid-afternoon Opposition0that the IEC was able to announce the

     results and declare the incumbent

    Voter turnout: President, Mr. Yahyia Jammeh as duly

     elected President of The Republic of The ndThe main lesson from the 22 of Gambia, for a third term in office.

    September 2006 poll is voter apathy. The

    apparent dissatisfaction of Gambian Election results:

    citizens with politics and the clear

    disinclination of large segments of the With a total of 264,404 votes, the military-

    society to vote are reflected in the drastic turned-politician and APRC leader

    drop of voter turnout, from 89.71% to significantly outnumbered his two

    58.58% between 2001 and 2006. opponents. Mr. Darboe and Mr. Sallah,

     who respectively received a total of

    Abstention, which represented one out of 104,808 votes (26.69%) and 23,473

    ten registered voters in 2001 (10.17%), votes (4.98%).

    increased to 41.42% in the 2006 2006 Presidential results by partypresidential poll. It means that four

    registered voters did not turn to polling

    sites to cast a ballot on E-day while four NADD5,98%others voted in favor of APRC leader and UDP-NRP26,69%only two supported the opposition.


The divided opposition, the privilege of

    incumbency but also a popular

    Page 2 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    Abstention 2001 -2006Voter Roll trends

    670 3361 600 000700 000

    1 600 000509 301600 000457 4841 400 000392 685500 000915 0001 200 000277 651400 0001 000 000670 336670 336670 3362001800 0002006509 301300 000

    600 000200 00051 817400 000100 000200 000

    00Voter RollVotesAbstentionVR 2001-2006Population vs. VRVAP vs. VR

     Not only a majority of Gambians did not Based on an estimated population of 1.6 turn to polling stations to vote on E-day, million, the electorate represents only but between 2001 and 2006 the active 42% of the total population, and likely electorate those who vote- slightly 73% of the Voting Age Population (VAP) declined. Votes fall by 64,799 (from estimated at 915.000. With such figures, 457,484 to 392 685), although the total The Gambia is far below the average voter population increased by 161,035. ratio of registered population / total

    Electoral results overview population of countries having similar 12001 - 2006socio-demographic patterns.

    Should the figures be accurate, they will 700 000

    also reflect an incomplete registration of 600 000the VAP although voter registration, no 500 000being mandatory, is unlikely to match the

    400 000adult population. However with three out

    of ten adults not registered, the exercise 300 000can’t be truly qualified as inclusive and 200 000successful. The low registration turnout 100 000may also indicate political and social 0apathy with regard to an electoral 2001exercise seen as meaningless or simply 2006lacking political stakes. Voter Roll

    Should the country population be only 1.4

     million, the registration figures would get Votes closer to regional standards, although still AbstentionVoter Registration: on the low range. A possible explanation may be the large number of Senegalese APRC The 2006 Final Voter Roll enrolled nationals living in The Gambia, distorting Opposition670,336 voters, increased by 31.62% the population figures. In any case, such between 2001 and 2006, including the

    94,924 names added during the 1supplementary voter registration Benin has 4.2 million voters for a total conducted in July 2006 while 11,555 population of 7.8 million (ratio 5.4) and Togo has deletions were processed. 3.6 million voters for a total population of 5.5

    million (ratio 6.5).

    Page 3 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    low ratio is likely to disqualify any Under-age voting: complaint regarding massive registration of non-Gambians. Observers persistently reported

     underage voting, an unfortunate pattern stThe 1 of September 2006 Supreme of less developed country elections. Court of Justice ruling, by recognizing the Although some evidence of underage right for any voter with a valid voter card voting was made available (photos), it but whose name didn’t appear of the was difficult to assess frequency and Voter Roll to be allowed to vote, clearly scope of such occurrences. undermined the principles and legal basis of the voter registration. In such A conservative projection of ten to twenty a ”revisited” legal framework, the underage voters per polling station Objection and Appeal process, following however indicates that that potentially ten the completion of the countrywide to twenty thousands voters illegally registration exercise, became irrelevant participated to polling, accounting for 2.5 since any registration card holder was to 5% of the cast ballots. Provided that given a right to vote. under-age voters mainly benefited to the

     ruling party such electoral malpractice Through its ruling, the Supreme Court may have affected the results by a opposed any legal opportunity for maximum margin of 5%. Whatever real challenging a voter card issuance. The numbers are the perception remains of a ruling did not only contradict the omission defective voter registration.

    and objection provisions of the 1996 Elections Decree, it also denied any right To the IEC discharge, it must be pointed to object names inclusion on the voter roll out that according to section 12 of the or potentially defective issuance of voter 1996 Elections Decree, the IEC is not cards by registration staff. empowered to challenge the registration Similarly, the decision of the IEC to of alleged under-age voters and/or increase the Appeal and Objection supposed non Gambians, as long as registration fee by 400% (from Dal 5 to appropriate documentation is produced Dal 25) made almost impossible any for the registration. Any document issued appeal and objection. Not only the fee by the State (Birth Certificate, Gambian represented an unaffordable cost for Passport, National ID card) or a most Gambian citizens, earning a dollar a certificate from five elders has valor of day, it definitively prevented political proof and can’t be simply disregarded by

    parties to log on appeals in Court for lack IEC registration officers. Therefore the of financial resources. problem lies more in the production of

     such documents by the State apparatus Already questionable in its principle, the and local administrative structures, than substantive increase of registration fee on IEC technical deficiencies. for Objection and Appeal made the

    Military voting: provisions of the Law simply nominal.

    Associated with the ruling of the Supreme Court, it made totally irrelevant Another disturbing factor commonly the legal provisions for Appeal and reported by observer groups was the Objections, as set in section 22 of the large number of voters in military fatigue 1996 Elections Decree and denied any in specific polling stations. The absence possibility legally and technically- to of adequate electoral provisions object names inclusion in the Voter Roll. regarding the vote of the armed forces,

     associated with apparent abuses of duty

     certificates, complacently delivered by

     the IEC staff to the security services, led

    Page 4 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    to a perceived if not deliberate- This clearly indicates that rather than intimidation of voters in polling stations widening its support-base the ruling party where unarmed soldiers had to cast their is gaining marginal votes. In values, vote. figures are still positive with an increase

     of 22,102 votes over the period while However the issue remains particularly opposition lost 80,311 votes. But APRC associated with the nationally-based electoral base which accounted for presidential election. In the absence of almost five out of ten voters in 2001 duty certificate delivery for multiple dropped to less than four voters in 2006, constituency elections, large military the abstention being the overwhelming gatherings at polling stations should not and disturbing factor of the presidential affect parliamentarian and local elections, election. although the question of potential intimidation from military-dressed Electorate breakdown personnel voting remains. 2006

    Similarly, there is no provision for other NADDUDP-NRP23 473special-needs voters, including prisoners, 104 8084%hospital patients, disabled…etc, hence 16%Abstentiondisenfranchising several segments of the 277 65141%Gambian voting population.

     APRCPartisanship and political party voters’ 264 404support-base: 39%

     Between 2001 and 2006, the incumbent Electorate breakdown President, omnipotent and omnipresent 2001leader of the ruling party, won only

    Abstention;22,102 votes while the registered voting UDP;51 817population increased by 161,035. The 149 448;10%29%9.12% increase in APRC support

    between 2001 and 2006 is far less

    important that the 31.62%% increase of

    the voter population. Statistically, less PDOIS13 841APRC;than one out of seven new voters 3%242 302;NCPdecided to support APRC. In 2001, NRP48%17 262; 35 671APRC gathered 47.58% of the registered 3%7%voters while abstention was set at

    Out of seven administrative areas, the 10.17%. Five years later, the ruling party

    ruling party gained votes in six and lost was backed by only 39.44% of the

    support in one. A slight increase of APRC electorate.

    votes indeed occurred in five regions: Partisan votes against Voter RollBanjul (+2.75%), Kanifing (+8.22%), 2001- 2006Brikama (+9.54%), Kerewan (+8.16%),

    and Janjabureh (+2.44%). APRC support

    670 336slightly dropped in Mansakonko (-2.56%) 800 000

    while the Eastern region (+28.32%) saw 509 301600 000an important increase of APRC 264 404242 302185 119400 000supporters, accounting for 35.9% of the 104 808

    total rise of the ruling party votes 200 000

    countrywide (9.12% increase at 22,102 0votes) Voter RollAPRCUDP-NRP

    Page 5 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

     a US$ 30,000 contract to carry out voter Similarly opposition support recessed education countrywide, including well-from 42.45% of the electorate to 19.14%. attended face-to-face meetings, The main opposition front-bearer, discussion panels and live phone-in Ousainou Darboe, received support from programmes on the national Radio-TV 15.64% (29.34% in 2001) of the total broadcast, while the IEC sponsored 14 registered population while the third well-know artists to compile electoral contestant captured only 3.50% of the songs and produce video-clips, later on total electorate. With only 104,808 votes aired on the national Radio-TV broadcast in favor of UDP-NRP alliance in the 2006 along with simple but eye-catching voter polls (26.69% of cast votes), Mr. Darboe information ads. Unfortunately no poster, lost 80,311 votes in comparison to the leaflet and other printed material 2001 election (185,119 votes). As a supplemented the limited activities matter of fact, the opposition faced a carried on countrywide to help voters significant tide-off in all seven areas, with make an informed choice during E-day. in particular drastic losses in major urban areas, traditional strongholds of the Incidentally, the IEC was never clearly opposition. mandated with voter education. Neither

    the 1996 Elections Decree nor the 1997 Projection of 2006 votes according to 2001 turnoutConstitution refer to voter education as

    part of the IEC mandate.

     700 000404 9232006Political campaigning: 264 404600 000

    500 000An almost violent-free political campaign 196 4572001ended 24 hours before the poll. Although 128 281400 000

    sporadic clashes between supporters 300 000from UDP and APRC were reported on 200 000the last day of the campaign, the 100 000with 2001 turnoutatmosphere remained very peaceful and 0political campaigning was conducted actual votes (2006)without any outbreak over the past three stVoter Roll of weeks of the official campaign (31

    August - 20 September 2006).

    Voter information and education: The ruling party focused on the current Votes administration achievements, in particular In the run-up to the advanced the infrastructural development the APRC

    presidential election, civil society country had benefited since President

    Oppositioncontribution to democracy building and Jammeh took office in 1994 through a citizens’ participation in the elections bloodless military coup. The incumbent were not given proper attention by the President repeatedly vowed to take in the electoral authorities. Voters information future development projects to only the was almost exclusively conveyed by areas supporting APRC. The UDP political parties, in particular the ruling agricultural-focused manifesto reaffirmed party, very much inclined to embark on that improving the lot of farmers was its voter information and political national priority while for NADD propaganda. entrenchment of democratic structures in

     The Gambia was overriding. However, with the support of development partners, the National

    Council for Civic Education was awarded

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    2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    The holding of the Dialogue with the of official public billboards (where party 2People Tourposters and manifesto could be , purposely organized by the

    conveniently displayed) excluded de presidential team during the official

    facto opposition party visibility. Political election campaign period impinged on

    intimidation, local authority social control, campaign fairness, facilitating APRC

    police harassment and potential access to public assets and resources

    retaliation against party activists and offering the ruling party candidate

    associated with the opposition as well as with overwhelming media coverage. Not

    opposition party scarce financial only the entire State apparatus was

    resources were additional factors mobilized in support of the incumbent

    preventing the appropriate display of President meetings with Gambians, but

    opposition party political materials, hence the Government and private charity

    organizations linked to the ruling party drastically hampering the opposition

    candidates ability to inform voters. timely poured into the country donations,

     awarding prizes and projects funding.

    Media monitoring:

     The active role of security services,

    The first-ever media monitoring survey including the military, in support of the

    conducted in The Gambia during APRC, the mobilization of public servants

    as well as state-owned enterprises active elections, initiated by the IEC with

    international support, clearly indicated participation to APRC meetings and

    that voters were not given adequate rallies not only infringed the

    Commonwealth-brokered Memorandum opportunity to make a fully informed

    choice. The main, if not only source of of Understanding, signed in the early

    news for all Gambians outside of Greater days of 2006, but clearly offered the

    Banjul, were the Gambia Radio ruling party with an indisputable

    Television Services which showed an advantage which opposition parties could

    overwhelmingly bias in favor of the ruling not compete with. Abuses by the ruling

    party. party of the incumbency definitively

     affected the level of the playing field.

    Opposition manifesto and campaign

    information were accessible to public Although the country was bracing up for

    audience only through the access time the presidential race, few signs indicated

    brokered by the IEC, showing however that political campaigning was carried on.

    an increase in time and much better President Jammeh’s “Operation no

    footage for the ruling party. More compromise” posters and green APRC

    disturbingly, the state-owned radio-TV flags were almost the unique visible ads

    overwhelmingly expressed support to displayed countrywide, and still, in quite

    APRC during the newscast and barely limited numbers. Opposition outreach

    mentioned opposition parties. items, in particular posters, were not

     seen at all, as pointed by many observer

    The right of media to report and express groups, who questioned whether a level

    views on matters of public interest in playing field was observed for all

    candidates or not. particular electoral manifesto- was

    exercised mainly in print media, while

    GRTS showed a strong bias for the The IEC reluctance to effectively regulate

    APRC and the private radio networks campaign practices but also the absence

    simply chose not to meddle with politics

     2 Although section 122 (15) of the 1997

    Constitution requires the President to undertake a tour twice a year, such a tour across the country . was not organized for the past three years.

    Page 7 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    should be in a position to secure the Editorial time allotted to political renewal of most of the seats of its out-parties by seconds 09/06 09/22 going MPs. 2500

    A reunited opposition confronting the 2000

    ruling party and opposing in each 1500 constituency a unique candidate is likely

    to remain an untenable wish. All factors 1000

    converge to make such an objective 500 unachievable. Failed attempt to agree

    over a single national candidate by 0 GRTS TV GRTS Radio WC KWT opposition parties prior to the presidential

    poll is likely to turn into fierce open

    competition among local front-runners, ? APRC ? UDP ? NADD and should give the path to an indisputable victory for the ruling party in Moreover, intimidation occurred on next year general elections. Prevailing several occasions, notably when GRTS local political appetites are likely to recalled and dismissed the reporter 3 exacerbate competition while FPTPcovering opposition party activities, later electoral system should help APRC detained by the National Intelligence secure a simple majority over a divided Agency, resulting in a drastic drop in opposition. UDP and NADD campaign coverage by GRTS for period of ten days. Should the opposition be able within the next couple of months to regain voters Parliamentarian elections support to the level attained in 2001 perspectives: (185,119 votes) while APRC will be maintaining its current trend of votes, the With already 47 out of 48 constituencies parliamentarian elections will feature an swept by the ruling party in the affordable 71% turnout. Extrapolating presidential poll, the opposition is likely to figures from the presidential polls of 2001 face an even greater challenge for the and 2006, APRC would still secure a up-coming general elections. Should the maximum of 40 seats while the current trend prevails in term of voter opposition would gain 8 seats only. apathy and disinclination to back opposition parties while the ruling party Should the opposition be able to will likely maintain its strengths- the nominate a single candidate in few of the opposition will only be represented in 4most contested constituencies, five more Parliament by the Kiang West constituencies could shift to the constituency, which overwhelmingly ndopposition. One or two other voted for the opposition on 22 of 5constituencies should also be within the September 2006. reach of an opposition success, provided that opposition votes slightly increase Although it can be objected that National and unique candidates contest the poll. Assembly elections are constituency-Such an optimistic but still reachable based and therefore more locally focused, objective should offer the opposition up there is little doubt that the ruling part

    should benefit from a divided opposition.

    Local competition as well as commended local opposition candidates may make 3 First Past The Post (simple majority system) APRC UDP the statistics lie in several constituencies, 4 In particular Kiang Central, Basse, Wulli West, hence slightly redrawing the electoral Wulli East and Sandu 5map. But there is little doubt that APRC Jimara and Serrekunda Central

    Page 8 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    to 15 seats out of 48, the ruling party simplistic explanation on how to securing in all accounts a large majority. introduce the token in a party-colored

     drum. Escaping the financial and Voting system: logistical burden of printing and

     dispatching ballot papers, this system The Gambia is conducting election makes it affordable and sustainable. through a unique voting system However its reputation of non-introduced in the early 60s, in particular manipulation in particular ballot stuffing-

    using tokens (color-free marbles) to be is definitively over-rated.

     cast in separate drums for each

    Electoral system: candidate. When the marble is

    introduced in the iron-made party color drum, it hits a bell whose sound clearly Within the current trend marked by voter indicates to the audience in the polling apathy, stagnation of ruling party support station that a vote was cast. This simple and defection away from opposition and affordable system with which candidates, the FPTP electoral system Gambians are well acquainted with is offers political leverage and undisputable reputedly impossible to rig. advantage to the ruling party. In this

     regard, the disproportionate The system requires however representation of the ruling party within appropriate settings to ensure the parliament will be hardly challengeable. secrecy of the vote. The drums must be The limited number of constituency-installed within well-fitted polling booths, based representation seats (48) is likely the more candidates compete, the larger to further exaggerate the mainstream the booths must be. Should the bell not vote outcome. ring, polling staff is required to check whether the marble was mishandled by There is indeed a deep correlation the voter (laying down the ground or between FPTP and seat allocation simply put on the table). Therefore, the distortion which may affect national system doesn’t allow any voter to representation: a large part of the express a blank vote in secrecy. The electorate found itself without absence of ringing clearly indicates to the representatives despite having audience that a vote wasn’t cast in one of expressed a preference for a particular the drums. Slight but clearly noticed tone party. ringing differences between drums may produce unacceptable breaches in vote The single-member constituency FPTP secrecy and lead to potential intimidation system although offering better and vote directing. accountability, strong geographic

     representation, simple understanding by More worrying is that the cumbersome voters (the winner being the candidate but very much required counting of such receiving most votes, but not necessarily large number of tokens is unlikely to be with absolute majority), allowing voters to performed by polling staff prior to the poll choose between candidates and not only while, in the absence of ad hoc voter between political parties, has the tracking by polling staff, token issuance unfortunate disadvantage of distorting can’t be checked in the course of E-day. results nationwide. One of its main

     outcomes is indeed a “waste” of minority

    Nevertheless, token-ballot system votes while majority-backing votes get remains a very convenient voting system extra-weight and over-representation. in countries with large illiterate voting population and limited financial resources. Proportional Representation (PR) Voter education can be easily limited to systems attempt to reduce such a

    Page 9 of 11

2006 Gambian Presidential Election An overview

    disparity between party’s share of the Such detrimental national representation national votes and the share of seats. is further exacerbated by discriminatory Within a PR scenario, the ruling party will constituency delineations. Although the still secure a two-third majority (32 seats national threshold for the 48 according to the 2006 presidential figures) constituency-based seats is established 7while the opposition will obtain 16 seats at 13,965 registered voters, the ratio

    instead of 1 under the current FPTP rises up to 4.15 in Kombo North, enlisting system. Such projections show how 57.960 voters, and definitively the most asymmetrical and disproportionate the populous constituency in The Gambia. It FPTP constituency-based system is. drops to only 0.12 in Janjanbureh, the

     least populated constituency with 1,651 6Mixed systemsvoters. This means that 35.11 votes from may offer alternative

    Kombo North are needed to equal one solutions to mitigate the disadvantages of

    vote in Janjanbureh. Under the FPTP both PR and plurality-majority systems.

    system, both constituencies despite their Although much more complicated to

    huge voter population discrepancy elect understand by voters they are usually

    one representative. easer to agree upon as political

     compromise when changes in the

    As of today, 29 out of 48 constituencies electoral systems are negotiated.

    in The Gambia benefit from an over-

    representation while 16 are under-In the context of The Gambia, the only

    represented and 3 are almost meeting way for the opposition to overcome such

    the national threshold (Bakau, Tumana structural impediment to effective and

    and Upper Niumi). equitable representation is to unite and

     build up an alternative front to the

    Kanifing Municipal Council is parliamentarian majority. As long as the

    handicapped in four out of five of its opposition will contest the polls divided,

    constituencies by under-representation, the ruling party will maintain a clear

    meaning voter population out-numbering advantage, whatever popular backing it

    the national threshold from 161% to may effectively receive.

    234%. In contrast Western Division

    cumulates both over and under-Unfortunately the biased outcome of a

    representation. Kombo North and single-seat plurality-majority system can’t

    Komboi Central suffer from an excess of be easily overcome and will require long-

    voting population, respectively 415% and term efforts and persistent strategy from

    246% of the national threshold, while the opposition to change the outcome of

    voters in Foni Bondali and Foni Jarrol future elections. In the context of

    account for only 27% of the national Gambian mono-chamber system where

    threshold. Similar discrepancies occur in no Upper House can mitigate Lower

    Lower Division and Central River Division, House single-color representation, the

    with a predominance of lower figures, FPTP is likely to exaggerate election

    hence over-representation, in South results, distort partisanship and keep on

    Bank. preventing broad-based representation in


    Within the legal framework of an

    immutable 48 constituency-based

    representation (hence maintaining a

    Constituency Demarcation: 7 Calculated as follows: total registered population divided by the number of seats in parliament. It

    means that on average 13,365 votes should be 6needed to fill in one seat. Parallel Vote or Mixed Member Proportional.

    Page 10 of 11

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