NCW Report to Congress

By Alice Scott,2014-03-26 17:43
10 views 0
Consequently, a conceptual framework employing these domains can be used to EMC, and Boeing), its translation into the Japanese and Korean languages,

    Report on Network Centric Warfare

    Sense of the Report

    Submitted to the Congress in partial fulfillment of Section 934 of the

    Defense Authorization Act for FY01 (Public Law 106-398)

    March 2001

    Arthur L. Money

    Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)

    Report on Network Centric Warfare

    Sense of the Report

    This “Sense of the Report” is submitted in partial fulfillment of Section 934 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY01 (Public Law 106-

    398). This section calls for the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with

    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a report on the

    development and implementation of network-centric warfare concepts

    within the Department of Defense. The Act stipulated that the following

    areas be addressed:

    (A) A clear definition and terminology to describe the set of

    operational concepts referred to as “network-centric warfare.”

    (B) An identification and description of the current and planned

    activities by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Joint

    Chiefs of Staff, and the United States Joint Forces Command

    relating to network-centric warfare.

    (C) A discussion of how the concept of network-centric warfare is

    related to the strategy of transformation as outlined in the

    document entitled “Joint Vision 2020,” along with the

    advantages and disadvantages of pursuing that concept.

    (D) A discussion of how the Department is implementing the

    concepts of network-centric warfare as it relates to information


    superiority and decision superiority articulated in Joint Vision

    2020. (E) An identification and description of the current and planned

    activities of each of the Armed Forces relating to network-

    centric warfare.

    (F) A discussion of how the Department plans to attain a fully

    integrated joint command, control, communications,

    computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

    (C4ISR) capability.

    (G) A discussion of the joint requirements under development that

    will lead to the acquisition of technologies for enabling network

    -centric warfare and whether those joint requirements are

    modifying existing service requirements and vision statements. (H) A discussion of how Department of Defense activities to

    establish a joint network-centric capability are coordinated

    with other departments and agencies of the United States and

    with United States allies.

    (I) A discussion of the coordination of the science and technology

    investments of the military departments and Defense Agencies

    in the development of future joint network-centric warfare


    (J) The methodology being used to measure progress towards

    stated goals.


    These areas will be addressed comprehensively in two documents.

    The first document is this “Sense of the Report,which provides an initial perspective on where network-centric warfare is today and where it is

    going in the Department of Defense. A subsequent document, to be

    provided no later than 1 July, will cover all areas in detail. A coordinated

    outline of this subsequent document is provided at Appendix A. The

    Department is currently in the process of collecting and integrating

    information for this second document.

    Sense of the Report

    st Century The Department is fully committed to creating a 21

    military by taking advantage of Information Age concepts and

    technologies, particularly new “business models” and information technologies. Information technology provided the building blocks for

    the Internet, radically restructured the economics of information, and

    enabled new ways of doing business that have created a “new economy.

    These same dynamics can help the Department transform its primarily

    platform-centric force to a network-centric force a force with the capability to create and leverage an information advantage and

    dramatically increase combat power a force that will enhance the Departments capability to preserve global peace and dominate across

    the spectrum of military operations if required to restore tranquility.

    NCW as a Product of the Information Age


    Warfare takes on the characteristics of its Age. Network Centric

    Warfare (NCW) continues this trend -- it is the military response to the

    opportunities created by the Information Age. The term network-centric

    warfare provides a useful shorthand for describing a broad class of

    approaches to military operations that are enabled by the networking of

    the force. “Networking the Force” entails much more than providing

    connectivity among force components. It involves the development of

    distributed collaboration processes designed to ensure that all pertinent

    available information is shared and that all appropriate assets can be

    brought to bear to by commanders to employ dominant maneuver,

    precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

     Consequently, the terms network-centric operations and network-

    centric warfare are used to describe various types of military operations

    in the same way that the terms e-business and e-commerce are used

    to describe a broad class of business activities that are enabled by the

    Internet. Scott McNealy, Chairman and CEO of Sun Microsystems,

    1recently stated: “the “e” in e-business is redundant. His basic point is

    that e-business has to be about creating value and making a profit or it

    is not going to be relevant. In a similar sense network-centric warfare is

    very much about warfare about warfare in the Information Age. The competitors who were first able to correctly identify the opportunity

    space provided by the Internet and e-business have been able to reap

    disproportionate rewards. The Department of Defense seeks similar


disproportionate advantages in future conflicts as we develop and

    implement a strategy for transformation with network-centric warfare as

    a principal component. NCW Defined

     To first order, network-centric operations are military operations

    that are enabled by the networking of the force. When these military

    operations take place in the context of warfare, the term network-centric

    warfare is applicable. Warfare takes place simultaneously in and among

    the physical, the information, and the cognitive domains.

    Physical Domain: The physical domain is the traditional domain of warfare. It is domain where strike, protect, and maneuver take place

    2across the environments of ground, sea, air, and space. It is the domain

    where physical platforms and the communications networks that

    connect them reside. Comparatively, the elements of this domain are the

    easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power has traditionally

    been measured primarily in this domain. Two important metrics for

    measuring combat power in this domain, lethality and survivability, have

    been and continue to be benchmarks for measuring the effectiveness of

    combat operations.

    Information Domain: The information domain is the domain

    where information lives. It is the domain where information is created,

    manipulated, and shared. It is the domain that facilitates the

    communication of information among warfighters. It is the domain


where the command and control of modern military forces is

    communicated, where commander‟s intent is conveyed. Consequently, it

    is increasingly the information domain that must be protected and

    defended to enable a force to generate combat power in the face of

    offensive actions taken by an adversary. And, in the all-important battle

    for information superiority, the information domain is ground zero.

    Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domain is the domain of the mind of the warfighter and the supporting populous. This is the domain

    where many battles and wars are won and lost. This is the domain of

    intangibles: leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training and

    experience, situational awareness, and public opinion. This is the

    domain where commander‟s intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures reside. Much has been written about this domain, and key

    attributes of this domain have remained relatively constant since Sun

    Tzu wrote The Art of War. The attributes of this domain are extremely difficult to measure, and each sub-domain (each individual mind) is


    A warfighting force that can conduct network-centric operations

    can be defined as having the following attributes and capabilities:

    Physical Domain:

    All elements of the force are robustly networked achieving

    secure and seamless connectivity.

     Information Domain:


    The force has the capability to share, access, and protect

    information to a degree that it can establish and maintain an

    information advantage over an adversary.

    The force has the capability to collaborate in the information

    domain, which enables a force to improve its information

    position through processes of correlation, fusion, and


    Cognitive Domain:

    The force has the capability to develop high quality

    awareness and share this situational awareness.

    The force has the capability to develop a shared knowledge of

    commanders intent.

    The force has the capability to self-synchronize its operations.

    The central hypothesis of network-centric warfare is that a force

    with these capabilities can increase combat power, by:

    ? better synchronizing effects in the battlespace

    ? achieving greater speed of command

    ? increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness

    Network-centric operations to date have tended to focus on the

    tactical and operational levels of warfare, but they impact all levels of

    military activity from the tactical to the strategic. At the operational level,

    network-centric operations provide commanders with the capability to

    generate precise warfighting effects at an unprecedented operational

    tempo, creating conditions for the rapid lockout of adversary courses of



NCW as an Emerging Perspective

    The term network-centric warfare is, as yet, not universally

    accepted in the Defense community nor are network-centric warfare

    concepts well understood. The term network-centric warfare was first

    introduced to a wide audience in 1998 in the article “Network Centric

    3 Warfare: It‟s Origins and Future,” in Proceedings of the Naval Institute.

    This article described a new way of thinking about military operations in

    the Information Age and highlighted the relationship between

    information advantage and competitive advantage. Given the short

    period of time that has transpired since then there has been an

    enormous amount of progress in getting the fundamental tenets of

    network-centric operations understood.

    There is an emerging understanding within the DoD and the

    international defense community of the power of network-centric

    operations. This understanding is the cumulative effect of tens of

    articles, hundreds of briefings, the distribution of tens of thousands of

    copies of the book Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging

    4Information Superiority. Additional factors that have contributed to this understanding include the reprinting of the book by leading information

    technology and defense companies (Sun Microsystems, EMC, and

    Boeing), its translation into the Japanese and Korean languages, and the

    worldwide downloading of the book in PDF format via the Internet. There

    is a growing appreciation of the fact that it is far more important to get


the basic ideas of network-centric operations across than it is to force

    people to adopt a particular label or term. Human nature and the sheer

    size and diversity of DoD and its supporting community make it

    inevitable that different enclaves have and will continue to coin their own

    terms to express the fundamental ideas that lie at the heart of network-

    centric warfare.

     Therefore, the second document in this report will go beyond the labels to the ideas behind them to pull together those DoD activities and

    initiatives that reflect the central hypothesis of network-centric warfare

    whether or not the term network-centric warfare is or is not used.

    The Network as a Source of Value Creation

    All network-centric concepts share the same simple, yet powerful idea the idea that information sharing is a source of potential value. In the commercial sector, this value can be measured in terms of four

    principal competitive attributes: functionality, reliability, convenience,

    5 In combat operations, this value can be measured in terms of and cost.

    key attributes of combat power, such as survivability, lethality, speed,

    timeliness, and responsiveness.

    Over the past few years of Internet build-out, an important insight that has emerged from the commercial sector is that the particular

    combination of factors that contributed to the success of e-business

    concepts were not a priori intuitive. It is now clear in retrospect that

    billions of dollars were invested in e-business concepts that were


Report this document

For any questions or suggestions please email